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## **MONITORING AND EVALUATION SUPPORT ACTIVITY II (MEASURE II)**

### **MIDTERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE USAID'S ASSISTANCE TO CITIZENS IN FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM PROGRAM ACTIVITIES**

September 1, 2022

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### ***Final Report***

*September 1, 2022*

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## ABSTRACT

This midterm performance evaluation of the United States Agency for International Development's Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption Activity (ACFC) and Investigative Journalism Program (IJP) examines the outcomes the activities achieved during the first two and a half years of implementation. Both activities started in September 2019 and will end in September 2024. The evaluation concluded that the two activities increased citizens' awareness about and confidence in anticorruption activities of civil society in directly targeted municipalities, and awareness about media anticorruption reporting at a national level. More success stories and a centralized effort to promote results and messaging should follow, and all supported media requires an improved approach to audience engagements. Despite stagnation at the national level, citizens' engagement in anticorruption increased significantly in affected municipalities, especially through locally based informal groups and CSO initiatives, as well as through well-tailored initiatives for monitoring abuse of public resources in pre-election campaigns and public procurement during the pandemic. The lack of coordination between direct beneficiaries, and with external stakeholders, partially caused by the pandemic, made anticorruption efforts fragmented and less sustainable. The pandemic and political stalemates negatively affected the high-level advocacy initiatives with modest results only in the areas of conflict of interest and public procurement, while the ACFC grantees had some results in their advocacy initiatives. The two activities were effective in getting institutions to process corruption reports and in stopping illegal activities in some of the institutions. Investigative journalism reports resulted in several high-profile corruption cases. Even though judicial effectiveness is improving, citizens' distrust in judicial and other institutions still hampers gains in reporting corruption.

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## ACRONYMS

ACCOUNT	USAID's Anti-Corruption Civic Organizations' Unified Network Activity
ACFC	USAID's Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption Activity
AIR	The American Institutes for Research
APR	Abuse of Public Resources
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BiH PA	BiH Parliamentary Assembly
BIRN	Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
CCI	Centers for Civic Initiatives
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CMI	Chr. Michelsen Institute
CLA	Collaboration, Learning, and Adapting
CoI	Conflict of Interest
COP	Chief of Party
CRMA	Center for Media Development and Analysis
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DO	Development Objective
EA	Employers' Association
EQs	Evaluation Questions
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FCR	Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FMET	Federal Ministry of Environment and Tourism
FO	Field Office
HJPC	High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council
HO	Home Office
HoP	House of Peoples
IJP	USAID's Investigative Journalism Program Activity
IMPAQ	IMPAQ International, LLC
IP	Implementing Partner
IR	Intermediate Result
JEI-BiH	Judicial Effectiveness Index
KIs	Key informants
KIIs	Key informant interviews
LoA	Life of Activity

LoE	Level of Effort
MEASURE II	Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
NSCP	National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PI	Performance Indicators
PP	Public Procurement
PR	Public Relations
RS	Republika Srpska
SoW	Statement of Work
TI	Transparency International
USAID/BiH	United States Agency for International Development BiH Mission
WP	Whistleblower Protection

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The United States Agency for International Development Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) commissioned the USAID/BiH's Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II) to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of two five-year USAID/BiH Activities: USAID's Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption (ACFC) – \$7 million activity - and the Investigative Journalism Program (IJP) – \$2.5 million activity.

This midterm performance evaluation will focus on investigating the Activities' performance and outcomes achieved during the first two years of implementation and provide USAID/BiH with actionable data to inform decision-making for the remainder of the Activities' implementation.

## METHODS

This evaluation took place between March and June 2022 and used a mixed-methods design consisting of a desk review of program documents, 41 remote key informant interviews (KIs), five remote focus group discussions (FGDs), three online surveys of direct beneficiaries (media, CSOs, informal groups), one Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) survey in four municipalities, and media content analysis. Through KIs and FGDs, evaluation team reached 95 individuals from USAID and implementing partners (IPs), direct beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, relevant institutions, and international organizations. Representatives of 16 CSOs, 17 informal groups, and 12 media outlets responded to online surveys, with response rates exceeding 50 percent in all cases. CATI survey was administered to a stratified random sample of 1,600 individuals in four municipalities (400 individuals in each location) randomly sampled from locations directly targeted by the ACFC-funded CSOs and informal groups. Content analysis included 81 pieces of content randomly sampled from two categories – IJP Žurnal content and IJP grantees content. The team triangulated data to develop credible findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

## FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The following provides a high-level overview of the findings and conclusions.

### EVALUATION QUESTION 1: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE ACFC AND IJP RAISED PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN ACTIVISM AND AWARENESS ABOUT CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA EFFORTS TO FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION?

- **Awareness about and confidence in anti-corruption activities.** Surveys conducted in municipalities/cities where the ACFC-supported initiatives took place show higher levels of awareness about the ACFC anti-corruption activities, especially about informal groups' initiatives. Similarly, according to CATI surveys and KIs, citizens of targeted municipalities have higher confidence in anti-corruption activism. Awareness about and confidence in anti-corruption activities at the national level remain low according the 2021 National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions, but such improvements require more time and a strategic approach.
- **Media's role.** Citizens perceive improvements in frequency of media reporting on corruption. But confidence in media in BiH generally remains low. While the media grantees are perceived more trustworthy than media in general, they are not sufficiently influential to gain popular interest or acceptance common with mainstream media.

- **Promotion.** ACFC and IJP helped their grantees improve their visibility and promote their initiatives. But their promotional efforts have been fragmented and lacked country-wide focus so they insufficiently drew attention to positive outcomes and success stories.

## **EVALUATION QUESTION 2: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE ACFC AND IJP IMPROVED CITIZEN, MEDIA, AND OTHER ACTORS' ENGAGEMENT IN ANTICORRUPTION ACTIVITIES?**

- **Citizen engagement.** Informal initiatives contributed significantly to increased citizens' engagement in the fight against corruption, although these efforts were fragmented. Special interest oriented CSOs among grantees have modestly contributed to citizens' direct engagement, mostly through one-off actions. The IPs succeeded in more sustained and consequential engagement of citizens. The short-term nature of initiatives hampered their local influence.
- **Media engagement.** The IJP increased reporting about corruption, especially in microregions where citizens have limited access to unbiased information about corruption. The IJP grantees could benefit from additional capacity building in investigative reporting and reaching audiences. The ACFC Pratimotendere.ba tool served the media grantees well, but further improvements should be considered.
- **Other stakeholders' engagement.** The ACFC made some effort to engage other stakeholder groups, such as the private sector and government institutions, in the fight against corruption. The effects of their inclusion are limited.
- **Effects of the pandemic.** ACFC and IJP successfully adapted to new circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Several media grantees used the momentum to report about misuses in public procurement of medical equipment, resulting in prosecution of highly ranked public officials.
- **Coordination and collaboration.** The ACFC and IJP invested effort into exchange of information and cooperation, though this was not facilitated strategically within and between supported groups. Coordination and cooperation in the field of anti-corruption is insufficient.

## **EVALUATION QUESTION 3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE ACFC AND IJP'S MONITORING, ADVOCACY, AND INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM EFFORTS RESULTED IN IMPROVEMENTS OF ANTICORRUPTION POLICIES, REPORTING, AND JUSTICE RESPONSE?**

- **Policy improvements.** The ACFC contributed to policy improvements on conflict of interest in BD BiH, with some breakthroughs in state-level public procurement legislation. Political blockages and COVID-19 restrictions slowed the progress in other areas though. Some of the grantees' advocacy initiatives were at least partially successful so far (e.g., state-level prosecutors' transparency, electricity regulation in FBiH, public spending in BD BiH and in FBiH).
- **Reporting.** With ACFC and IJP contributions, citizen's reporting of irregularities and corruption to CSOs and institutions increased through monitoring activities and supported initiatives or media, although the tendency to report corruption is still low in the general population.
- **Justice/institutional response.** The ACFC and IJP contributed to more effective operations by some of the key institutions, but the institutional response to filed corruption cases overall remains partial and unsatisfactory in the executive branch, especially in those institutions where irregularities are taking place. The ACFC's legal assistance to whistle-blowers was satisfactory and well-received despite known whistleblowers' stories remaining few and

discouraging. IJP's support to media grantees in defamation lawsuits was rarely required by the grantees and was mostly absorbed by the IP.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

With regards to the low country-level effects in **AWARENESS ABOUT ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES AND CONFIDENCE IN ACTIVISM**, the ACFC and USAID are recommended to:

1. Develop a joint Communications and Visibility Plan for the ACFC, IJP, and potentially JACA, which would prioritize measures needed for increased awareness and confidence in activism on a country level. Improve clarity and application of visibility standards.
2. Promote more success stories; track, aggregate, and promote results better. Support ACFC and IJP grantees to track and promote their societal or institutional results and include those results in the future IJP progress reports.
3. Make investigative reports more relevant for citizens by helping IJP media in connecting abstract corruption topics in investigative articles with people's daily lives, experimenting with content cocreation with citizens and ACFC informal groups, and connecting to younger audiences through new platforms.
4. Employ better performance monitoring on online engagement beyond simple audience engagement statistics, focusing on audience trust, depth of engagement, and visitor journey flow to improve editorial decision-making and penetration of corruption-related investigative reports.
5. Intensify central campaigning to ensure realization of key ACFC results at national level and complement individual initiatives' campaigns, while coordinating and possibly pooling resources with potential external partners planning such campaigns.
6. Demonstrate more transparency and integrity by encouraging all IPs and grantees to start webpages and regularly publish financial and narrative reports and improve ethical vetting of potential grantees.

Regarding the Activities' effects in **ENGAGING CITIZENS, CSOS, MEDIA, AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS** in the fight against corruption, the evaluation team recommends that IPs and USAID:

7. Organize events and meetings to improve the exchange of information, coordination, and collaboration within Activities between different grantees and informal groups, between the two Activities, as well as with external stakeholders. Strengthen exchange of information and cooperation with USAID Activities E-Governance, JACA, upcoming local governance, and media activities.
8. Support grantees, especially traditional CSOs, in connecting with constituencies, possibly through peer learning from more successful grantees.

To strengthen effects in **POLICY ADVOCACY, REPORTING, AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE**, evaluation team recommends to:

9. Encourage partnerships in sectoral policy advocacy between grantees and informal groups with similar objectives and encourage them to reach out to potential collaborators more. For example,

scan existing sectoral networks and connect supported initiatives with those that are operational and well-coordinated.

I0. Intensify corruption reporting by encouraging informal groups to better investigate connections between involved public officials or employees' private gains and the issues those groups are fighting against, and file corruption reports to relevant institutions on their behalf.

I1. Intensify pressure on low-functioning institutions and the judiciary through IJP investigative reports and ACFC IPs' or grantees' reports on their performance in anticorruption, as well as central campaigning activities, especially in relation to whistleblower protection, but also other areas of judicial processing of corruption.

I2. Devise new tactics to promote whistleblowing in absence of success stories and continue providing legal aid to activists, including by strengthening the legal team of ACFC/CCI.

I3. Implement tactics to deter lawsuits against media by publishing data on defamation lawsuits initiated against the media grantees' journalists; by initiating civil cases for compensation of material and non-material damages in courts in cases when a journalist or a media house has successfully defended a defamation case against them; or by media filing counter-complaints at the initiation of defamation cases against journalists.

I4. Work with courts on the civil/administrative/enforcement side, especially on defamation, freedom of expression, and whistleblower protection, through online materials and trainings, in partnership with USAID JACA and international partners who hold expertise in those areas.

## INTRODUCTION

In January 2022, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) issued a Statement of Work (SoW) to its Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II) for a joint midterm performance evaluation of two Activities - the USAID Assistance to Citizens in the Fight Against Corruption (ACFC) and the Investigative Journalism Program (IJP), both launched in September 2020 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and scheduled to end in September 2024. This midterm performance evaluation explores the Activities' performance and outcomes achieved during the first two and half years of implementation and provides actionable recommendations to inform decision-making for the remainder of the Activities' implementation.

## BACKGROUND

This section of the evaluation report describes the basic information about the Activities under evaluation, their theories of change, expected results, and performance indicators. ACFC and IJP were originally designed under the 2012-2020 USAID/BiH's Country Development and Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) to contribute to the Intermediate Result (IR) 1.2, "increased citizen participation in governance". Under the 2020-2025 CDCS, both Activities contribute to USAID/BiH's Development Objective (DO) 1: "Accountability of government to citizens strengthened.", the IR 1.1 "Impact on inclusive citizen engagement improved" and the IR 1.2 "Governance effectiveness in targeted areas strengthened".

### THE ACFC PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND THEORY OF CHANGE

ACFC is a five-year, \$7 million Activity implemented by the Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI), in partnership with the Center for Media Development and Analysis (CRMA) and Transparency International BiH (TI BiH). The ACFC theory of change proposes that, "if civil society influences government policy development decision-making, effectively engages citizens, and coordinates their efforts with other stakeholders, then the participation of citizens in the fight against corruption will increase."

### Exhibit I. Basic Information on the ACFC Activity

Activity Name	USAID's Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption
USAID Office	USAID/BiH Democracy Office
Implementer	Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI)
Cooperative Agreement #	72016819CA00001
Total Estimated Cost	\$7,000,000
Life of Activity	September 16, 2019 to September 15, 2024 (5 years)
Active Geographic Region	Across Bosnia and Herzegovina
Target Groups	Local civil society organizations (CSOs) in BiH, business sector, media, government institutions, whistleblowers, and citizens.
CDCS 2020-2025 Intermediate Result	IR 1.1: Impact on inclusive citizen engagement improved IR 1.2: Governance effectiveness in targeted areas strengthened
Required evaluation	No
External or internal evaluation	External

The **Activity Goal** is the "increased citizens' participation in the fight against corruption", and the **Activity Purpose** is to build a "civil society which is representative and credible in the fight against

corruption”. The ACFC Activity by design includes three main sub-purposes pertaining to (1) policies, (2) citizen engagement, and (3) coordination. **Sub-purpose 1**, “CSOs effectively influence government anti-corruption policy development decision-making,” includes two tiers: (1.1) civil society and citizens’ monitoring in key areas of anticorruption policies; and (1.2) policy changes with significant civil society input. Two flagship monitoring initiatives of the ACFC include PP monitoring, results of which are publicly available through the platform PratiMotendere.ba, and the monitoring of pre-election campaigns to detect misuse of public resources (MPR) in campaigning. The recommended legislative changes are those listed in the EU’s 14 priorities for progress in accession negotiations (WP, PP, Col, and transparency of campaigning, or more specifically, the MPR). **Sub-purpose 2**, “CSOs effectively engage citizens in the fight against corruption,” includes (2.1) empowering citizens to affect change; (2.2) providing free legal aid to citizens who report corruption; and (2.3) increasing reporting and protection of whistleblowers. Under this component, the ACFC supports CSOs in advocacy for policy change in sectoral policies which are severely affected by corruption, such as healthcare, education, and budget transfers, and provides in-kind support to informal groups of citizens fighting specific problems of corruption in their daily lives. TI’s legal aid center also provides support to whistleblowers, and the Activity encourages more people to report corruption. **Sub-purpose 3**, “CSOs coordinate their anti-corruption efforts with other interested stakeholders”, includes expected improvements in (3.1) cooperation between anticorruption stakeholders; (3.2) satisfaction of local CSOs with the ACFC administration and coordination; (3.3) capacities and financial viability of local CSOs; (3.4) promotion of anticorruption among top priorities. Under this last component, the emphasis is on capacity building of local CSOs and coordination in the anti-corruption field.

## THE IJP PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND THEORY OF CHANGE

CRMA, a subcontract on ACFC, is also the prime implementor for IJP, a five-year, \$2.5 million Activity.

### Exhibit 2. Basic Information on the Investigative Journalism Program

Activity Name	Investigative Journalism Program (IJP)
USAID Office	USAID/BiH Democracy Office
Implementer	Center for Media Development and Analysis (CRMA)
Grant No.	72016819GR00002
Total Estimated Cost	\$2,500,000
Life of Activity	September 30, 2019 to September 29, 2024.
Active Geographic Region	Across Bosnia and Herzegovina
Target Groups	Media outlets (editors-in-chief, owners, journalists); independent journalists, bloggers, and the general public.
CDCS 2020-2025 Intermediate Result	IR 1.1: Impact of inclusive citizen engagement improved IR 1.2: Governance effectiveness in targeted areas strengthened
Required evaluation	No
External or internal evaluation	External

As defined in the Activity award, the IJP’s main **Goal and Purpose** is that “citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have access to unbiased information.” The Activity works towards achieving four outcomes. **Outcome 1** is to increase the quantity and quality of investigative media reporting on corruption, through increased quantity of high-quality professional investigative reporting on corruption. The Activity supports media outlets and journalists who investigate and publish on



corruption, while the CRMA Zurnal.info web portal also produces and publishes high quality, fact-based investigative reports, including videos. Additionally, the Journalism Award that was implemented under the USAID's Anti-Corruption Civic Organizations' Unified Network Activity (ACCOUNT, from July 2015 to July 2019) continued under IJP. **Outcome 2** is to provide support to media outlets and journalists/bloggers dedicated to investigative reporting, primarily through networking and cooperation with media outlets and journalists who are combating corruption. **Outcome 3** is to increase public awareness on corruption, an outcome which is the link between IJP and other USAID activities. The Activity provides support to citizens' initiatives through investigative reports and strengthens cooperation with other CSOs and USAID's Activities. The main focus of this component is working with media to help them present citizens' concerns and act as a voice of citizens' needs and interests while also highlighting and strengthen CSOs' anti-corruption initiatives and actions across the country. **Outcome 4** is to provide legal support to media outlets and journalist partners targeted by defamation lawsuits. The IJP pays for a lawyer/legal firm to provide counsel and legal representation to journalists and covers all costs and fees of civil procedures.

## EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

**EVALUATION PURPOSE:** The mid-term performance evaluation of the ACFC and IJP Activities will investigate the results achieved during the first two years of implementation. The evaluation will provide the Mission with actionable data and valuable insights to inform decision-making for the remainder of the Activities' implementation to maximize the likelihood of achieving the intended results. The Mission and the implementing partners will use the evaluation results to take mid-term corrective actions to the Activity designs and implementation practices. Knowledge generated by the evaluation will support USAID/BiH's evidence-based decision-making practices.

**EVALUATION QUESTIONS (EQs):** The evaluation aims to address the following evaluation questions:

1. To what extent have ACFC and IJP raised public confidence in activism and awareness about civil society and media efforts to fight against corruption?
2. To what extent have ACFC and IJP improved citizen, media, and other actors' engagement in anti-corruption activities?
3. To what extent have ACFC and IJP's monitoring, advocacy, and investigative journalism efforts resulted in improvements of anti-corruption policies, reporting, and justice response?

As the USAID/BiH's 2020-2025 CDCS considers the fight against corruption a high priority for BiH, this evaluation addressed several of the Mission's key learning questions and priorities defined in the Performance Management Plan (PMP). The report presents this analysis in the Annex 10.

## EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

### METHODS

To examine the effectiveness of the Activities' interventions and their results, the evaluation team employed a mixed-methods data collection approach that included data triangulation. This evaluation examined more than two years of ACFC and IJP implementation for which reporting data were available: from the end of September 2019 through April 2022. The fieldwork took place from early March until the end of May 2022. Evaluation data were obtained systematically and efficiently from the following sources:

**ACTIVITY DOCUMENTS**, including Activity Awards; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plans; work plans; annual and quarterly progress reports; lists of beneficiaries, experts, and other stakeholders involved in implementation; and data and documents collected and produced by the Activities and their beneficiaries, such as policy proposals, monitoring databases and reports, investigative reports, and social media analytics.

**SECONDARY DOCUMENTATION** relevant to the anti-corruption field, including data from the MEASURE-BiH/MEASURE II National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions (NSCP);<sup>1</sup> Judicial Effectiveness Index (JEI); evaluation reports of former USAID's Activities (e.g., USAID/BiH's Anti-Corruption Civic Organizations' Unified Network – ACCOUNT, Justice Activity, Strengthening Independent Media Activity); and research reports and other documents developed by government institutions, international organizations, CSOs, and media. Annex 3 presents the full list of all documents reviewed.

**KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (KIIS)** with USAID/BiH and ACFC and IJP implementing partners (IPs) and subcontractors; other USAID/BiH Activities; ACFC and IJP grantees and beneficiaries; relevant international and donor organizations; governmental anti-corruption agencies; media representatives; CSO representatives; and academic community. A total of **41** individual and group interviews were conducted.

**FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (FGDS)** with ACFC and IJP grantees and informal initiatives. A total of **five** FGDS were conducted – **one** with **11** representatives of the IJP media grantees, **two** focus groups with a total of **19** representatives of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) which were the ACFC grantees, and **two** more focus groups with representatives of **16** informal initiatives supported through the ACFC.

**Exhibit 3. Individuals reached through online interviews and focus groups**

USAID	Implementing Partners	Beneficiaries (Grantees and informal groups)	Non-Beneficiaries	Institutions	International Organizations	All
2	16	54	12	6	5	95

<sup>1</sup> NSCP is collected annually, face-to-face, on a stratified random sample of 3,000 civilian, non-institutionalized adults. Findings are published at <https://www.measurebih.com/national-survey-of-citizens-perceptions>, with up to nine months of delay from data collection. Data from the survey administered in November 2021 are used in this evaluation report, although the publication of findings is still in preparation.

**ONLINE SURVEYS** (3) of ACFC and IJP beneficiaries also supported the analysis. One survey was designed for 36 ACFC-supported informal groups, and 17 informal groups responded (52 percent response rate). The second survey targeted 27 ACFC grantees (CSOs) and 16 responded to the survey (60 percent). Out of the 15 IJP grantees (media CSOs), 12 responded to the survey (80 percent).

**COMPUTER-ASSISTED TELEPHONE SURVEY (CATI)** took place in April 2022 in four locations (Sarajevo, Bijeljina, Kreševo, Brčko) randomly assigned from the list of cities/municipalities directly targeted by the ACFC grantees and informal groups. Respondents (1,600, 400 in each municipality/city) in those locations were randomly selected from the databases of fixed and mobile phone numbers for each telecom operator in each municipality. Sample management and the questionnaire flow were controlled by CATI software.<sup>2</sup>

**CONTENT ANALYSIS** was used to analyze 45 out of 223 pieces of content (20 percent) produced within the IJP media grantees and 38 out of 760 (5 percent) pieces from Žurnal. Within the two groups, the content was randomly sampled, and analyzed by the evaluation team's media expert using pre-defined variables listed in Annex 9. The analysis aimed to identify whether the supported content covers areas and scales of corruption that affect citizens more directly, whether the voice of citizens and activist groups is represented in the content, and whether the content gives hope that corruption can be stopped.

In mid-May 2022, the evaluation team analyzed the data, triangulating various data sources to generate robust findings and conclusions about the evaluation questions. The evaluation team presented preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations to USAID/BiH during a presentation held on May 19, 2022, at the US embassy premises in Sarajevo.

## **LIMITATIONS**

**Survey response rates** were below 40 percent for the ACFC-supported non-formal citizens' initiatives upon survey dissemination for the first three weeks. The evaluation team reminded the grantees about completing the survey via e-mail and telephone in an effort to increase responses. The lower response rate of grantees is partially explained by the fact that several grantees' experienced technical difficulty completing the survey on the SurveyMonkey platform. The evaluation team assisted those grantees who experienced technical difficulties, increasing the response rate to above 50 percent. However, the report does not include the opinions of a significant part of the informal groups, including some which explicitly refused to respond.

**Limited access to some groups of beneficiaries:** While surveys captured the experiences of directly supported CSOs and informal initiatives, the evaluation team was not able to gather experiences of their constituencies. Although CCI planned to establish contact lists of individuals participating in anticorruption activities, they could not do so due to difficulties protecting personal data in such lists. Further, the data on persons who reported corruption to the TI's Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (ALAC) is confidential, and the evaluation team interviewed only three whistleblowers as organized by TI. The evaluation team did not gather opinions of volunteers and observers in monitoring initiatives – their opinions are mediated by CRMA and TI. Lastly, the opinions of audiences of the IJP media were not surveyed. To offset the limited access to some of

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<sup>2</sup> A portion of surveys conducted in Kresevo were conducted on site, as the data collection company was unable to reach the quota over the phone.

the groups of beneficiaries, the evaluation team designed the CATI survey which targeted a random sample of adult population in the ACFC-affected municipalities, while asking questions relevant to the IJP results as well.

**Limited access to views of non-beneficiaries:** Considering the country size, the evaluation team had difficulty identifying CSOs and media comparable to IPs and their grantees in focus and type of activities, albeit not supported by USAID. The opinions of international organizations and domestic institutions working in the field of anticorruption complemented non-beneficiary views, which nevertheless hold their own biases related to the CSOs and media stemming from different roles.

## FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### FINDINGS EQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE ACFC AND IJP RAISED PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN ACTIVISM AND AWARENESS ABOUT CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA EFFORTS TO FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION?

The evaluation addresses the first EQ by exploring the extent to which the ACFC and IJP have raised public confidence in activism and awareness about civil society and media efforts to fight against corruption. Annex I I provides a summary of key activities and deliverables considered for the first EQ.

**Finding I. Surveys conducted in municipalities/cities where the ACFC-supported initiatives took place (hereinafter, CATI surveys) show that many citizens were generally aware about the ACFC's anti-corruption activities, especially about those implemented by informal citizen groups.** Based on the CATI surveys, many citizens in local communities where ACFC-supported initiatives took place are aware of CSO grantees' initiatives, and even more so about informal groups' initiatives. On average, 25 percent of citizens in the four municipalities have heard about the CSOs initiatives, while 42 percent have heard of initiatives implemented by informal citizen groups.<sup>3</sup>

Whereas in Sarajevo, Bijeljina, and Kreševo the share of those who have heard about CSO grantees' initiatives is lower than for informal groups, in Brčko District of BiH (BD BiH), the situation is reversed - citizens are more aware of CSO initiatives. In-depth analyses revealed that, in Brcko, CSOs (Vermont and Demos) tackled topics which are important for wider constituencies (agricultural subsidies and employment rights) while informal citizen initiatives there focused on issues interesting to only a narrow group of citizens (recognition of diplomas from a local private university and irregularities in government funding of CSOs). In general, when it comes to CSOs' initiatives, those conducted by well-known organizations were the best known among the respondents in all municipalities (e.g., Ja BiH u EU, Aarhus, Restart Srpska). Regarding the informal groups' initiatives, in large municipalities such as Sarajevo, initiatives that started long before the ACFC implementation and received considerable media coverage over the years were the best known among the respondents (e.g., the initiative aiming to preserve the Hastahana park, the initiative to stop building the Hifa gas station in Dobrinja). In a small municipality such as Kreševo, only one informal group initiative was implemented and 64 percent of respondents have heard of it, while in Bijeljina (larger municipality) 41 percent have heard about an informal group's initiative

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<sup>3</sup> The figures are just for illustration and represent the mean percentages reported for all individual initiatives.

implemented in this municipality. Overall, the vast majority (23 out of 36) of informal groups tackled environmental issues (84 percent of in-kind assistance was spent on initiatives such as protecting rivers, fighting illegal waste disposal, pollution, and illegal construction), while CSO initiatives addressed corruption in areas such as employment, health care, and education.

At the national level, according to the 2021 NSCP, when asked if they know of any CSOs fighting against corruption in BiH, six percent of respondents listed the ACFC and IJP IPs (TI, CCI, and/or CRMA). TI was the best known among the three IPs<sup>4</sup>.

**Finding 2. According to CATI surveys and KIs, citizens of targeted municipalities have higher confidence in anti-corruption activism, especially in informal groups.** According to KIs, informal groups are more effective and have more enthusiasm in the fight against corruption than CSOs. Still, both informal groups and the CSO grantees managed to inspire and motivate new anti-corruption initiatives. For example, after the initiative against illegal gravel exploitation in the RS part of the Bosna River became more visible, similar initiatives started emerging upstream in FBiH (Maglaj, Žepče, and Zavidovići). Kruščica women’s movement against a hydropower plant in Vitez inspired other similar groups, albeit even before the ACFC implementation. The Hastahana park initiative against construction in downtown Sarajevo inspired several initiatives, including one against new construction in Stari Grad Sarajevo. Among CSOs, the Aarhus Center and Cardboard Revolution received requests for support to citizens groups unrelated to their primary issues – they were not able to meet those requests within the ACFC grants. Whereas originally the CCI targeted existing informal groups inviting them to apply for support, the IP has now reached a stage when new informal initiatives approach CCI for support.


Regarding direct beneficiaries’ own confidence in anti-corruption activism, based on the online surveys with each beneficiary group (CSOs, media, and informal groups) each group believes that they themselves can contribute to the fight against corruption more than other groups.

According to the NSCP, citizens’ confidence in the power of activism to fight corruption remains low at the national level. As shown in Exhibit 4, the share of respondents who agree that the fight against corruption in BiH is effective has been decreasing in the last three years, falling to as low as 9 percent in 2021. Approximately only every fifth citizen of BiH recognizes CSOs as a citizens’ voice in anti-corruption efforts, agreeing that these CSOs work in citizens’ interest (refer to Exhibit 4). According to several KIs, BiH citizens trust the established and proven CSOs in the fight against corruption, especially TI and CCI, which is evidenced also in the large number of corruption reports TI receives. However, this has not been confirmed by the CATI surveys, which indicated that in the municipalities directly targeted by at least one of the grantees or informal groups, slightly more than a quarter of respondents believe that CCI and TI represent citizens’ interests (27 and 26 percent respectively), and every fifth person (21 percent) believe the same about CRMA.

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<sup>4</sup> The NSCP design did not include questions about informal groups’ anti-corruption initiatives.

**Exhibit 4. Percentage of citizens who agree with the following statements (source: NSCP-BiH)**



**Finding 3. Transparency in IP and grantee operations and ACFC's vetting procedures may present potential obstacles for public confidence building.** The evaluation has found that TI publishes its narrative and financial annual reports regularly, though with some delay. CCI publishes annual financial indicators, but not the narrative reports since 2014, while CRMA does not have an official organizational website beyond the media outlet and does not publish financial and narrative reports. Further, for 23 out of 44 ACFC or IJP grantees the evaluation team could not find a website and for 40 out of 44 the financial reports could not have been found online.

Based on KIIs, there are few cases of leaders of grantee organizations whose personal conduct does not correspond to the purpose of their activities. For instance, one leader of a healthcare grantee organization is known for openly inciting distrust in the medical profession and vaccines during the pandemic. Another has been mentioned in the press to have blackmailed a politician based on sexuality and later defended his position proclaiming the same person mentally ill. Some concerns exist over political independence of informal groups or their individual members, which local political elites sometime abuse to discredit the groups.<sup>5</sup> While political party membership of individual activists is not problematic, the ACFC has nevertheless recommended such individuals to stay in the background. For some citizens, especially voting abstainers, political party members involvement in a group may be a discouraging factor from joining the anticorruption activities. The remaining concerns demonstrate lack of / insufficient integrity vetting procedure for grantees, which are particularly important for the anti-corruption activities aiming to build public confidence in civil society and their efforts to fight corruption.

**Finding 4. The NSCP respondents and ACFC/IJP beneficiaries perceive improvements in frequency of media reporting on corruption, even though only halfway through implementation, the supported investigative media have not equaled the level of influence or acceptance common with mainstream media.** Rising shares of NSCP respondents report increased frequency of media reporting about corruption: from 39 percent in 2019 to 44 percent in 2021, suggesting that people are more **aware** of such content. In the beneficiary surveys, 12 out of 15 informal groups and almost all CSO grantees (14 of 15) also observed an increase in media reporting about corruption. IJP media which increased the quantity of such content contributed to such result, together with other key investigative media which KIIs often mentioned as positive examples in this context – Center for Investigative Journalism (CIN) and

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<sup>5</sup> Starmo.ba (2022). Kordić o Uborku: Gospoda se politički aktivirala... Starmo.ba, May 12, 2022. <https://starmo.ba/kordic-o-uborku-gospoda-se-politicki-aktivirala/>



Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)/Detektor. According to some KIs, part of this increase may also be a result of the pandemic during which regular rules in public procurement were suddenly curbed, often for private interests, creating more opportunities for investigative reporting.

Based on the NSCP data, the influence of online media has modestly increased – while 34 percent of people said they followed the internet portals daily in 2020, 37 percent said so in 2021. Expectedly, youth follow online news portals significantly more often than adults, at 48 percent, compared to 33 percent of adults. The most read news portals in the country are Klix (consistently in top two in both entities and for all three ethnic groups), Blic.net, and Bljesak.info, with considerable variations across ethnic groups. None of the IJP media grantees are among the top three news sources in either entity or for any ethnic group. The implementing partners recognize there is imbalance between the influence of the mainstream, dominant media compared to independent, investigative portals.

*“It would be ideal if we (the independent media in BiH) had budgets like those which the politically controlled media in BiH have, if we had our own television channels and radio frequencies, so that we could reach every citizen. But with this budget at our disposal, and we are grateful for it, I am not referring to that, but the budget we have compared to that other side of the media, is incomparable. That is really something we should consider.” - IP*

**Finding 5. ACFC and IJP helped their grantees improve their visibility and promote their initiatives.** The ACFC’s Communication Strategy prioritized promoting specific grantees and informal groups’ issues and successes to general audiences rather than promoting broad CCI messages. For some initiatives, getting CCI support was a defining moment for the success of their initiative. CCI used Antikorupcija.info, the quarterly newsletters, and tailored PR support to each supported initiative as central tools. Monitoring, reporting, and advocacy activities were also promoted by CCI. For some KIs, the Activities’ visibility standards were unclear.

*“We tried to reach media and institutions in various ways, but we were not able to, and then we turned to CCI. They did an enormous job, really. I cannot believe that we are in a position now to literally refuse to speak to the press when we are not able to, that is the level of attention we are now receiving. (...) What is interesting to me now is that we are not interesting to media because of pollution, but because we came across bribery, corruption, crime, illegal activities.” ACFC informal group*

*“Well honestly, communication related to branding could be improved. I have a feeling that we did not have (...) clear guidelines. Honestly, I am still puzzled over some things – when we call someone out, we do not put a USAID logo because we think it is sensitive content, while I think that we did not have clear guidelines on that. (...) In some situations, we cannot wait for the USAID approval. (...) Maybe those processes are a bit slow.” IP*

Based on the IJP media content analysis, citizens and CSOs, including informal groups’ initiatives, have limited presence in the IJP media reporting as protagonists, sources, and success stories. For example, of the randomly sampled 81 pieces of IJP content, 10 percent described alleged corruption that had citizens and 4 percent described alleged corruption that had CSOs as protagonists, while as high as 68 percent focused entirely on the corruption without mentioning anyone fighting corruption. In the sampled IJP content, the only explicitly mentioned ACFC protagonist was TI, while none of the other IPs, informal groups, or CSO grantees were mentioned. Further, IJP media use the public documents, institutions, and politicians more likely to stand up in court as their

priority sources - only six percent of analyzed pieces had citizens as sources, only five percent CSOs, and only six percent had experts as sources.

The IJP's tactic to promote the media grantees' content rested on mutual content sharing. Analysis of the ACFC press clipping data from the second year shows that the IJP media reported on the ACFC to a limited degree; 7 percent of the media content about the ACFC/CCI activities were produced or at least taken over by the IJP media. Similarly, 8 percent of the content about the ACFC/TI activities was from the IJP media.

Based on the review of the ACFC website and newsletters, the success stories and positive outcomes are not dominant in the ACFC websites or newsletters, but the share of **success stories** has been increasing in the ACFC newsletters as the initiatives started winning small victories. Very few positive stories related to whistleblowers were shared. In the first two years of implementation, the ACFC IPs, grantees, and informal initiatives did not have a unifying, single, clear promotional campaign that would reach a larger share of citizens – although there is limited PR coordination between initiatives against small HPPs and against corruption in healthcare. In that sense, PR support and campaigning could be strengthened.

## CONCLUSIONS

Many citizens in ACFC targeted municipalities are aware of the interventions implemented by the Activity in these locations, particularly about those implemented by informal citizen groups. Different factors may contribute to visibility of initiatives, such as the nature of the problem (e.g., whether it affects wider or narrower groups of citizens, whether it is a concrete problem with clearly visible consequences such as HPPs, or more of a general problem such as corruption in public employment); implementor (e.g., whether it is implemented by a (prominent) CSO or an informal group of citizens), duration of the initiative, and number of initiatives relative to community size. An important outcome of the ACFC was that both informal groups and CSO grantees were successful in inspiring and motivating some new anti-corruption initiatives. Raising public confidence in activism or awareness about CSO and media efforts to fight against corruption at the national level requires more time and a strategic approach to promote success stories at a country-level.

There is a considerable room for improvement of (financial) transparency among the ACFC and IJP and their grantees. The ACFC should also consider refining its approach to grantee selection to include the steps to safeguard the integrity and positive public image of the activity and civil society in general.

Citizens have noticed more investigative reporting on corruption during the last year, to which IJP contributed. The investigative media have substantially less influence on shaping public opinions compared to the mainstream media, and need more support to become more visible and influential.



## **FINDINGS EQ2: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE ACFC AND IJP IMPROVED CITIZEN, MEDIA, AND OTHER ACTORS' ENGAGEMENT IN ANTICORRUPTION ACTIVITIES?**

The second evaluation question relates to the degree to which the two Activities have managed to increase citizen, media, and other stakeholders' engagement in anti-corruption activities. A summary of key activities and deliverables considered for the second EQ is provided in Annex II.

**Finding 6. A significant share of citizens participated in the ACFC-supported anticorruption activities in local communities, although pressures discouraged citizen engagement.** According to the ACFC reports, in FY 2020, more than 8,300 citizens were directly engaged in the anticorruption initiatives and campaigns, while the participation further intensified in the FY 2021 with a rising number of supported initiatives and less restrictive pandemic measures.

Several informal groups representatives and whistleblowers noted that those fighting corruption face scorn or ridicule in their communities – normal behavior is to become complicit in corruption if you have a chance, not to fight or report it. More importantly, activists face pressures, threats, legal processes targeting their livelihoods. Two informal initiatives had lawsuits started against them and conditional sentences issued, and for one of the groups, such pressure significantly influenced the number of people able and willing to participate. One activist noted that her private business started receiving more inspection visits once she started speaking out and organizing against another waste site in BiH, and local politicians used libel and defamation on public radio to discredit her.

*“We were definitely among the more active associations, if not the most active in BiH. But because of the absence of adequate response by authorities, the lack of understanding from the rest of the community in BiH, people get tired. This cost us a lot of our effort, a lot of sacrifice by these people, we had threats from all government levels, we were fined with ... BAM. We now have over 60 of our members who have suspended sentences. So now we are really in an unenviable position, because these 60 members were our true power present in every action, and now they are on probation and cannot show their faces anymore.” ACFC informal group*

Still, some initiatives started receiving greater support from the local population after a period of sustained pressure.

*“We were all originally dragged down, but we see now slowly that people are getting their voice back through our activism and we are all seeing new possibilities.” ACFC informal group*

*“Early on, everyone said ‘you cannot do a thing, let it go, people get fired when they expose themselves in such a way’. Now, everyone we come across in town says ‘well done, you are great’. We get really positive comments now and there is greater turnout of people now. More people dare to come now when they have realized that protesting is safe, not a problem, since we are only protecting our rights, and nothing more than that.” ACFC informal group*

When asked how interested the key groups of local stakeholders were in joining their anticorruption activities, the ACFC initiatives (CSO grantees and informal groups alike) more often marked directly affected citizens, media (from public and private outlets), and local CSOs as moderately or very interested. Conversely, the local politicians, indirectly affected citizens, prosecutors and judges, and local business owners and crafts were less interested in the ACFC anticorruption activities.

On a national level, looking at NSCP data on participation, 17-18 percent of citizens over the last three years reported doing any specific anti-corruption activity (not only like the ones CSOs and

informal groups organized)<sup>6</sup> in the year before the survey. This stagnation in activism against corruption at a national level reflects the problem of normalization of corruption in the BiH society, as explained by one KI:

*“Corruption is greatly supported by citizens. It has become a part of our lives, while those who are opposing corruption are only doing it because they do not have money or connections to do what they want. Everyone would pay to get their kid a job. Everyone would pay a doctor to get a better treatment. (...) I believe this is a major thing that most of us working in anti-corruption refuse to admit to ourselves.” CSO grantee*

**Finding 7. Informal initiatives contributed significantly to increased citizen engagement, especially those focusing on environmental degradation.** Citizens’ engagement in informal groups grew as the initiatives were gaining traction, especially in those initiatives related to natural resources exploitation. Konjic/ Neretvica and Vitez/Kruščica initiatives against small HPPs, as well as the Drvar initiative against a landfill were particularly successful in gaining public attention and attracting citizens to engage. In the survey with informal groups, 6 out of 16 respondents estimated that between 15 and 50 citizens participated in their initiative, and in 3 cases hundreds of citizens were present<sup>7</sup>. The critical areas typically perceived as very corrupt, such as healthcare, education, public sector employment, and public spending have rarely been tackled by informal groups’ initiatives. Their initiatives pertained mostly to concessions for natural resource exploitation. Two KIs saw the surging number of environmental groups a result of the visibility and tangibility of such problems, which are therefore more actionable for grassroots groups than, for instance, conflict of interest or NGO funding. The surge is also connected to long-term advocacy of environmental NGOs and projects:

*“There is a rise in environmental activism in recent years (...). It seems that people connect to those issues – rivers, small hydropower plants, air quality more easily. (...) And perhaps the greatest successes have occurred in that sector in recent years (...). This is all a consequence of the engagement of environmental CSOs.” Non-beneficiary*

*“This type of (environmental) movements, our observation is that they are the most active... It is difficult really to expect significant activism around conflict of interest - that is removed from people’s real lives. But when you come and start building something in front of their house or create an illegal landfill, construct an illegal small hydropower plant, and their life directly depends on it, that is something completely different.” IP*

The informal initiatives are currently fragmented and uncoordinated – except for the HPP-related initiatives which are part of the wider Coalition for Rivers in BiH established through other projects, there is no other evidence of informal initiatives addressing common issues or stakeholders together. Most environmental informal groups were originally concerned with the consequences of environmental degradation on their health, wellbeing, and income generation activities, less so with corruption. Only with the ACFC/CCI assistance, the informal groups started thinking about violations of laws and regulations. The connection to the private interest of public officials is rarely explored or legally pursued in informal groups, even in the most successful ones, despite being a crucial element of corruption. Out of 16 respondents in a survey with informal groups, only one was

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<sup>6</sup> Response options included: reporting a public official for corruption to a CSO or a competent institution, signing a petition against corruption, participating in anti-corruption advocacy, a public hearing, a meeting, a protest or other public gathering against corruption, refusing to bribe a civil servant or a public official, or sharing content related to corruption on social media.

<sup>7</sup> In several cases, KIs reported thousands of supporters, and those were related either to petition signing or included social media supporters.

able to explain the link between the problem they are trying to address and the abuse of public resources or authority for private gains, while six more shared only overly broad insinuations. However, nine out of 16 initiatives have filed corruption reports to prosecutors, some of them multiple times; but only three initiatives said that an investigation was opened, and in one case some officials were arrested. In the remaining cases, the prosecutor decided not to investigate, and in one case the decision on investigation is still pending. While 13 out of 15 informal groups representatives in the survey said that they plan to continue fighting their specific problem in the next three years, some of them in focus groups said that they feel the efforts are fragmented and initiatives should unite to fight corruption beyond their specific problem. Except for those groups that established CSOs, of which there are few, the expectation is that the informal groups will dissipate once their problems are resolved or once they get tired.

**Finding 8. Specialized and interest oriented CSOs among grantees have modestly contributed to citizens’ direct engagement, mostly through one-off actions (e.g., petitions). The IPs succeeded in more sustained and consequential engagement of citizens.** Unlike informal initiatives, the CSO grantees engaged in the areas perceived as most prone to corruption – public employment, public procurement, healthcare, and education. Some of the CSO grantees engaged large numbers of citizens in their activities, for example through petitioning (e.g., Restart Srpska collected nearly 4,000 signatures for more transparency in public employment, BIRN collected 5,057 signatures for greater judicial transparency), emailing authorities (e.g., Ja BiH u EU engaged 240 youth, over 30 CSOs, 26 media, and 10 institutions), reporting tools (e.g., BIRN received 95 reports after posting an invitation at their website, FEA received 22 reports through the mobile app Čuvajmo Šume), and collecting narratives to document problems (Baby Steps collected over 150 personal experiences by women in maternity wards). Other CSO initiatives were less successful in terms of citizen engagement. Based on FGD results, one potential explanation is low citizens’ confidence that CSOs can affect change. Newer activist CSOs, such as Restart Srpska, specialized CSOs such as FEA, and interest based CSOs such as EAs and Baby Steps, have a more direct link to their constituencies and are able to engage them more easily, compared to traditional CSOs<sup>8</sup> among grantees, often called Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).<sup>9</sup>

*“Citizens’ motivation to engage in these activities is below our expectations because they maybe do not believe that we can influence the problem, or they try to get themselves accustomed to the situation in which the problems are not resolved.” CSO grantee*

Most CSOs were able to attract citizens’ attention through *ad hoc* engagement, rather than to sustain their interest and engage them over longer term. But the ACFC succeeded in making the CSOs use activist approaches for citizen engagement (e.g., petitions, street actions, protests) and for advocacy, rather than the usual project approaches (e.g., training, conferences, roundtables). CSO grantees’ initiatives were also fragmented; there is little evidence of coordination or addressing

<sup>8</sup> On discussion about traditional, organized civil society’s disconnect from citizens, please see Cooper, Rachel (2018). *What is Civil Society? How is the term used and what is seen to be its role and value (internationally) in 2018?* K4D. Available at [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c6c2e74e5274a72bc45240e/488\\_What\\_is\\_Civil\\_Society.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c6c2e74e5274a72bc45240e/488_What_is_Civil_Society.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> On terminology, please see Brian Tomlinson (2013). “Annex I. NGOs and CSOs: A Note on Terminology” in Tomlinson, Brian (2013). *Working With Civil Society in Foreign Aid: Possibilities for South-South Cooperation*. UNDP China, 2013. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/publications/undp-working-civil-society-foreign-aid>

common issues together. The only exception mentioned to the evaluation team was some collaboration between grantees working in the healthcare area.


Some grantees required more flexibility in activity implementation. Cardboard Revolution and the Aarhus Center both had requests for support by citizens' groups they were not able to meet because of the fixed grant agreements. Another issue is the short nature of anti-corruption activities supported by different donors, including USAID and the ACFC support<sup>10</sup>.

*"What I think should improve is greater freedom in going outside the project, so that we can adapt to the situation when it is necessary to adapt." Grantee*

*"We would make courts and prosecutors, those where we have the least results, at state level, to do their jobs, if we were exerting long term pressure on them, but our projects last one year. They know it, they know that they will need to organize a few meetings to ameliorate some of the pressure, and one year later, we go our way, they go their way. We need to devise a strategy with donors where any project we start in anticorruption should run until the issue is resolved." ACFC grantee*

Regarding engagement through reporting, TI ALAC registered higher number of calls to the corruption hotline and opened higher numbers of new corruption cases in 2020 and 2021, compared to the baseline year (2019) (refer to Exhibit 5 for more information). BIRN invitation to its audiences to report corruption in the judiciary<sup>11</sup> resulted in 95 citizens' reports which led to 10 investigative reports by BIRN journalists. In contrast, the FBiH EA platform for businesses to report corruption resulted in only one report.

**Exhibit 5. TI ALAC's statistics during the last three years (source: TI ALAC report)**



IPs provided positive feedback about citizens' engagement in the CRMA-led monitoring of public procurement (PP) and TI-led monitoring of abuse of public resources (APR) in pre-election campaigns. The APR observers identified 2,459 examples of APR in the 2020 pre-election campaign using Reflektor and online questionnaires as reporting tools, leading to 112 reports of violations filed with the Central Election Commission (CEC). The PP monitors were selected in a public call to

<sup>10</sup> Duration of the ACFC's grants is currently limited to 12 months, but grantees can apply for extensions or for multiple grants.

<sup>11</sup> BIRN (2020). Prijavite slučajeve korupcije za novinarska istraživanja BIRN-u BiH. <https://detektor.ba/2020/09/17/prijavite-slucajeve-korupcije-za-novinarska-istrazivanja-birn-u-bih/>

analyze and enter data and evidence onto PratiMotendere.ba, where an algorithm then assigns ratings to monitored procurement processes.

**Finding 9. IJP increased investigative reporting about corruption, especially in microregions where citizens have limited access to unbiased information about corruption.**

There are a limited number of investigative media in BiH focusing on corruption – KIs and FGD participants commonly mentioned the Center for Investigative Journalism (CIN) and BIRN in that context, while some also pointed to Žurnal, Capital, and Fokus. The selection criteria for IJP grants were not entirely clear for non-beneficiaries. CRMA explained that they considered it important to select media grantees directly based on proven anti-corruption reporting, rather than publish a call for merit-based applications. The IJP has succeeded in bringing investigative content on corruption closer to people in various parts of BiH, supporting local investigations. For example, in East Herzegovina the IJP supported the newly established Direkt-portal.com and the portal established in 2013 Mojaherzegovina.com. The presence of investigative media in micro-regions is important in BiH, because of the divisive political context leading to audiences divided along ethnic and center-periphery lines:

*“It is particularly important to have the RS media writing about corruption in Republika Srpska, because then the usual argument that media from the Federation invents corruption affairs simply to worsen the situation in the RS becomes meaningless, and vice versa, someone from Republika Srpska is inventing stories so to worsen the situation in the Federation. It is particularly important for us that each of these media pool members has their own audiences, but they also take over contents from other media pool members, and so these divided audiences then become one.” IP*

The IJP invested sparse efforts in building the capacities of media grantees to produce investigative reports, while the need is far greater considering the limited influence of IJP media. The IJP Program Description (PD) does not envision considerable media capacity building. But the expected results such as awareness raising and increasing quality of investigative reporting are hardly possible in absence of capacity. In the media grantees survey, all participants (12) marked that their primary audience are citizens who are directly affected by corruption, followed by judges and prosecutors (8 out of 12), CSOs (8), public employees (8), and politicians (7). To reach those diverse audiences, media nowadays need to use diverse audience engagement tactics and formats. Many IJP grantees said that they would like to use videos (7 of 12), combined formats (6), and infographics (3) more in their work. Also, all IJP grantees use Facebook to promote their content, while few use other social media such as Twitter (4) and Instagram (1), and none of them use TikTok or Snapchat. This suggests a disconnect between media reporting techniques so that a large section of youth will not see media reporting.

Out of 12 respondents in the IJP media grantees survey, 10 have used PratiMotendere.ba, the ACFC platform which CRMA administers primarily for citizens, but the platform is also used by investigative media and activists. Nearly all IJP media respondents find the platform (very or moderately) useful. When asked how they would improve the platform, some responded:

- Add more public procurement processes, and make them more easily accessible,
- Promote the platform more in social networks and media,
- Explain the results better since public procurement is complex and media do not often have time to investigate themselves.

Regarding the PratiMotendere.ba, there is evidence that the ACFC monitoring of public procurement in healthcare institutions during the pandemic and the IJP reporting about it resulted in investigations and indictments (“Corona Contracts” in the RS Healthcare Institute and the “Srebrna Malina Case” in the FBiH), as well as improved practices in some healthcare institutions. One IP explained the synergy between the media grantees, Žurnal, and TI:

*“As far as the RS Institute of Healthcare is concerned, Žurnal continuously reported about it, it had data which it received through its sources and cooperation, it really had documentation which is evidence to malpractice and inflated prices by several times. On the other side, the media pool member Restart Srpska, that is their portal InfoVeza also followed another case related to procurement of a mobile hospital. We can say that there was synergy, while there was also diversified focus. Transparency International on the other hand, within ACFC, filed reports with the Agency for Public Procurement.” IP*

*“During the (PP) monitoring process, our researchers identify issues which we report to the Agency for Public Procurement, and they issued several public notifications on malpractices based on our reports. But what I consider more important are the reports which Transparency International files with prosecutors. In some cases, we have their reaction, in some not, but we are particularly proud of the case against the RS Healthcare Institute.” IP*

*“The Federal Prime Minister is in court because our journalist, our web portal through this CRMA project, disclosed the ventilator affair (Malina Case).” IJP grantee*

According to the IP, the media grantees continue to investigate even after the trials start. Regarding pandemic procurements, authorities at times committed additional fraud or crimes when trying to prove that previous actions were justified, as was the case with faulty ventilators which were put into function in hospitals in FBiH to prove that they are operational, while journalists sustained interest and continued to report about those actions and their effects as well.

**Finding 10. The ACFC made some effort to engage other stakeholder groups, such as the private sector and government institutions, in the fight against corruption. The effects of their inclusion are limited.** Regarding the engagement of business stakeholders in activities, the FBiH EA received only one report of corruption in inspections via their platform [www.poslovanjebezkorupcije.ba](http://www.poslovanjebezkorupcije.ba), and the platform is not functioning at the time of this report. This segment of the FBiH EA intervention was not well prepared since pre-design research into business community preferences could have saved resources. Still, large numbers of companies participated in their focus groups and surveys, and the FBiH EA advocacy efforts had some success at policy level (discussed later in Finding 13 under evaluation question 3). The RS EA organized presentations of a brochure on the rights and obligations of businesses and inspectors during an inspection<sup>12</sup> in various locations. Together with the RS inspectorate, they compared inspection regulations to a sample of actual inspections to identify discrepancies. Despite good methodology and cooperation, the entity ministries did not adopt any of the Association’s proposals for regulation amendments (the pandemic was given as an explanation). But the Inspectorate did change its online form for reporting corruption in inspections and made it more visible. TI established a Business Integrity Forum as an online platform for communication with the business sector and surveyed and trained the business

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<sup>12</sup> UUPRS (2021). *Brošura o Pravima i Obavezama privrednih društava i inspektora tokom inspekcijuskog nadzora* (Rights and Obligations of Businesses and Inspectors During Inspections). UUPRS. Available at <https://unijauprs.org/dokumenti/Brosura-o-pravima-i-obavezama-privrednih-drustava-i-inspektora-tokom-inspekcijuskog-nadzora.pdf>



community on whistleblower protection in the RS. There was little evidence of those activities having any effect based on activity documentation, KIs, and FGDs.

Engagement of higher education institutions and healthcare institutions through CSO grantees' initiatives also did not produce significant or sustainable results. CSO Izgled Prirode/Cardboard Revolution Initiative from Tuzla and Demos from Brčko managed to ensure procurement of new medical equipment. According to KIs, public healthcare institutions in these locations were facilitating provision of healthcare services by few selected private providers under excuse of dysfunctional medical equipment in the public services. In Tuzla, advocacy has led to a new mammograph being bought and donated to the Healthcare Center, although left unused because of low staffing capacities in the institution. The Government then decided to cover mammography in any private institution. In general, except for the Tuzla Healthcare Center, healthcare workers have been cooperative in other initiatives, especially in the Baby Steps initiative to improve conditions in maternity wards in Banja Luka and Sarajevo, although meaningful effects are still pending. Doctors are among whistleblowers reporting abuses to media and CSOs. Employees of higher education institutions showed limited interest and engaged mostly covertly in those initiatives working on degree recognition or addressing corruption in education.

**Finding 11. According to KIs, FGs, and online surveys, COVID-19 had negative effects on implementation of some planned activities in ACFC and IJP, as well as on coordination with other stakeholders. Several media grantees used the momentum to report about misuses in public procurement of medical equipment, resulting in prosecution of highly ranked public officials.** The ACFC adapted its activities to the pandemic by redirecting funds into monitoring of public procurement processes in medical institutions and organizing online training sessions on public procurement monitoring. The adaptation contributed to many articles produced by Žurnal and IJP media grantees, resulting in several corruption affairs catching the public eye and the eye of the prosecutors. Fokus first reported about the 'Ventilators Affair' as part of the IJP project, which then led to indictments and trials against top officials in FBiH, as well as publicizing Turkish experimental medicines Favira and Remdesivir which the Inspection banned from sales after their article. TI also adjusted their activities and started paying more attention to decisions which tended to narrow down the democratic space during the pandemic. After the RS President Željka Cvijanović issued a decree which aimed to sanction those who are found to "spread panic and promote disorder" related to the pandemic, TI issued a press release warning that the decree is an infringement on freedom of speech and press freedoms, and the decree was soon withdrawn<sup>13</sup>.

In the beneficiaries' surveys, many beneficiaries<sup>14</sup> said the pandemic did not affect their initiatives. For those ACFC initiatives' representatives who felt it did, the most common problems included difficulty organizing events and meetings with citizens and institutions. Some noted that institutions became even more passive or used the pandemic to silence citizens and prevent protests. The IJP media had difficulty maintaining communication with sources and getting responses from institutions.

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<sup>13</sup> In addition to TI, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights also reacted to the decree and likely contributed to its withdrawal.

<sup>14</sup> Specifically, six out of 16 CSO grantees, seven out of 16 informal groups representatives, and six out of 12 media grantees said that the pandemic did not affect implementation of their interventions.

Others were also on heightened alert, recognizing that institutions were using the state of emergency for even more corrupt practices.

**Finding 12. The ACFC and IJP invested efforts into exchange of information and cooperation, though lacked strategic coordination within and between supported groups.** Cooperation within and between informal groups and CSO grantees was lacking, with initiatives against small HPPs and small CSO grants focused on health being the exception, partly due to the heterogeneous nature of their focuses. To resolve issues systematically, some of the initiatives needed to jointly advocate changes of policies at higher levels of governance or address common stakeholders whose performance is affecting multiple issues, as Aarhus Center does with regards to small HPPs. The Aarhus Center received a grant specifically to support three informal groups against small HPPs and more importantly, to advocate change in the entity energy policies which would put an end to new small HPPs. Policy changes were coordinated, and pressure exerted jointly through the Coalition for Rivers established within a different project. This coordinated effort has given results before and during the ACFC implementation.

There was space also for stronger support between initiatives:

*“The balance was more in our favor when we had the ACCOUNT network of 116 or so organizations, and when we start something in (city name), we automatically get support from Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Doboj, Tuzla, Zenica, wherever, and our impact is greater. We even had a practice of all of us from the entire BiH coming to an even in some smaller place.” ACFC grantee*

*“Here, in this conversation, there are ten of us, and each of us has a certain number of citizens behind their back who want changes and rule of law, respect for rights. If we gathered in one spot, this is a critical mass of people, much larger than any of our groups separately. We must unite. Like this, we are small groups with the same aim, but we face the same problems, and we are easier to manipulate like this, more easily pressured.” ACFC informal group*

Inter-activity cooperation occurred intentionally in three important ways.

1. First, the ACFC regularly shared information and contacts from the ACFC grantees and informal initiatives with the IJP to encourage the media grantees to support citizens' anticorruption initiatives, which is one of the IJP's many strategic objectives. This cooperation led to less than 10 percent of content about ACFC being produced by the IJP media and few of the IJP's investigative stories involving the informal groups or grantees.
2. Second, IJP writing informed the early selection of ACFC informal groups:

*“We learned about the group through the Aarhus Center, but especially through that Žurnal article, and we reached out to those citizens in Kreševo, and this is how the Kreševo Civic Movement emerged.” IP*

3. Third, the IJP media were trained on public procurement monitoring, they receive daily updates from PratiMotendere.ba, and have, thus far, produced a sizable portion of content from the monitoring data.

TI, as the main advocacy and reporting member of the consortium did not consistently follow the IJP investigative stories and file corruption reports, while media themselves do it less than CSOs because of duty to protect their sources.

**Coordination with other USAID-funded Activities.** Some cooperation and joint activities with other USAID-funded Activities were planned and realized with USAID's E-Governance Activity (in



which TI is a partner) and the USAID Judiciary Against Corruption Activity (USAID JACA). For example, the ACFC public procurement monitoring grantees participated in the E-Governance monitoring trainings; the ACFC/CRMA presented the Pratimotendere.ba platform to prosecutors in one JACA event for prosecutors; and the IJP/CRMA journalists presented examples of successful investigative reports to prosecutors in a training session on proactive investigative techniques that JACA organized. On the perception of prosecutors about the IJP/CRMA contribution:

*“I think it was a positive impression. Prosecutors asked questions to the presenting journalists... well to the presenting organization, but in general, I believe that prosecutors realized that there is certain information which is publicly available and that they really do need to take them into account a bit more seriously.”*

E-Governance and JACA were not fully aware of the scope of the ACFC and IJP activities, especially the ACFC work with CSOs and informal groups. The FBiH EA, as one of the key ACFC grantees, met with E-governance twice, but there was little follow-up or cooperation. The ACFC shared plans for the CSO Put Pravde (Road to Justice) with JACA to analyze the work of prosecutors in the RS. However, JACA had little information about any ongoing criminal cases initiated by the ACFC IPs, grantees, or informal initiatives – what they knew was mostly from media sources. The ACFC/CCI met also with the USAID Energy Policy Activity (EPA) to discuss small HPPs in BiH. Other international and local anti-corruption projects had even less information about the full scope of the two activities.

**Access to information to facilitate coordination.** One observation by a representative of a government anti-corruption body was that there are now numerous databases and information sources on anti-corruption in the country.

*“E-platform on anticorruption which this Agency will establish will include links – it will be a focal point for information which will then lead (the user) to (other platforms). (...) You have an abundance of information, and I fear that in that abundance not all are relevant sources. This platform would be an additional authentication of such sources.” AC body*

The government public procurement portal<sup>15</sup>, the public procurement database of the Sarajevo Canton<sup>16</sup>, and other government public databases on public procurement which the OSCE is supporting simply provide status of public procurement processes. Such databases offer data, without interpretation, to journalists or interested activists. The ACFC/CRMA Pratimotendere.ba provides snapshot information on which past public procurement processes have been risky by internationally recognized criteria. In that sense, there is no overlap with government platforms. E-governance is considering developing a public procurement platform which will be more advanced than Pratimotendere.ba. It will also show which public procurement processes were risky, except that the entire process of monitoring is automated and, according to the activity, there will be no need for a human monitor to collect data. The TI Register of Public Officials covers the entire country, unlike the current Canton Sarajevo database of public officials at Anticorruptiks.com. The background integration of different registers at Transparentno.ba, recently initiated by TI, will provide added value because it will also enable readers to get findings across databases, as opposed to merely data from one database.

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<sup>15</sup> <https://www.ejn.gov.ba/>

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.anticorruptiks.com/>

The cooperation of the ACFC grantees with anti-corruption institutions was limited. But many grantees established contacts and cooperation with other institutions which were relevant to their specific problems. For instance, Vermont was working on transparency of agricultural incentives with the BD BiH Department for Agriculture, Forestry, and Water; the Association of Public Procurement Professionals, Trainers, and Officers worked with six public healthcare institutions in Sarajevo Canton (FBiH) and Sarajevo-Romanija Region (RS) to improve public procurement procedures; an informal initiative from Dobož worked with the RS Higher Education Agency to improve transparency of information about accredited higher education institutions. Still, even with directly relevant institutions, informal groups had limited cooperation and were often at first ignored by institutions, if not pressured.

## CONCLUSIONS

ACFC grantees and beneficiaries managed to engage a considerable number of citizens in their activities at the local level. Even though citizens are unlikely to engage – partially because many consider corruption a normal behavior, and due to fear, threats, and pressure – the likelihood of engagement seems to increase in localities with multiple initiatives. The initiatives with longer durations seem to be gaining more citizen support with time. There has been minimal change in anti-corruption activism at the national level.

Informal citizen initiatives were the most effective in fostering citizens' engagement in the fight against corruption, even though political pressures discourage citizen engagement. Few citizen initiatives established CSOs, and they need to be closely followed to see whether the institutionalization of such groups will contribute to improvements of the anti-corruption infrastructure in the country in the longer-term. The representatives of informal citizen initiatives are oftentimes not aware whether or how their initiatives are tied to corruption but, due to the ACFC assistance, most of them end up reporting corruption to institutions. The effects of these initiatives could be improved by facilitating collaboration and joint actions, and by focusing on larger-scale corruption issues as opposed to more narrow, local issues.

CSO grantees have modestly contributed to citizens' direct engagement in the fight against corruption, mostly in the short term and through one-off actions. The short-term nature of these initiatives, as well as poor coordination and collaboration, hampers their influence. The CSOs choose to tackle corruption in areas perceived to be the most conducive to corruption, such as public employment, public procurement, healthcare, and education, and changes in these areas require longer-term approach. The IPs succeeded in shifting the CSOs approach to fight against corruption from more traditional and passive to more concrete and activist approach. TI and some grantee organizations managed to increase citizen engagement by facilitating reporting of corruption cases. Some citizens also engaged in monitoring corruption via the platforms established by the ACFC.

IJP increased investigative reporting about corruption, especially in microregions where citizens have limited access to unbiased information. Most media outlets receiving IJP support say they find the PratiMotendere.ba platform useful for their investigations. Nevertheless, the IJP platform needs modifications to be more user-friendly for journalists and to prevent misinterpretation of the data. IJP's approach to selecting procurement for in-depth analysis needs to be reconsidered.

ACFC invested efforts to engage stakeholders such as businesses, government institutions, healthcare, and education stakeholders in the fight against corruption. Entity employment agencies invested effort and achieved partial results. Healthcare workers have so far been cooperative in

several initiatives, and the results of these actions are still pending. Higher education stakeholders showed limited interest and engagement in anti-corruption efforts.

The pandemic had negative effects on implementation of some ACFC and IJP face-to-face activities and coordination with other stakeholders, but the activities succeeded in adapting most of their interventions to new circumstances. The pandemic also created opportunities for investigative media to report on misuse of public procurement for medical equipment, resulting in prosecution of highly ranked public officials. ACFC and IJP invested effort in information exchange and cooperation, but their efforts lacked a coherent strategic approach. Coordination and collaboration within and between ACFC and IJP grantees need improvement. The activities also need to improve communication and collaboration with other USAID's activities, government agencies, and other donors, as many different stakeholders work on similar anti-corruption issues.

### **FINDINGS EQ3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE ACFC AND IJP'S MONITORING, ADVOCACY, AND INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM EFFORTS RESULTED IN IMPROVEMENTS OF ANTICORRUPTION POLICIES, REPORTING, AND JUSTICE RESPONSE?**

Under the third evaluation question, the evaluation team explored to what degree the Activities contributed to policy improvements, increased reporting of corruption, and improved institutional and judicial response. A summary of key activities and deliverables considered for the third EQ is provided in Annex II.

**Finding 13. ACFC contributed to policy improvements on conflict of interest in BD BiH, with some breakthroughs in state-level public procurement legislation. Political blockages and the COVID-19 conditions slowed the progress in other areas.** TI participated in the development of the draft Law on Conflict of Interest in BD BiH which was adopted in 2021. As per TI's recommendation, the BiH Agency for Public Procurement amended the 2016 Rulebook on Monitoring of public procurement with provisions regarding e-consultations. BiH Parliamentary Assembly House of Peoples adopted amendments to the BiH Law on Public Procurement in the first reading, including provisions TI worked on. The CEC amended the forms for political parties financial reporting as per TI recommendations, enabling better monitoring and analysis.

The political situation at state and entity level, exacerbated by the pandemic, resulted in slow progress in the key policy areas. Based on KIs, changes of the Law on Conflict of Interest in the RS and adoption of the FBiH Law on Conflict of Interest are unlikely for the time being. All the proposals of TI regarding the integrity of elections, including abuse of public resources, are on hold because of an impasse between political parties on the electoral law reform matters. Whistleblower protection legislation has not improved either, although TI did contribute to its promotion among

the RS businesses. External stakeholders recognize political stalemate as a viable explanation for absence of progress in anticorruption policies:<sup>17</sup>

*“You don’t have the Law (on Col) in the Federation, and this is also lack of political will. So my general impression is that it is nearly impossible, and at entity level impossible for other reasons, to change anything, and so I see that the international community is turning to lower levels, trying to change something at cantonal level. That is okay, but I am not sure how good that approach is, because it can lead to disharmonized solutions.” International stakeholder*

**Finding 14. Some of the grantees’ advocacy initiatives were at least partially successful so far.** Some of the ACFC grants specifically aimed to advocate for policy improvements at BD BiH, entity, and state level in relation to corruption in energy projects, transparency in public employment, public transfers (agriculture, CSOs, employment of persons with disabilities), judicial transparency, regulation of prices of medicines, patients’ rights, and corruption in inspections.<sup>18</sup> Several grantees achieved at least some success:

- BIRN advocated adoption of a communication strategy in the HJPC, which adopted its new Communications Strategy in 2021 with some of the BIRN’s recommendations included; the acting Chief Prosecutor also instructed the BiH Prosecutor’s Office to publish edited factual descriptions of the confirmed indictments, as of 2022.<sup>19</sup>
- ACFC grantee’s advocacy (Vermont association in partnership with agricultural producers) led to the BD BiH Government adopting a new longer-term Rulebook on Agricultural Incentives<sup>20</sup> as opposed to the earlier practice of adopting the Rulebook every year which led to significant delays in payment of incentives.<sup>21</sup>
- Misli Dobro / Mean Well initiative resulted in the RS Government’s decreasing of margins for medicines from 20 to 18 percent.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> TI is also arguing against fragmented efforts to establish the anti-corruption legislation at the cantonal level, which initiated in some locations, as it would potentially lead to a prolonged process of adopting up to 10 new cantonal laws on conflict of interest or whistleblower protection. Cantonal laws would also likely lead to significant issues in harmonization, enforcement, oversight, and access to information about their implementation.

<sup>18</sup> ReStart Srpska/Banja Luka, BIRN/Sarajevo, Vermont/Brcko, FBiH EA/Sarajevo, RS EA/Banja Luka, Union of Employees of the Fund for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of PWDs/Sarajevo, Misli Dobro-Mean Well/Banja Luka, the Aarhus Center/Sarajevo, Stop Mobbing/Trebinje with Association KAP/Sarajevo, DON/Prijedor

<sup>19</sup> Currently listed descriptions of indictments do not include any corruption-related cases, only organized crime and war crimes, likely because no new corruption indictments were raised in 2022:

<http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=12&id=96&jezik=b>

<sup>20</sup> BD BiH Assembly (2021). Rulebook on Allocation and Eligibility for Agricultural Incentives.

[http://psv.bdcentral.net/data/dokumenti/pdf/Pravilnik/Pravilnik\\_o\\_nacinu\\_i\\_uslovima\\_za\\_podsticaj\\_u\\_poljoprivrednoj\\_proizvodnji\\_-\\_HR.pdf](http://psv.bdcentral.net/data/dokumenti/pdf/Pravilnik/Pravilnik_o_nacinu_i_uslovima_za_podsticaj_u_poljoprivrednoj_proizvodnji_-_HR.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> The Law on Agricultural Incentives was amended to stop the practice of annual revision of the Rulebook.

See articles 2 and 4: [https://skupstinabd.ba/3-](https://skupstinabd.ba/3-zakon/ba/Zakon%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji/06B04-21%20Zakon%20o%20izmjenama%20i%20dopuni%20Zakona%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji.pdf)

[zakon/ba/Zakon%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji/06B04-](https://skupstinabd.ba/3-zakon/ba/Zakon%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji/06B04-21%20Zakon%20o%20izmjenama%20i%20dopuni%20Zakona%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji.pdf)

[21%20Zakon%20o%20izmjenama%20i%20dopuni%20Zakona%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji.pdf](https://skupstinabd.ba/3-zakon/ba/Zakon%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji/06B04-21%20Zakon%20o%20izmjenama%20i%20dopuni%20Zakona%20o%20podsticaju%20u%20poljoprivrednoj%20proizvodnji.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> RS Government (2021). “Usvojena Uredba o izmjeni Uredbe o ograničavanju marži u prometu robe“ (Decree on Changes to the Decree on Limiting Retail Margins for Goods Adopted). Vladars.net, November 4, 2021. <https://www.vladars.net/sr-SP-Cyrl/Vlada/Ministarstva/MTT/media/vijesti/Pages/umanjena-marza.aspx>

- The FBiH Ministry of Labor and Social Policy took 50 employers off the list of eligible recipients of support for employment of persons with disabilities (PWDs)<sup>23</sup> based on the ACFC grantee's request.
- At the proposal of the Aarhus Center and the Coalition for the Protection of Rivers in BiH, the FBiH House of Representatives adopted amendments to the Law on Electricity in FBiH in the second reading<sup>24</sup>. Once adopted in the House of Peoples, this Law will require the ban of new small HPPs and revision of the existing ones.
- The changes in six out of ten laws and regulations which the FBiH EA proposed have been accepted by relevant governments. According to KIs they have not yet been discussed in parliaments.
- The RS EA advocacy resulted in improved visibility and structure of the form for reporting corruption<sup>25</sup> at the RS Inspectorate's website; the legislative amendments the RS EA proposed were not accepted.

Even though some forms of coordination between CSO grantees existed – 6 out of 16 CSO grantees in the survey did not coordinate their activities with any other grantee. In fact, the group of grantees with state and entity-level policy advocacy initiatives coordinated with other grantees the least. ACFC did not facilitate coordination between CSO grantees (except healthcare grants to a degree) and with external stakeholders strongly enough during the first two years of implementation.

**Finding 15. With ACFC's and IJP's contributions, reporting irregularities and corruption to CSOs and institutions was more common for monitored activities and supported initiatives. But the tendency to report corruption is still low in the general population.** The ACFC public procurement monitoring contributed to an increase in the number of reports on irregularities which the Agency for Public Procurement controlled/verified. In 2019, the Agency controlled 347 public procurement procedures; in 2020, the number increased to 506, of which 101 was based on TI reports. Regarding abuse of public resources, the ACFC received reports for 2,459 potential abuses and early campaigning in the 2020 Local Elections and sent 112 reports to the CEC. CEC issued 44 fines based on that data. The ACFC IPs and grantees filed at least 11 corruption reports to Prosecutor's Offices<sup>26</sup>, and at least 15 administrative disputes<sup>27</sup> in addition to numerous submissions, appeals, complaints, and requests submitted to executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

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<sup>23</sup> Not verified

<sup>24</sup> FBiH House of Representatives (2022). Available at: [https://parlamentfbih.gov.ba/v2/userfiles/file/Materijali%20u%20proceduri\\_2021/Prijedlog\\_zakona\\_o\\_dopunama\\_Zakona\\_o\\_elektri%C4%8Dnoj\\_energiji\\_u\\_FBiH\\_bos.pdf](https://parlamentfbih.gov.ba/v2/userfiles/file/Materijali%20u%20proceduri_2021/Prijedlog_zakona_o_dopunama_Zakona_o_elektri%C4%8Dnoj_energiji_u_FBiH_bos.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> <https://spediter-inspektorat.vladars.net/prijave>

<sup>26</sup> Criminal reports - TI against: the RS Public Health Institute officials; the Serb Member of the BiH Presidency; the Sarajevo University Oriental Institute officials; the Director of the Supervisory Board of Sarajevo Putevi; Gacko Mine and Thermopower Plant; FBiH Roads; Kreka Mines; Federal Administration of Civil Protection; Public Institution for Emergency Medical Aid of Sarajevo Canton. Doljanka/Zlata HPP initiative against: the former Jablanica Mayor, former Municipal Councilors, and Local Community (mjesna zajednica) representatives; Minister of Water Management, Forestry, and Agriculture in Herzegovina Neretva Canton.

<sup>27</sup> Some of the administrative disputes: TI against the RS Commission for Col, against the Primary School Aleksa Santic, Banja Luka, against the RS Republic Administration for Geodetic and Property Affairs, against the Ministry of Transport and Communications; against the Zenica Doboj Cantonal Assembly, against the RS Government, against the University Clinical Center Tuzla, the Banja Luka Center for Social Work, RUGIP RS; Public Institution "Vodovod" Čelinac; Neretvica/Konjic initiative started an administrative dispute against the FBiH Ministry of Environment and Tourism.

The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council's administrative data suggest that the overall number of corruption reports received by Prosecutor's Offices has also increased in 2021 for the first time after six years of steady decline.<sup>28</sup> The incidence of citizens' reporting of corruption, however, seems to be decreasing. Only 4 percent of respondents in the NSCP who noted they had bribed a public sector employee or an official during the previous 12 months stated that they reported their infraction to an official authority or institution in 2021, compared to 7 percent who reported doing the same in 2020. KIs suggested that citizens are still reluctant to report corruption directly to police or Prosecutor's Offices, with the prevailing reasons being the perceived lengthy court processes, fear of repercussions, or expectation of negative court outcomes.<sup>29</sup> Based on the surveys of beneficiaries, a number of ACFC and IJP grantees and beneficiaries<sup>30</sup> reported cases of legal transgressions to at least one institution, most commonly to prosecutors and inspections. In most cases, these beneficiaries were dissatisfied with their reaction. Only a few reported their case to TI and they were very satisfied with TI reaction.

**Finding 16. The ACFC and IJP contributed to more effective operations of some of the key institutions. Regardless, the institutional response to reports of corruption overall remains partial and unsatisfactory in the executive branch, especially in those institutions where irregularities are taking place.** In the 2021 NSCP, 71 percent of citizens believed that government agencies, such as supreme audit institutions, tax offices, and inspections, are ineffective against corruption. Interviews with whistleblowers suggest that institutions where corruption or malpractice is taking place are ignoring their requests or appeals, until TI intervenes. Informal initiatives made similar observations – only the CCI pressure managed to make some institutions pay notice to civic initiatives. One CSO grantee observed the importance of direct support from the U.S. Embassy:

*“There should be constant support. We here in (city name) managed to get the U.S. Ambassador to visit, but such support is needed in the remaining initiatives as well. (...) It should be clear that the U.S. Embassy is backing us. After our meeting with the Ambassador, we had 10 calls from the authorities. They are taking us more seriously now.” ACFC grantee*

KIs and activity progress reports explicitly mention examples of institutions not delivering on their mandate or contributing to corruption. For instance, the RS Commission on Conflict of Interest in RS Institutions in one case dismissed (Miljenko Vićanović) and in another suspended the proceedings (Mladen Sićar) which TI started, without adequate procedure. APIK did not provide adequate and timely protection to a whistleblower who the Indirect Taxation Authority started disciplinary proceedings against in retribution for his reporting of corruption. The FBiH Ministry of Environment and Tourism issued a number of environmental permits for construction projects, waste locations, and small HPPs which were in many cases informed by fraudulent reports of public hearings, despite local communities' opposition to such projects. Nepotism and political patronage drive institutional culture in low-performing institutions:

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<sup>28</sup> In 2020 - 825, in 2019 – 945, in 2021 – 1053.

<sup>29</sup> In the NSCP 2021, most respondents (83 percent) believed that the perpetrators of corruption in BiH are not punished, which speaks directly to the expectation of negative court outcomes. In terms of negative repercussions for those reporting corruption, whistleblowers known to media are mostly a showcase of institutional abuse, rather than positive encouragement for others to report corruption.

<sup>30</sup> Specifically, eight out of 15 CSO grantees, 13 out of 16 informal initiatives, and six out of 11 media grantees.



*“The greatest obstacle to the civil society’s fight against corruption are political appointments to key posts which have a controlling function, that is inspectorates, taxation authorities, etc. These are appointees of political parties, even though we allegedly have public employment procedures for those posts.” ACFC grantee*

The monitoring initiatives focusing on public procurement and abuse of public resources, as well as online tools and legal aid, contributed significantly to improving the effectiveness of institutions crucial for anticorruption policies. For example, as noted before, the Agency for Public Procurement controlled more procedures, and the CEC issued more sanctions for premature campaigning than before. BiH Parliamentary Commission on Conflict of Interest fined the parliamentarian Nenad Nešić and the Srebrenik Municipal Council (MC) dismissed the Director of the Srebrenik Healthcare Centre because of conflict of interest which TI identified through its Registry of Public Officials. Per TI motion, the BiH Ombudsman for Human Rights warned the APIK to undertake measures to protect the whistleblower from human rights violations in the Indirect Taxation Authority.

The ACFC monitoring of public procurements and reporting also had preventive effects in some institutions. For example, the BiH Air Navigation Services Agency and the BD BiH Government canceled their procurement procedures after TI warned of irregularities; the RS Public Health Institute started disclosing improved information about procured goods and services in 2021; a public company Mostar Bus published its 2021 procurement plan after PratiMotendere.ba flagged the irregularities in the company’s procurement procedures. Acting on reports received through ALAC and media, TI also corrected the work of institutions in multiple instances:

- An RS inspection body annulled an irregular employment procedure and one employment contract in Kalinovik Municipality in 2020.
- The BiH Agency for Protection of Personal Data ordered the RS Ministry of Education and Culture to stop publishing lists of staff who donated their salaries to the COVID-19 Solidarity Fund<sup>31</sup> - the same Ministry changed their initial decision to exclude private pre-school education providers from COVID-19 support for employee salaries and contributions in 2020.
- The BiH Agency for High Education and Quality Assurance and the Tuzla Canton Inspection ordered the Tuzla American University to issue degree certificates to students after the University requested additional payments for university accreditation in 2020 as a precondition.

The IJP media contribution is also noted - administrative decisions were made, criminal reports filed, and civic initiatives emerged after IJP reports, such as:

- Prohibition of sales of Turkish drug Favira as a COVID-19 treatment by the state-level Agency for Medicines and Medical Means, based on writing by the IJP grantee Fokus.
- Fokus also wrote about procurement of ventilators – the story led to investigations and criminal procedure against the Prime Minister of FBiH, Minister of Finance of FBiH, and the Federal Directorate for Civil Protection.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Publishing of names was used as a pressure against those who did not wish to donate their salaries.

<sup>32</sup> The original article: Degirmendžić, Semira (2020). FH Srebrena Malina: Poljoprivredno Gazdinstvo Dobilo Posao od 10,5 Miliona Maraka za Nabavku Respiratora (FH Silver Raspberry: Agricultural Business Got a Job to Procure 10.5 Million BAM Worth of Ventilators). Fokus.ba, April 27, 2020. <https://www.fokus.ba/vijesti/bih/poljoprivredno-gazdinstvo-dobilo-posao-od-105-miliona-maraka-za-nabavku-respiratora/1753735/>

- Advocacy by Goražde informal group and Žurnal's investigative reports led to the FBiH Ministry for Spatial Planning to abolish the construction permits for the Goražde Drina embankments.<sup>33</sup>
- After Žurnal writing about the illegal issuing of medical diplomas and corruption in employment in the Zenica Medical School, the School asked the Cantonal Ministry of Education to terminate the Director's employment contract, while the School Board President withdrew from the function.<sup>34</sup>
- Žurnal wrote about irregularities in waste disposal in Krupačke Stijene locality, and the advocacy of a Krupac informal group supported by the ACFC, the Environmental Inspection of Istočno Sarajevo issued a decision to temporarily close the waste site, while the police initiated an investigation into illegal operations.<sup>35</sup>
- Žurnal's writing stopped criminal activities in the Vitezit public company which is currently in the bankruptcy proceedings – the director arranged a sale of high value military equipment to a fictitious company from Zenica for less than 6,000 BAM, and after Žurnal's article,<sup>36</sup> the contract was terminated.

The ACFC grantees and informal initiatives also corrected the work of some institutions. For example:

- Based on the reports from ACFC-supported informal groups fighting against illegal gravel exploitation in the lower flow of the Bosna River, the RS Ministry of Interior opened new investigations into illegal gravel exploitation.
- After the Aarhus Center and a local informal group in Donji Vakuf informed the Donji Vakuf Municipal Council about the potential harmful effects and corrupt activities related to two small HPPs on Vrbas, the Council refused to give preliminary consent for their construction.
- Šićki Brod community group managed to convince the Tuzla Canton Assembly to refuse amendments to the Cantonal Spatial Plan which would enable Tuzla Thermopower Plant to dispose poisonous waste in Šićki Brod.
- The Federal Ministry of Environment and Tourism (FMET) withdrew an environmental permit for disposal of Italian waste in Drvar and the FBiH Government paid to remove it after a local informal group organized protests and motivated the media and activists from the country and abroad to advocate against that waste disposal.
- Cardboard Revolution managed to get the Tuzla Canton Government to procure an MRI scanner in Tuzla and DEMOS got the BD BiH Government to procure a CT scanner in Brčko.

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<sup>33</sup> Cviko, Dino (2020). Ministar Donio Rješenje: Urbanistička Saglasnost I Odobrenje za Gradnju Obaloutvrde Proglašene Ništavnim (The Minister Decided: Urbanistic Approval and Construction Permit for Embankments are Void). Žurnal, October 13, 2020. [https://zurnal.info/clanak/urbanisticka-saglasnost-i-odobrenje-za-gradnju-obaloutvrde-proglasene-nistavnim/23451?fbclid=IwAR1zXVzc4ZREeD7HQvQ7Y\\_sSoi\\_7M2OIwJYjG-3gqnF\\_PyCR0T4CRX2Ow6I](https://zurnal.info/clanak/urbanisticka-saglasnost-i-odobrenje-za-gradnju-obaloutvrde-proglasene-nistavnim/23451?fbclid=IwAR1zXVzc4ZREeD7HQvQ7Y_sSoi_7M2OIwJYjG-3gqnF_PyCR0T4CRX2Ow6I)

<sup>34</sup> Gutić, Amarildo (2020). Nakon pisanja Žurnala o Medicinskoj Školi: Ostavka predsjednice školskog odbora, postupak protiv direktora (After Žurnal's Writing About the Medical School: School Board President Withdraws from Function, Procedure Initiated Against the Director). Žurnal, October 25, 2020. <https://zurnal.info/novost/23483/ostavka-predsjednice-skolskog-odbora-postupak-protiv-direktora?fbclid=IwAR3QZtfieMijjqfUm7jruOg6lvPIBxs9ZwAaDzrb4hoj-8IX9SEYtIEL30>

<sup>35</sup> Delilović, Zinaida (2021). Investigation Closing In, Case Goes to Prosecutor: What Else is Disposed in The Waste Site in Krupačke Stijene. Žurnal, February 1, 2021. <https://zurnal.info/clanak/sta-sve-krije-deponija-na-krupackim-stijenama/23734>

<sup>36</sup> Gutić, Amarildo (2021). Nakon Pisanja Žurnala: Raskinut Ugovor o Kupovini Starog Baruta iz Viteza (After Žurnal's Writing: Contract for Sale of Old Gunpowder Terminated). Žurnal, March 16, 2021. <https://zurnal.info/clanak/raskinut-ugovor-o-kupovini-starog-baruta-iz-vitezita/23843>



- After the association of employees of the FBiH Fund for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of PWDs started advocating for more transparency in the operation of the Fund and distribution of support for employment of PWDs, the Fund started publishing its annual reports and information about its Management Board, and the FBiH Ministry of Labor and Social Policy removed 50 companies from the list of eligible recipients of Fund's support due to employees reporting misuse of funds.

**Finding 17. The ACFC's legal assistance to whistleblowers was satisfactory and well-received. Known whistleblowers' stories are few and discouraging, considering the current legal solutions and institutions in charge of their protection.** APIK received between two and six requests annually for whistleblower protection at state level in the past eight years – some years it rejected all requests, like in 2016. APIK only has purview over state level public employees who report corruption in their institutions at the state level, which is problematic for private companies interacting with state level institutions, for example. Whistleblowers from the public and private sector in the RS can seek protection from the employer or from the RS courts depending on residence, but public reporting of whistleblowers (i.e., whistleblowers turning to media) is not allowed (if a person is protected as a whistleblower), unlike in the state Law. The Law on Whistleblower Protection in BD BiH is more comprehensive than the previous two, although all three laws are still far from the standard laid out in the 2019 EU Directive on protection of persons who report breaches of the EU law.<sup>37</sup> There is no legislation on whistleblower protection in the FBiH yet.

Few whistleblowers are open to talk to the media – this results in a limited number of advertised cases to encourage others to report corruption, especially as success stories. TI provided legal support and representation for two whistleblowers who said in interviews that this support was crucial for their legal case.

Like whistleblowers, activists from informal groups also face repercussions and pressures. For example, one ReStart Srpska activist was attacked in Novi Grad (RS) while collecting signatures for mandatory public vacancy announcements for jobs in public services in RS in 2020. Two informal groups had lawsuits initiated against them – the Mostar Uborak and Kasindolska/Istočno Sarajevo activists. In the period of data collection, ACFC/CCI initiated conversations with USAID about the possibility to start providing legal aid to activists as well. Mostar Uborak initiative faced physical threats and more than 60 members of the initiative are on suspended sentence for blocking the waste site. USAID flexibility and CCI adaptation was beneficial in such cases, although there is need for more legal staff working with ACFC initiatives, according to two informal groups:

*“I would recommend to CCI to boost up the legal team, you only have one lawyer who cannot meet all needs.”*  
ACFC informal group

**Finding 18. IJP's support to media members in defamation lawsuits was rarely required by the media members (anyone who needed it, received it) and was mostly absorbed by the IP.** IJP delivered legal assistance in 34 defamation cases - 30 were against the IP (CRMA/Žurnal)

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<sup>37</sup> See Tom Devine and Mark Worth (2021). Analiza nedostataka u zakonima o zaštiti osoba koje prijavljuju korupciju u Bosni i Hercegovini (Gap Analysis of Whistleblower Protection Laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 2021. Available at: [https://rai-see.org/php\\_sets/uploads/2021/10/RAI-GAP-Analysis-excerpt-BiH.pdf](https://rai-see.org/php_sets/uploads/2021/10/RAI-GAP-Analysis-excerpt-BiH.pdf)

or its journalists, most of them by one company - Foto Art. At the end of the second year, Žurnal used the IJP legal aid in 48 lawsuits. The IJP/CRMA legal expert and staff operate preventively as well, guiding the media grantees towards higher professional standards which can protect them against defamation lawsuits. Beyond defamation lawsuits, media grantees experience other forms of threats, such as physical violence and verbal threats via social networks.

Based on KIs, all completed cases that benefited from IJP legal aid were decided in journalists' or in media favor. Despite favorable results, IPs are of the opinion that judges deciding in such lawsuits (mostly in municipal or basic courts) are not specialized for defamation or press freedoms, they are often under pressure from petitioners, and there are doubts of their integrity:

*"We generally believe that the judges' understanding of defamation is low, and they are generally unfamiliar with the freedom of speech, press freedoms, and similar." IP*

*"This pressure is evident, the fear from that other side suing the journalist. (...) We had cases when a judge openly asked: 'Why are you investigating crime?' Or when they discard evidence and proposals coming from police agencies or judicial institutions." IP*

**Finding 19. There is a general perception of KIs that there was no progress in corruption processing by judiciary, although administrative data suggest recent improvements in this regard.**

According to the NSCP data – two thirds of respondents regard the judiciary and police as ineffective in combating corruption. The KIs underscored the lack of will of judicial institutions to process corruption as one of the key obstacles to fighting corruption more effectively, stipulating a common example of an evident lack of convictions of high-ranking officials or prosecutors' practice to discard reports filed by individuals and even CSOs:

*"You have a systematic problem here. When you file a report, and we filed over a hundred reports, the prosecutors most often discard the report and decide not to investigate. Your only option here is to complain to the same prosecutors' office. We see this as a problem, there is no second instance in these decisions. Systematic changes should enable people to make prosecutors to investigate the claims in a second instance procedure, to check the evidence and act in accordance with evidence." ACFC grantee*

KIs noted the difficulty of accessing information from courts about ongoing corruption cases and one grantee specifically deals with that problem in the BiH judiciary. ACFC also filed a disciplinary report against the Banja Luka District Court judges for identified irregularities in their work (missed deadlines, the urgency to act, not allowing the party to review the case documentation). Two informants believe that low judicial effectiveness is only a manifestation of the key problem – the *captured state* phenomenon:

*"Judiciary is the worst, though prosecutors do raise indictments, but they all fail later. Police are also okay, as well as SIPA. Maybe prosecutors do not prepare the indictments well, but let us face it, the thing is, we are captured by a few political parties." - Non-beneficiary*

*"People here primarily want to see changes in prosecutors and courts which are deeply captured and corrupt. Somehow, they see all those fighting corruption in the same light. (...) These are mostly political satellites, prosecutors appointed here, and they are the key guardians of the captured state." - Institution*

Nevertheless, data from the HJPC shows that after a three-year downward trend, the number of resolved cases<sup>38</sup> in Prosecutor's Offices increased for the first time in 2021 – the Prosecutor's Offices resolved 26 percent more corruption cases than in 2020. Also, the age of backlog decreased by 227 days or 27 percent. The number of final convicting sentences for corruption has increased in 2021, after a drop in 2019 and 2020, based on TI's reconstruction of administrative data.<sup>39</sup> However, the public is not aware of such progress and changes in public perception likely depend on the resolution of the ongoing high corruption cases initiated based on the IJP reports during the pandemic.

## CONCLUSIONS

Despite TI's substantial policy development and advocacy efforts, policy improvements in four key areas (conflict of interest, public procurement, whistleblower protection, and abuse of public resources in prelection campaigns) were limited, primarily due to political stalemates and the pandemic. The successes of the Activity included the adoption of the Law on Conflict of Interest in BD BiH and some breakthroughs in state-level public procurement legislation, as well as some minor changes of the BiH Agency for Public Procurement and CEC's regulations. However, grantees invested considerable efforts to improve regulations in other areas and some of these initiatives were at least partially successful, with the potential to be even more effective with improved coordination/collaboration between the grantees, and with other interest groups and stakeholders.

There is evidence that the ACFC's monitoring activities and CSO and informal groups' initiatives contributed to increased detection and reporting of irregularities and corruption to CSOs and institutions. ACFC and IJP contributed meaningfully to improved performance of some key institutions but, in the absence of pressure, the institutional response to corruption cases is overall unsatisfactory.

ACFC's legal assistance to whistleblowers was satisfactory and well-received. Known whistleblowers' stories are few and discouraging, considering the current legal solutions and institutions in charge of their protection. ACFC adapted and responded to activists' unexpected need for legal protection. Assistance to investigative media in defamation lawsuits was provided by Zurnal when needed, but few media grantees requested such assistance.

Even though the administrative data suggest recent improvements in the work of judiciary in processing corruption, these improvements are not yet visible to citizens or other stakeholders. Changes in public perception about the judiciary require conviction by high-ranking officials and cases initiated by IJP during the pandemic will contribute to the direction of such changes.

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<sup>38</sup> Resolved cases are a sum of dropped charges and raised indictments.

<sup>39</sup> The JEI indicator Success of Indictments (the ratio of convictions in relation to the total number of indictments filed) is not available for 2021. The evaluation team therefore used the data from TI BiH (2021). Interaktivna mapa procesuiranja korupcije u Bosni i Hercegovini (Interactive Map of Corruption Processing in BiH). Available at: <https://mapa.ti-bih.org/bs/tuzilastvo-group/1?godina=2021>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

With regards to the **low country-level effects in awareness about anti-corruption activities and confidence in activism**, USAID should consider:

### 1. DEVELOPING A JOINT ACFC/IJP (AND POTENTIALLY JACA)

**COMMUNICATIONS & VISIBILITY PLAN** which would prioritize measures needed for increased awareness and confidence in activism on a country level. The measures can include recommendations 2-6 below. Improve clarity and application of visibility standards.

### 2. PROMOTING MORE SUCCESS STORIES, TRACKING AND PROMOTING

**RESULTS BETTER:** The ACFC could, with IJP's support, improve promotion of success stories from grantees and informal groups, demonstrating their achievements and winning strategies. The Antikorupcija.info homepage could better highlight initiatives' achievements categorized per type of results, for example specific problem solving, policy change, court processes, election outcomes, etc. The IJP could open a section on each supported web portal's homepage where successful investigative reports (those which contributed to some wider societal effect, not merely the most read) would be shown and updated regularly, from the host and other media. As part of regular monitoring, the IJP could invite media grantees to track and report societal effects of their content, such as launched criminal investigations, administrative disputes, policy changes, or citizens' initiatives, so that the IP can track such instances more consistently and report on them in the IJP progress reports.

### 3. BRINGING INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS CLOSER TO CITIZENS, USING MORE INNOVATIVE FORMATS, TOOLS, AND CHANNELS:

The IJP could encourage the media grantees to improve relationships with audiences and start telling their stories more. This could include connecting highly abstract articles about corruption to actual consequence for real people, as well as content co-creation with some of the ACFC informal groups or other citizens.<sup>40</sup> Consider helping media grantees to reach younger and more diverse audiences through shorter videos, convergent formats such as scrolly-telling, social media other than just Facebook, and online influencers.<sup>41</sup> The IJP could improve such assistance by pooling resources with other USAID media activities as is already done through BMAP.

### 4. EMPLOYING BETTER PERFORMANCE MONITORING ON ONLINE

**ENGAGEMENT:** The **ACFC**, and especially the **IJP** should change the emphasis from simple audience engagement statistics (reactions, comments, shares, and clicks in social media or numbers of visits to websites) to exploration of audience trust (e.g., through 2-question pop-up survey), depth of engagement (number of users reading an article through to the end), loyalty (e.g., number of users

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<sup>40</sup> Example: The ACFC grantee BIRN invited readers to tip stories related to malpractice in the judiciary and corruption in general at the start of their project (<https://detektor.ba/2020/09/17/prijavite-slucajeve-korupcije-za-novinarska-istrazivanja-birn-u-bih>) which journalists then investigated and reported on. See for example: Rovcanin, Haris (2021). Sudovi ne štite dovoljno žirante u dugim i skupim postupcima (Courts Are Not Protecting Loan Guarantors Sufficiently in Long and Expensive Court Procedures). (<https://detektor.ba/2021/09/16/sudovi-ne-stite-dovoljno-zirante-u-dugim-i-skupim-postupcima/>).

<sup>41</sup> The younger audiences are more likely to undertake untypical political activity (beyond voting) than people above 40, especially if they perceive their governments corrupt, likely because corruption casts a shadow over the institute of elections, not only governments. See more in Krause, Heather (no year). Generation Activist: Young People Choose Protest Over Traditional Politics. Orb Media. <https://orbmedia.org/generation-activist-data>

with three or more sessions per month), and visitor journey flow (what sections of the homepage users view the most, how corruption-related content can be better placed on the homepage, etc.). The IJP or other USAID's media activities could procure online tools for all grantees and train them how best to use those tools for editorial decisions.

## **5. INTENSIFYING CENTRAL CAMPAIGNING AND POOLING RESOURCES WITH**

**PARTNERS:** While separate promotional campaigns by grantees and informal initiatives were useful to address specific problems, the accumulated results from initiatives are better promoted and the ACFC's key results (to raise awareness about and confidence in anticorruption activism) are more effectively achieved through entity or country-wide campaigns. Furthermore, ACFC campaigns to exert public pressure at cantonal, entity, or state level should complement those implemented by individual initiatives in order to influence more persistent problems some initiatives are up against. The ACFC could pool resources with other organizations planning similar campaigns, such as the OSCE Mission to BiH, considering the Activity's planned contribution to improved coordination in the anticorruption field. The IJP could encourage media grantees to collaborate with other USAID supported media, to outweigh the negative mainstream media effects on attitudes toward CSOs and independent media.

**6. DEMONSTRATING MORE TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRITY:** The ACFC and IJP can lead by example and encourage grantees to establish organizational websites where they would regularly publish financial and narrative reports. While some may use USAID funding as an argument against credibility of grantees and media in some circles, lack of transparency has a more detrimental effect on confidence among those who are interested in fighting corruption or partnering with these initiatives. Further, the ACFC and IJP could introduce ethical vetting on top of other screenings already performed for potential grantees.

Regarding the Activities' effects in engaging citizens, CSOs, media, and other stakeholders in the fight against corruption, the USAID should consider:

**7. EXCHANGING INFORMATION, COORDINATING, AND COLLABORATING:** The ACFC and IJP could improve information exchange, coordination, and collaboration in the anti-corruption field. The ACFC-supported CSOs advocating for similar issues could devise joint policy advocacy strategies for example. Different informal initiatives potentially face similar underlying causes of corruption (e.g., the same problematic ministry) or fear investigating corruption elements of their problems, while the power of numbers could help them overcome those obstacles. Media grantees could strategically plan for thematic and geographical coverage, like on public procurement during the pandemic. The ACFC could facilitate citizen engagement and CSO advocacy related to issues the IJP media report on. Further, collaboration with other USAID's Activities (e.g., E-Governance, JACA, upcoming local governance and media activities) could improve, as it could with other donors and relevant government counterparts. The Activities could dedicate the coming year and break from the pandemic to intensify collaboration internally and externally.

**8. SUPPORTING GRANTEES IN CONNECTING TO CONSTITUENCIES:** The ACFC could support CSOs, especially those traditional organizations which do not have large membership or interest-based mission to better identify their constituencies and target groups and calibrate their activist approaches accordingly. Learning with this aim (as well as for other purposes) could be done though online or hybrid communities of practice with successful informal groups and CSOs as mentors.

To strengthen effects in policy advocacy, reporting, and institutional response, USAID should consider:

**9. ENCOURAGING PARTNERSHIPS IN SECTORAL POLICY ADVOCACY:** The ACFC could organize events or other activities to encourage coordination between grantees with similar areas of interest (e.g., inspections, public sector employment, healthcare) on policy advocacy in their sector, especially to reach out and collaborate more with external stakeholders who may have different specialties, like what TI usually does in policy advocacy. Transfer of knowledge between TI as the leading policy advocacy IP and grantees is encouraged on successful tactics, especially the segment on collaboration and alliance building. These external stakeholders could be anticorruption bodies, the private sector, members of the academic community and experts, media catering to niche audiences, membership based CSOs, professional associations, international organizations, or any other structure with the same aim. Successful informal groups could be supported to become cluster leaders who would further advance their activism, advocating systematic solutions in specific areas to sustain their engagement beyond separate problems.

**10. INTENSIFYING CORRUPTION REPORTING:** Based on IJP investigative reports, the ACFC could report corruption to police, prosecutors, anticorruption bodies, or other relevant institutions. The informal groups could be encouraged and assisted to better investigate connections between possibly corrupt public officials or employees' private gains and their problems, and to file corruption reports to relevant institutions. The ACFC could also work on improving the quality of citizens' direct reporting of corruption to institutions.

**11. INTENSIFYING PRESSURE ON LOW-FUNCTIONING INSTITUTIONS:** The two activities could promote effective institutions and intensify pressure on low-functioning or underperforming institutions, especially those critical for whistleblower protection and those relevant to solutions across supported civic initiatives. This is one area where central ACFC campaigning is necessary. For example, considering international and domestic reports on the judiciary's underperformance in the area of fight against corruption, the ACFC (TI and justice-oriented grantees such as BIRN and Put Pravde) could intensify advocacy for better functioning of specific courts and prosecutors' offices in coordination with USAID JACA, and IJP could publish investigative reports about inefficient aspects of the judiciary. BIRN's initiative for more transparency in corruption processing is one example of such pressure exerted at state level, but other underperforming institutions at lower judicial levels, and institutions in the executive and legislative branch should be identified and called out, so to ensure better institutional results.

**12. DEVISING NEW TACTICS TO PROMOTE WHISTLEBLOWING, IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCCESS STORIES, AND CONTINUING WITH THE PROVISION OF LEGAL AID TO ACTIVISTS:** Include grantees and informal groups in promotion of legal whistle-blower protection in the RS, BD BiH, and at state level, as well as the TI role in whistleblower protection. In some of the specific problems the initiatives are dealing with, corruption goes uninvestigated, and whistleblowers from involved institutions may be able to uncover those cases of corruption. The ACFC could introduce legal and psychological support to whistleblowers so to extend their support network. To meet the demand for legal aid and legal representation to grantees, and especially informal groups, CCI could extend its legal team.

**13. IMPLEMENTING TACTICS TO DETER LAWSUITS AGAINST MEDIA:** In addition to promoting professional standards and transparency about sources of funding among grantees, the

IJP could implement other tactics to prevent defamation lawsuits. For example, publishing data on defamation and SLAPP cases in the country, initiating compensation of material and non-material damages in courts for cases won; filing counter-complaints at the initiation of defamation cases. When making decisions about fund allocation for legal assistance in defamation lawsuits, USAID should consider whether such funding is already available from other sources.

#### **14. WORKING WITH COURTS ON THE CIVIL/ADMINISTRATIVE/ENFORCEMENT**

**SIDE:** Consider developing online training materials for judges on whistleblower protection and promoting the existing training materials on defamation and protection of press freedoms<sup>42</sup> in cooperation with USAID JACA and international partners who hold expertise in those areas, such as the Council of Europe (CoE). Promote such materials and potentially deliver training for those courts where the ACFC/IJP beneficiaries have cases, with possible further spillover to other POs/courts. CoE project “Reinforcing Judicial Expertise on Freedom of Expression and the Media in South-East Europe” (JUFREX II) has trained tens of judges in BiH on application of the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights related to freedom of expression in relation to other human rights, such as the right to privacy and dignity which are often invoked in defamation lawsuits.

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<sup>42</sup> Council of Europe (2020). Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP): Freedom of Expression Course. <https://help.elearning.ext.coe.int/>



## ANNEXES

### ANNEX I: STATEMENT OF WORK

#### PURPOSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

The United States Agency for International Development Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (USAID/BiH) has requested its Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II), implemented by IMPAQ International, LLC, to conduct a mid-term performance evaluation of the USAID's Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption (ACFC) and Investigative Journalism Program (IJP) Activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This performance evaluation will investigate ACFC and IJP's results achieved during the first two years of implementation in improving the public awareness of civil society organizations (CSO) and media efforts in the fight against corruption; citizen, media, and other actors' engagement in anti-corruption activities; and improvements in the anti-corruption legal framework, reporting and justice response to corruption in BiH. Given that both Activities were initially designed with the same goal, to increase citizen participation in anti-corruption activities, and given that they both contribute to the same Development Objective (DO) under USAID/BiH's 2020-2025 Country Development and Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), and taking into account the strong coordination and collaboration between the Activities, the Mission decided to explore the results achieved by both Activities jointly. The purpose of this mid-term performance evaluation is to provide USAID/BiH with actionable data and information to inform decision-making for the remainder of the Activities' implementation to maximize the likelihood of achieving the intended Activity results. The Mission and the implementing partners (IPs) will use the evaluation results to take mid-term corrective actions to the Activity designs and/or implementation practices.

#### SUMMARY INFORMATION

The USAID/BiH-funded Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption (ACFC) is a 5-year, \$7 million Activity implemented by the Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI), in partnership with the Center for Media Development and Analysis (CRMA) and Transparency International BiH (TI BiH). CRMA also implements the USAID/BiH-funded Investigative Journalism Program (IJP), a 5-year, \$2.5 million Activity. Both Activities contribute to USAID/BiH's Development Objective (DO) 1: "Accountability of Government to Citizens Strengthened" under USAID/BiH's 2020-2025 CDCS. The mid-term performance evaluation will analyze the Activities' progress towards achievement of the expected results. The evaluation team will conduct a rigorous performance evaluation design to obtain high-quality data and produce credible and useful findings, conclusions, and action oriented recommendations.

#### Exhibit I. Basic Information on the ACFC Activity

Activity Name	Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption (ACFC)
USAID Office	USAID/BiH Democracy Office
Implementer	Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI)
Cooperative Agreement #	72016819CA00001
Total Estimated Cost	\$7,000,000
Life of Activity	September 16, 2019 to September 15, 2024 (5 years)
Active Geographic Region	Across Bosnia and Herzegovina
Target Groups	Local CSOs in BiH, business sector, media, government institutions, whistleblowers, and citizens
CDCS Intermediate Result	IR 1.1: Impact on inclusive citizen engagement improved IR 1.2: Governance Effectiveness in Targeted Areas Strengthened



Required evaluation	No
External or internal evaluation	External

## Exhibit 2. Basic Information on the Investigative Journalism Program

Activity Name	Investigative Journalism Program (IJP)
USAID Office	USAID/BiH Democracy Office
Implementer	Center for Media Development and Analysis (CRMA)
Grant No.	72016819GR00002
Total Estimated Cost	\$2,500,000
Life of Activity	September 30, 2019 to September 29, 2024 (5 years)
Active Geographic Region	Across Bosnia and Herzegovina
Target Groups	Media outlets (editors-in-chief, owners, journalists); independent journalists, bloggers, and the general public
CDCS Intermediate Result	IR 1.1: Impact of Inclusive Citizen Engagement Improved IR 1.2: Governance Effectiveness in Targeted Areas Strengthened
Required evaluation	No
External or internal evaluation	External

## Country context

Corruption presents a comprehensive challenge to BiH, with the complex state structure often cited as an underlying driver of corruption. Corruption is omnipresent across all BiH government levels, occurring in different forms – from an undue political influence and interference, clientelism and patronage, bribery, and abuse of public office<sup>43</sup>. In 2020, BiH ranked 111 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index<sup>44</sup> and, with a score of 35, the country dropped seven index points since 2012. Even though CSOs, political figures, media, and agencies increasingly voice their concerns around the dangers of corruption in BiH, the lack of political will and inadequate law enforcement mechanisms impede their anti-corruption endeavors.

According to the 2020 National Survey of Citizens’ Perceptions (NSCP-BiH), citizens perceive public sector employment as the most corrupt, followed by public procurement and the judiciary. About-three quarters of BiH citizens believe that there is no political will to fight corruption (76 percent), and a great majority believe that they cannot do anything to contribute to countering corruption. Consequently, only one out of six respondents to the NSCP-BiH reported participating in an anti-corruption activity in 2020<sup>45</sup>. In addition, most media in BiH are politically dependent and divided along ethnonational lines. Media reporting in BiH is considered incomplete and one-sided, often lacking multiple and diverse sources of information<sup>46</sup>. This allows the regime media to cover up corruption-related stories that may have negative implications for the incumbent political elites,

<sup>43</sup> Lee-Jones, K., Chêne, Korajlic, I. (2018). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption. U4 Helpdesk Answer, available at: <https://beta.u4.no/publications/bosnia-and-herzegovina-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption.pdf>

<sup>44</sup> Transparency international. 2020. CPI 2020: EASTERN EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA, available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2020-eastern-europe-central-asia>

<sup>45</sup> MEASURE II. 2020. National Survey of Citizens Perception, available at: <http://measurebih.com/uimages/NSCP-BiH20202020Report.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> IREX (2019). Media Sustainability Index.

often attacking their opposition and pressuring independent journalists. This generates a negative ambiance for BiH citizens, where seven out of ten believe that anti-corruption efforts are ineffective<sup>47</sup>.

### **ACFC description and theory of change**

ACFC's goal is to "increase participation of citizens in the fight against corruption by empowering CSOs to effectively engage citizens." ACFC envisions that, "if civil society influences government policy development decision-making, effectively engages citizens, and coordinates their efforts with other stakeholders, then the participation of citizens in the fight against corruption will increase." Based on the Award Program Description, ACFC aims to achieve the following results:

**Activity Goal:** Increased citizens' participation in the fight against corruption

**Activity Purpose:** Civil society is representative and credible in the fight against corruption

The Activity interventions are geared towards the following sub-purposes and outcomes.

- Sub-purpose 1: CSOs effectively influence government anti-corruption policy development decision-making
  - Outcome 1.1: Increased quantity and quality of civil-society anti-corruption monitoring efforts that stimulate engagement of citizens and raise public awareness on corruption
  - Outcome 1.2: Anti-corruption-related legislation, required for European Union (EU) accession, is adopted with significant input from civil society
- Sub-purpose 2: CSOs effectively engage citizens in the fight against corruption
  - Outcome 2.1: Citizens report reduced feelings of being unable to affect change
  - Outcome 2.2: CSOs provide free legal aid to citizens who report corruption
  - Outcome 2.3: Increased number of citizens who report corruption and seek the status of the whistleblower
- Sub-purpose 3: CSOs coordinate their anti-corruption efforts with other interested stakeholders
  - Outcome 3.1: Anti-corruption stakeholders report more efficient cooperation
  - Outcome 3.2: Local partners under this Activity report satisfaction over the administrative management and coordination conducted by the lead
  - Outcome 3.3: Local anti-corruption CSOs increase their capacities and financial viability
  - Outcome 3.4: Domestic anti-corruption CSOs impose the topic of corruption as one of the critical problems of BiH society

ACFC's cross-cutting focus is on women, youth, and marginalized populations. The Activity intends to ensure gender balance in all their activities and pay particular attention to types of corruption where women are more vulnerable. The Activity plans to reach youth through most of their interventions and campaigns, and ensure that all initiatives identify vulnerable groups related to their specific activities and areas.

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<sup>47</sup> MEASURE II. 2020. National Survey of Citizens Perception, available at: <http://measurebih.com/uimages/NSCP-BiH20202020Report.pdf>

## ACFC monitoring, evaluation, and learning plan

ACFC is tracking eight indicators to measure progress in meeting the Life of Activity (LoA) targets, while MEASURE II tracks additional four indicators at the Activity Goal level (refer to Exhibit 3).

**Exhibit 3. ACFC Indicators with relevant Baseline values, Targets, and Actuals**

Level of Result	Narrative Summary	Indicators	Baseline	Targets (actuals)		LOA Targets
			FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	
Activity Goal	Increased citizens' participation in the fight against corruption.	USAID Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI)	3.8	(3.8)	(3.8)	n/a
		% of citizens who participated in at least one anti-corruption activity in the last 12 months	16.6%	(15.6%)	n/a	n/a
		% of citizens stating that citizens can contribute to fight against corruption	42.9%	n/a	n/a	n/a
		Anti-corruption index/Corruption perception index	36/100	n/a (35/100)	n/a	n/a
Activity Purpose	Civil society is representative and credible in the fight against corruption.	DR.4.2-2 Number of civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving USG assistance engaged in advocacy interventions	0	15 (17)	18 (27)	30
		% of citizens who recognize CSOs as representatives of citizens voice in the field of anti-corruption	23.6% (22.3%M; 24.8%F)	25% (18.9%)	24% (18.9%)	30%
		DR.2.4-2 Number of mechanisms for external oversight of public resource use supported by USG assistance	0	5 (5)	4 (4)	21
Activity Sub-Purpose 1	CSOs effectively influence government anti-corruption policy development decision-making.	DR.2.4-4 Number of anti-corruption measures proposed, adopted or implemented due to USG assistance, to include laws, policies, or procedures	0	5 (5)	10 (14)	30
		Number of monitored public institutions and officials	0	900 (1264)	1120 (4249)	5220
Activity Sub-Purpose 2	CSOs effectively engage citizens in fight against corruption.	Number of potential corruption cases reported to TI BiH	0	1200 (1701)	1400 (1807)	6500
		Number of CSOs and informal groups initiatives in the fight against corruption	0	30 (34)	50 (70)	200
Activity Sub-Purpose 3	CSOs coordinate their anti-corruption efforts with other stakeholders	Percent of ACFC-assisted organizations with improved performance	0	0%	50% (66.66%)	50%

## IJP description and theory of change

IJP aims to put public pressure on the BiH government and public officials to speed up required anti-corruption reforms and strengthen public awareness of the problem of corruption through strategically targeted media campaigns. Through sub-awards, the Activity supports independent, non-state-owned media outlets and journalists dedicated to anti-corruption investigative reporting in an effort to expand the network of media outlets reporting on corruption, increase the quality of investigative reporting, and increase citizen awareness of corruption issues. The Activity also offers legal support to media outlets and journalists for politically motivated defamation lawsuits. IJP's goal is "increased citizens participation in governance (with a focus on anti-corruption)". The Activity intends to ensure citizens have access to unbiased information by increasing the quantity and quality of investigative reports, expanding the pool of media and journalists engaged in investigative reporting and strengthening their mutual collaboration, and by improving the public awareness of corruption. Based on the Award Program Description, IJP aims to achieve the following:

**Activity Goal:** Increased citizens participation in fight against corruption

**Activity Purpose:** Civil society is representative and credible in the fight against corruption

The Activity aims to contribute to this goal by achieving four strategic objectives:

- Outcome 1: Increase the quantity and quality of investigative media reporting on corruption
  - Output 1.1: Increased quantity of media reporting on corruption
  - Output 1.2: Increase in the quality of professional investigative reporting on corruption
- Outcome 2: Provide support to media outlets and journalists/bloggers dedicated to investigative reporting
  - Output 2.1: Significantly expand the network of media outlets and journalists dedicated to investigative media reporting
  - Output 2.2: Strengthen cooperation with media outlets and journalist which are combating corruption
- Outcome 3: Increase public awareness on corruption
  - Output 3.1: Investigative reports produced and media support to citizens and their initiatives provided
  - Output 3.2. Strengthen cooperation with other CSOs and USAID's Activities
- Outcome 4: Provide legal support to media outlet and journalist partners that might be targeted by defamation lawsuits.
  - Output 4.1: Media outlet and journalists partner to receive free legal assistance/representation for defamation lawsuits

IJP's cross-cutting focus is to achieve sustainability of media partners engaged in the program, promote gender equality and female empowerment through all components, as well as address youth's concerns and empower youth to critically evaluate media reports related to political, economic, and civic developments. The program is fully focused on anti-corruption issues and supporting media outlets, journalists, and CSO anti-corruption initiatives in the country.

## IJP monitoring, evaluation, and learning plan

With minor adjustments to the results compared to the Award document, IJP is tracking six indicators to measure progress in meeting Life of Activity targets (refer to Exhibit 4), while MEASURE II tracks additional three indicators at the Activity goal level

**Exhibit 4. IJP Indicators with relevant Baseline, Targets and Actuals**

Level of Result	Narrative Summary	Indicators	Baseline	Targets (actuals)		LOA Targets
			FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	
Activity Goal	Increased citizens participation in governance (with focus on anti-corruption)	Corruption Perception Index/Anti-corruption Index	36/100	n/a (35/100)	n/a	n/a
		% of citizens who participated in at least one anti-corruption activity in the last 12 months	16.6%	(15.6%)	n/a	n/a
		% of citizens who bribed a public official in the last 12 months	17.4%	(11.3%)	n/a	n/a
Activity Purpose	Citizens' access to unbiased information ensured	% of citizens stating they noticed an increase in media reporting on corruption	42.7% (M 54, F 46)	(43.3%)	42 (42)	51
Activity Outcome/Output 1.1	Quantity of high-quality investigative reporting on corruption enhanced	DR.2.4-2 Number of mechanisms for external oversight of public resource use supported by USG assistance	0	380 (474)	390 (430)	2000
		Number of investigative reports produced by media partners that meet quality criteria	0	280 (305)	290 (295)	1500
		Number of non-state news outlets and journalists/bloggers assisted by USG	0	12 (12)	14 (12)	20
Activity Outcome/Output 1.2	Public awareness of corruption improved	Number of citizens' interactions with the social media content	350,000	380,000 (1 444, 845)	410,000 (1 431,720 )	2,200,000
Activity Outcome/Output 1.3	Legal support to media outlets and journalist partners that are targeted by defamation lawsuits provided	Number of reported defamation lawsuits for which legal assistance was provided	0	5 (25)	8 (9)	15

## EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation team will assess the Activities' progress to-date along the following evaluation questions (EQs):

1. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP raised public confidence in activism and awareness about civil society and media efforts to fight against corruption?
2. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP improved citizen, media, and other actors' engagement in anti-corruption activities?

3. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP's monitoring, advocacy, and investigative journalism efforts resulted in improvements of anti-corruption policies, reporting, and justice response?

The evaluation team will review the Activities' progress toward the achievement of monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) targets as part of these evaluation questions. The team will also investigate the Activities' potential to contribute to the detection of malign foreign influence.

## EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team will employ a mixed-method evaluation approach and triangulate data to assess the results achieved through the ACFC and IJP interventions and activities, utilizing the following data sources:

1. **Activity documents** including, Activity Awards; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plans; work plans; annual and quarterly progress reports; and data and documents collected and produced by the Activities and their beneficiaries, such as policy proposals, monitoring databases and reports, investigative reports, and social media analytics.
2. **Secondary documentation relevant to the Activities** including data from the MEASURE-BiH/MEASURE II National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions (NSCP); Judicial Effectiveness Index (JEI); evaluation reports of former USAID's Activities (e.g., USAID/BiH's Anti-Corruption Civic Organizations' Unified Network, Justice Activity, Strengthening Independent Media Activity); and research reports and other documents developed by government institutions, international organizations, CSOs, or media. Particular attention will be paid to longitudinal surveys on corruption, such as the Corruption Perception Index.
3. **Key informant interviews (KIIs)** with USAID/BiH and ACFC and IJP implementing partners (IPs) and subcontractors; ACFC and IJP grantees and beneficiaries; relevant international and donor organizations; government institutions and agencies; media representatives; CSO representatives; and corruption and anti-corruption experts. The full list of key informants (without identifying information) and draft KII guides will be presented in the evaluation work plan and subject to USAID/BiH comments.
4. **Focus groups (FGs)** with ACFC and IJP grantees and beneficiaries. The full list of FGs and the draft FG guide(s) will be presented in the evaluation work plan and subject to USAID/BiH comments.
5. **Survey(s)** of ACFC and IJP beneficiaries and citizens. The evaluation team intends to survey a broader range of Activities' beneficiaries to strengthen the data obtained through KIIs and FGs. The evaluation team will also consider conducting a survey of citizens. The purpose will be to identify to what extent and how ACFC/IJP initiatives and content have influenced public opinion, in particular citizens' confidence that corruption can be curbed as well as their motivation to report corruption. The sampling plan and draft survey(s) will be presented in the evaluation work plan and subject to USAID/BiH comments.

Exhibit 5 presents the evaluation matrix outlining the methodology to be employed to address each evaluation question. The evaluation team will start the analysis by reviewing secondary data on corruption and the fight against corruption in BiH. The team will then review the Activities' documents to learn about implementation and results achieved through different interventions. Subsequently, the team will conduct KIIs and FGs with donors, experts, implementers, and

beneficiaries to obtain in-depth knowledge of the results achieved by the Activities and lessons learned through implementation. Finally, based on key findings formulated through the desk review, KIIs and FGs, the evaluation team will design and conduct online surveys to identify how and to what extent the Activities' interventions contributed to changing public opinion and citizens' perceptions.

The evaluation team will conduct a desk review of the Activities' documents and secondary documents, transcribe and code KII and FG transcripts, and conduct descriptive analysis of the survey data. The team will compare data from all sources and further explore areas of convergence and divergence to ensure that the evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations are high-quality, valid, credible, and reliable.

EXHIBIT 5. EVALUATION MATRIX		
EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	DATA SOURCES/DATA COLLECTION METHODS	DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH
EQ1. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP raised public confidence in activism and awareness about civil society and media efforts to fight against corruption?	Activity documents (primarily Activity Awards, progress reports/MEL data, and social media analytics) and secondary documents on public perception of corruption (e.g., NSCP, CPI); KIIs and FGs with IPs and beneficiaries discussing public perception on corruption; surveys of ACFC and IJP beneficiaries and (if feasible) citizens	Desk review; KII/FG transcript coding; descriptive survey analysis
EQ2. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP improved citizen, media, and other actors' engagement in anti-corruption activities?	Activity documents (primarily Activity Awards, progress reports, and grant reports) and secondary documents; KIIs and FGs with IPs and beneficiaries (primarily participants in monitoring and anti-corruption interventions, and media representatives); surveys of ACFC and IJP beneficiaries and (if feasible) citizens	Desk review; KII/FG transcript coding; descriptive survey analysis
EQ3. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP's monitoring, advocacy, and investigative journalism efforts resulted in improvements of anti-corruption policies, reporting and justice response?	Activity documents (primarily Activity Awards, progress reports, and policy documents) and secondary documents; KIIs and FGs with IPs and beneficiaries; surveys of ACFC and IJP beneficiaries	Desk review; KII/FG transcript coding; descriptive survey analysis

## EVALUATION LIMITATIONS

- **Recall bias.** Some beneficiaries who participated in early interventions may have difficulties remembering details of interventions. The evaluation team members will review all Activity documents and prepare for the interviews and, when needed, remind the participants about interventions to help them recall their experiences and impressions.
- **Interview bias.** Interviewers' behavior and reactions may lead KIIs and FG participants to respond in a certain way. Therefore, the interviewers will be trained to ask questions in a non-leading way. In addition to avoiding any potentially leading questions, the evaluation team will make sure that respondents understand that their true opinions are the most appreciated and that their responses are confidential.
- **Response bias.** Many organizations participate in the implementation of a wide range of ACFC and IJP interventions. Implementers may overstate the results of anti-corruption interventions in which they engage. Whenever possible, the evaluation team will compare the information obtained from implementers with information from beneficiaries, including an anonymous survey of beneficiaries, to verify the credibility of findings. The evaluation team will



make sure that respondents understand that their true opinions are the most appreciated. The evaluation team will also ensure that respondents are aware of confidentiality of any information they provide.

- **Survey response rates.** Activities' beneficiaries may be unwilling to fill out the survey forms or refuse to participate in surveys. To increase response, the evaluation team will attempt multiple contacts with beneficiaries to improve the survey response rates.
- **Issues arising due to epidemiological situation.** Due to the worsened epidemiological situation in the country related to the COVID-19, the evaluation team intends to conduct this evaluation remotely. This may limit access to some stakeholders who are unwilling to participate in online meetings or focus groups. The evaluation team will be flexible and conduct meetings with such stakeholders in person. In such situation, the evaluation team will comply with all COVID-19 safety measures prescribed by local authorities and AIR's internal documents.

## **DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS**

All deliverables will be submitted electronically and in English. The deliverables will include:

### **1. Detailed evaluation work plan and data collection instrument(s)**

The evaluation work plan will include: (1) a detailed evaluation design matrix (including the key questions, methods, and data sources used to address each question and the data analysis plan for each question); (2) draft data collection instruments (interview guides, focus group discussion guides, and surveys) (3) the list of potential interviewees (without personal information); (4) sampling plan for the survey; (5) known limitations to the evaluation design; (6) the anticipated schedule and logistical arrangements; and (7) a list of the members of the evaluation/ team, delineated by roles and responsibilities.

### **2. Presentation of preliminary findings/briefing for the Mission**

A presentation of preliminary findings to USAID/BiH including a summary of initial recommendations to USAID/BiH.

### **3. Draft evaluation report**

The draft evaluation report will be consistent with the USAID Evaluation Report Requirements, USAID's evaluation policy, and take into account criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report specified in ADS REFERENCE 201MAA.

### **4. Final evaluation report**

Once USAID's comments on the initial draft are provided to the evaluation team, the team will address comments and submit a revised final report within ten calendar days. The final report will be up to 45 pages long, excluding the executive summary and annexes.

### **5. Evaluation follow-up workshop**

Upon the Mission's approval of the final report, MEASURE II will organize a follow-up workshop to discuss utilization of evaluation findings and conclusions, as well as application of recommendations to ongoing and/or future USAID/BiH development programming. The workshop will strengthen the use of evidence and facilitate improved collaborating, learning, and adapting (CLA) practices for USAID/BiH.



## SCHEDULE

The overview of the tentative evaluation timeline is provided in Exhibit 6.

EXHIBIT 6. TENTATIVE EVALUATION TIMELINE	
TENTATIVE DATES	TASKS AND DELIVERABLES
February 14, 2022	Draft Work Plan (with data collection instruments)
February 14 - 21, 2022	Logistical preparation, scheduling KIIs interviews and FGs, online survey preparation
February 14-April 12, 2022	Testing data collection instruments Data collection through KIIs, FGs, and surveys KII and FG transcription and coding Analysis of secondary data/documentation Preparing the presentation of preliminary findings
April 12, 2022	Presentation to USAID/BiH to discuss the preliminary findings and recommendations
April 12 – May 10, 2022	Finalizing transcription of KIIs and FGs Finalizing data analysis Report drafting Draft report submitted for the HO review
May 10, 2022	Address the HO and copy editor's comments on the draft report and submit the report to the Mission
TBD, May 2022	Evaluation follow-up workshop
TBD, May 2022	USAID to send comments on draft report
Up to 10 days upon receiving USAID comments	Submit the final evaluation report to USAID/BiH

## ANNEX 2: DETAILED METHODOLOGY

This section of the report details the main tasks the evaluation team carried out during each phase of the evaluation. The evaluation lasted from February to June 2022. The period comprised approximately three weeks for a desk review of the ACFC and IJP documents and drafting the Workplan and evaluation methodology, including developing data collection instruments, protocols, and other planning for fieldwork. The evaluation period also accounts for two weeks of fieldwork logistical preparation, six weeks of data collection, two weeks of data analysis, and three weeks of report drafting. Following USAID review and comments on the draft report, the evaluation team had two weeks to revise the report.

### PHASE 1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

To examine the effectiveness of the Activities' interventions and their results, the evaluation team employed a mixed-methods data collection approach that included data triangulation. This evaluation examined more than two years of ACFC and IJP implementation for which reporting data were available: from the end of September 2019 through April 2022. During the planning phase, the evaluation team reviewed and discussed the ACFC and IJP evaluation SOW, clarified team members' roles and responsibilities, reviewed key documents from ACFC and IJP (listed in Annex 3), prepared the Workplan, and formulated the evaluation design. The Workplan was submitted to USAID/BiH on February 14, 2022.

In the preparatory phase, the evaluation team **reviewed the ACFC and IJP documents**, including: Activity Awards; Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plans; work plans; annual and quarterly progress reports; lists of beneficiaries, experts, and other stakeholders involved in implementation; and data and documents collected and produced by the Activities and their beneficiaries, such as policy proposals, monitoring databases and reports, investigative reports, and social media analytics.

The evaluation team also collected and **reviewed the secondary documentation** relevant to the anti-corruption field, primarily those sources which MEASURE-BiH/MEASURE II collects regularly and produces. The MEASURE II National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions (NSCP) is collected annually, face-to-face, on a stratified random sample of 3,000 civilian, non-institutionalized adults. Findings are published at <https://www.measurebih.com/national-survey-of-citizens-perceptions>, with up to nine months of delay from data collection. Data from the survey administered in November 2021 are used in this evaluation report, although the publication of findings is still in preparation. The MEASURE II Judicial Effectiveness Index (JEI) is also calculated annually, based partially on the NSCP data, as well as other MEASURE II sources. MEASURE BiH/MEASURE II also conducted evaluations of former USAID's Activities which are relevant to the ACFC and IJP implementation – reports from those evaluations were also reviewed, including evaluations of the USAID/BiH's Anti-Corruption Civic Organizations' Unified Network (ACCOUNT) which preceded the ACFC, the earlier Justice Activity and the Strengthening Independent Media Activity. Research reports and other documents developed by government institutions, international organizations, CSOs, and media were also screened.

### PHASE 2. DATA COLLECTION

The fieldwork took place from early March until the end of May 2022. The ET used a mixed methods evaluation design and due to the COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, data collection was conducted remotely. The evaluation team conducted interviews and focus groups with a total of 95 individuals from USAID, implementing partners, direct beneficiaries, institutions, international organizations, and non-beneficiary organizations.

**Key informant interviews** were first conducted with USAID/BiH and ACFC and IJP implementing partners (IPs), followed by other USAID/BiH Activities. The evaluation team also interviewed a limited number of direct beneficiaries while the rest of the IJP and ACFC grantees and informal groups were invited to focus groups. The team also interviewed relevant international and donor organizations, governmental anti-corruption agencies, non-beneficiary media and CSOs, as well as three members of the academic community in BiH. A total of **41** individual and group interviews were conducted.

Annex 4 includes interview protocols which the evaluation team followed for the key groups of key informants. Each guide included a combination of questions relevant to the three evaluation questions, as well as 3-5 questions related to the Key Learning Priorities (KLPs), and questions related to lessons learned.

The protocols 1) ensure the ET addresses all key issues during data collection; 2) elicit rich, sometimes unanticipated, information from respondents; and 3) help organize information in a form that the ET can efficiently analyze. The protocols consist of questions that address and derive from the EQs, as well as from the ET's document review, initial discussions with USAID, and evaluation design knowledge.

**Focus Group Discussions** were conducted with the ACFC and IJP grantees and informal initiatives. A total of **five** FGDs were conducted – **one** with **11** representatives of the IJP media grantees (out of 15), **two** focus groups with a total of **19** representatives of the ACFC grantees (CSOs), and **two** more focus groups with representatives of **16** informal initiatives supported through the ACFC. All focus groups were conducted via Zoom.

Annex 5 includes a Focus Groups Guide which follows a similar logic like the interview protocols but adapted to the two-hour format which limits the space for details, and yet leaves enough time for all participants to highlight the most important experiences with the two Activities.

**Three online surveys** of ACFC and IJP direct beneficiaries also supported the evaluation. Survey designed for 36 ACFC-supported informal groups had a 52 percent response rate (17 initiatives responded). The second survey targeted 27 ACFC grantees (CSOs) and 16 responded to the survey (60 percent). Out of the 15 IJP grantees (media CSOs), 12 responded to the survey (80 percent).

Annex 6 includes the survey questions sent via email to groups of direct beneficiaries, namely the ACFC CSO grantees, the ACFC informal ingroups, and the IJP media grantees. Key areas of questions included beneficiaries' satisfaction with support, their key achievements within grants/support, their key activities (stakeholder engagement, especially citizens' engagement, requests for changes of administrative decisions, policy proposals, requests for information, filed corruption reports), as well as experiences with defamation lawsuits among media grantees. The questionnaires also explored the awareness about CSO and media grantees and informal initiatives, as well as confidence in specific supported organizations/groups public interest orientation and capacity to effect change. Survey also asked about confidence in and transparency of the implementing partners and about the general civil society and media context in BiH. Survey also asked about usefulness of the ACFC platforms and media grantees were asked specific questions about media content presentation and promotion. Several questions explored attitudes and experiences of the leaders of the ACFC initiatives, as well as some general information about the grantees.

The questions were synchronized between the three questionnaires so as to ensure comparability. A comparison of key results comparable across the three surveys is available in Annex 11.

**COMPUTER-ASSISTED TELEPHONE SURVEY (CATI)** took place in April 2022 in four locations (Sarajevo, Bijeljina, Kreševo, Brčko) randomly assigned from the list of cities/municipalities directly targeted by the ACFC grantees and informal groups. Respondents (**1600**, 400 in each municipality/city) in those locations were randomly selected from the databases of fixed and mobile phone numbers for each telecom operator in each municipality. Sample management and the questionnaire flow were controlled by CATI software.<sup>48</sup> Survey questionnaire is available in Annex 7.

### PHASE 3: DATA ANALYSIS

The team co-leads oversaw and managed the systematic analysis of qualitative data. The evaluation team's data analysis approach used data triangulation to crosscheck results, and applied several analysis methods to provide evidence for the evaluation's findings and conclusions.

**Process:** The evaluation team members took detailed notes of KIIs and FGDs, cleaning and sharing electronic summaries on a rolling basis throughout fieldwork. Team members conducted internal debriefs during fieldwork to discuss progress and make any adjustments as needed in the evaluation schedule. The team discussed evidence collected to help answer the EQs, as well as identify any discrepancies. The team also identified any emerging patterns and themes that were helpful in developing the analysis coding scheme. To the extent allowed by participants, the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. The evaluation team compared the notes with transcripts to maximize the quality of findings. The evaluation team captured preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations (FCR) in a matrix that categorized analysis by EQ. The matrix tallied themes that arose from the interviews and included metadata, such as respondent type or interview type (KII or FGD). This enabled the evaluation team to look for trends within and across sub-groups. The matrix ensured that the ET prepared a systematic and thorough response to each EQ, verified preliminary analysis accounts for gender and social dimensions, identified any gaps where the ET needed additional clarification or analysis, and served as the basis for developing the evaluation report.

**Methods:** The evaluation team employed several data analysis methods to identify key findings from the collected data, as well as to draw conclusions and make recommendations for the two Activities. The type of analyses depended on the specific data assessed. Analysis methods included:

- **Content Analysis** – Entailed the evaluation team's intensive review and coding of KII and FGD data to identify and highlight notable examples of successes (or lack of successes) that contributed to the (or inhibited) achievement of its objectives.
- **Gap Analysis** – The evaluation team examined which aspects of the two activities, if any, fell short of anticipated performance, and the likely factors contributing to these gaps.
- **Comparative Analysis** – The evaluation team undertook comparisons of the ACFC and IJP results across stakeholder groups, including comparisons of qualitative data from interviews and focus groups on one side, and quantitative data from surveys with direct beneficiaries and citizens in targeted municipalities/cities.

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<sup>48</sup> A portion of surveys conducted in Kresevo were conducted on site, as the data collection company was unable to reach the quota over the phone.

**Media content analysis** was also specifically used to analyze 45 out of 223 pieces of content (20 percent) produced within the IJP media grantees and 38 out of 760 (5 percent) pieces from Žurnal. Within the two groups, the content was randomly sampled, and content analysis followed pre-defined variables. The analysis aimed to identify whether the supported content covers areas and scales of corruption that affect citizens more directly, whether the voice of citizens and activist groups is represented in the content, and whether the content gives hope that corruption can be stopped.

**Variables for media content analysis** included:

- Corruption areas: Abuse of office; Construction; Discrimination; Education; Energy sector; Environment; Healthcare; Judiciary; Police work; Privatization; Public procurement; State institutions; Other
- High politics vs small story
- Protagonists: Institutions; citizens; media; CSOs; employees; experts; media; other
- Sources: AC protagonists; citizens; CSOs; media; expert; institution; politician; media; company; public register; public official; private document; unnamed
- Title tone: confusing; informative; metaphorical; sensationalist
- Location or level:
- Explores policy problem (YES or NO)
- Offers policy solution (YES or NO)
- Success story included (YES or NO)
- Whistleblowers involved (YES or NO)
- ACFC/IJP as protagonists (Grantees; Informal groups; IPs; media pool)

**The sampling approach for media content analysis** is described in the following table. The evaluation team randomly selected 20 percent of the content the media pool produced, and five percent of the content the IJP produced. Randomization enabled for better generalizability of findings, while the limited time prevented the evaluation team from analyzing in detail all 983 pieces of content produced within IJP.

SOURCE	TOTAL	SAMPLE RATE	NO SAMPLED	APPROACH
Media pool	223	20.0%	45	Randomization in excel, sorting
Žurnal	760	5.0%	38	Randomization in excel, sorting
Total	983	8.4%	83	

## Triangulation

In mid-May 2022, the evaluation team analyzed the data, triangulating various data sources to generate robust findings and conclusions about the evaluation questions. Triangulation enabled the evaluation team to cross-verify and cross-validate findings that emerged from using the above data collection methods and data sources to validate responses and identify correlations among findings to determine the ACFC's and IJP's overall effectiveness. The evaluation team designed data collection protocols with the same or similar questions across its KIIs (for various stakeholder groups), FGDs, and surveys. This facilitated data triangulation because each method/stakeholder group addressed subsets of the same EQs, and their testimony validated or refuted that of the other techniques/stakeholders. This approach also enabled the evaluation team to strengthen the potential

linkages and accuracy of its data if the results obtained through one method or from one stakeholder group were less conclusive than those obtained through another method or stakeholder group.

EXHIBIT 5. EVALUATION MATRIX		
EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	DATA SOURCES/DATA COLLECTION METHODS	DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH
EQ1. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP raised public confidence in activism and awareness about civil society and media efforts to fight against corruption?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Activity documents (primarily Activity Awards, progress reports/MEL data, social media analytics)</li> <li>2. Secondary documents on corruption (e.g., NSCP, JEI, CPI)</li> <li>3. KII with the Mission, IPs, representatives of government and international organizations, CSOs, and media</li> <li>4. FGs with ACFC and IJP grantees and beneficiaries</li> <li>5. Online surveys with direct beneficiaries (ACFC CSO grantees, ACFC informal groups, IJP media grantees)</li> <li>6. CATI of citizens in targeted municipalities</li> <li>7. Media content analysis</li> </ol>	<p>1 and 2: Desk review</p> <p>3, 4, and 7: KII/FG transcript coding</p> <p>5 and 6: descriptive survey analysis</p> <p>7. Media content analysis</p>
EQ2. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP improved citizen, media, and other actors' engagement in anti-corruption activities?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Activity documents (primarily Activity Awards, progress reports/MEL data, social media analytics)</li> <li>2. Secondary documents on corruption (e.g., NSCP, JEI, CPI)</li> <li>3. KII with the Mission, IPs, representatives of government and international organizations, CSOs, and media</li> <li>4. FGs with ACFC and IJP grantees and beneficiaries</li> <li>5. Online surveys with direct beneficiaries</li> <li>6. CATI of citizens in targeted municipalities</li> <li>7. Media content analysis</li> </ol>	<p>1 and 2: Desk review</p> <p>3, 4, and 7: KII/FG transcript coding</p> <p>5 and 6: descriptive survey analysis</p>
EQ3. To what extent have the ACFC and IJP's monitoring, advocacy, and investigative journalism efforts resulted in improvements of anti-corruption policies, reporting and justice response?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Activity documents (primarily Activity Awards, progress reports/MEL data, social media analytics)</li> <li>2. Secondary documents on corruption (e.g., NSCP, JEI, CPI)</li> <li>3. KII with the Mission, IPs, representatives of government and international organizations, CSOs, and media</li> <li>4. FGs with ACFC and IJP grantees and beneficiaries</li> <li>5. Online surveys with direct beneficiaries</li> <li>6. CATI of citizens in targeted municipalities</li> <li>7. Media content analysis</li> </ol>	<p>1 and 2: Desk review</p> <p>3, 4, and 7: KII/FG transcript coding</p> <p>5 and 6: descriptive survey analysis</p>

### **ANNEX 3: REVIEWED DOCUMENTS**

1. USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy
2. USAID ACFC Program Description
3. USAID ACFC Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan
4. USAID ACFC Activity Tracking Table
5. USAID ACFC 1<sup>st</sup> Annual Work Plan
6. USAID ACFC 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual Work Plan
7. USAID ACFC 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual Work Plan
8. USAID ACFC 1<sup>st</sup> Annual Progress Report
9. USAID ACFC 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual Progress Report
10. USAID ACFC Press Clipping Y1
11. USAID ACFC Press Clipping Y2
12. USAID ACFC Y1 Q1 Quarterly Report (Sep-Dec 2019)
13. USAID ACFC Y1 Q2 Quarterly Report (Jan-Mar 2020)
14. USAID ACFC Y1 Q3 Quarterly Report (Apr-Jun 2020)
15. USAID ACFC Y2 Q1 Quarterly Report (Sep-Dec 2020)
16. USAID ACFC Y2 Q2 Quarterly Report (Jan-Mar 2021)
17. USAID ACFC Y2 Q3 Quarterly Report (Apr-Jun 2021)
18. USAID ACFC Y3 Q1 Quarterly Report (Sep-Dec 2021)
19. USAID ACFC Y3 Q2 Quarterly Report (Jan-Mar 2022)
20. Info Sheet – ACFC Grants for CSOs 2022
21. Info Sheet – ACFC Informal Citizens Groups 2022
22. ACFC Grantees' List of Institutional Partners
23. ACFC IPs' List of Institutional Partners
24. ACFC/CCI Healthcare Grants Call, Contracts, and Implementation Reports
25. ACFC/CCI Small Grants Call, Contracts, and Implementation Reports
26. ACFC/CCI Informal Groups Call, Memorandums, and Implementation Reports
27. ACFC/CCI Grants Manual/revised
28. ACFC/CRMA PP Monitoring Grantees Contracts and Implementation Reports
29. ACFC/CCI Indicators background documentation for FY1 and FY2
30. ACFC List of Websites and Social Networks Profiles
31. ACFC Audience Engagement Statistics in ACFC-affiliated websites and Facebook pages
32. ACFC Guidance and Materials for Monitoring of PP and APR
33. ACFC Analyses and Policy Recommendations by CCI grantees, TI, and CRMA
34. ACFC Communication and Visibility Plan
35. USAID IJP Activity Award



36. TI (2020). Zakonodavstvo i praksa zaštite uzbunjivača u Bosni i Hercegovini (Legislation and Practice of Whistleblower Protection in BiH). <https://ti-bih.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Zakonodavstvo-i-praksa-zastite-uzbunjivaca-u-BiH.pdf>

## **ANNEX 4: INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS**

### **USAID**

1. What have been the main reasons for USAID to design and support the ACFC and IJP Activities in BiH?
2. What are your key expectations for the ACFC and IJP Activities? Which key results were you expecting the Activities to have achieved by now and have they achieved those?
3. To what extent and how would you say the Activities have improved citizens' awareness of civil society and media's anti-corruption activities and efforts?
4. To what extent and how would you say the Activities have improved citizens' confidence in anti-corruption efforts supported by CSOs and media, or their own individual activism?
5. To what extent and how have the Activities managed to create or reinvigorate a network of anti-corruption CSOs and expand their constituencies?
6. To what extent and how have the Activities mobilized citizens to join the fight against corruption, either through monitoring and advocacy activities, increased reporting of corruption, implementation of citizen initiatives through informal groups, or any other way?
7. To what extent and how have the Activities expanded the number and quality of media outlets and journalists engaged in investigative reporting?
8. Have the Activities facilitated the engagement of any other stakeholders in the fight against corruption? Please elaborate.
9. To what extent have the Activities engagement resulted in policy changes? Can you provide an example?
10. To what extent have the Activities engagement (e.g., monitoring, analyses, investigative reporting) resulted in increased reporting of corruption to authorities? Can you provide an example?
11. How would you describe the justice response to such reporting, including the response to defamation lawsuits which are at times used as a strategy to deter media writing about corruption?
12. What challenges, if any, have ACFC or IJP experienced during the first 2.5 years of implementation?
  - a. Coordination with other USAID's Activities (e.g., JACA, E-Governance, IMEP, BMAP)
  - b. COVID-19 circumstance
  - c. Political backlash against activists and journalists
13. How might the Activities address these challenges to improve implementation during the remaining years?
14. Are there any upcoming or recent changes within the Activities that could affect implementation that the ET should be aware of? PROBE:
  - a. Staffing changes?
  - b. Financing?
15. What information are you and/or the Activities most interested in learning from this evaluation? How does USAID intend to utilize this learning?

### **IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS**

#### *Introduction and context*

1. What are the major obstacles facing CSOs and media in BiH as it relates to the fight against corruption? What windows of opportunities are there?
2. FMI: To what extent would you say CSOs and media in BiH are independent and working in citizens' interest, versus being subject to external influences? If you feel that CSOs and media



are subject to external influence, how do you feel these influences have impacted BiH's EU integration efforts? What or who are the drivers of these external influences?

3. KLP: To what extent would you say BiH citizens trust the work of local CSOs and the information produced by local media outlets? If you think they do not trust them, why do you think so?
4. FMI: To what extent would you say BiH citizens are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation in media? Please elaborate.

### *Results*

1. How have you promoted the ACFC/IJP activities among the public and in what ways, if any, has this resulted in improvements of citizens' awareness of CSO and media anti-corruption activities?
2. In what ways, if any, have ACFC/IJP improved citizens' confidence in anti-corruption activism conducted by CSOs, media, and their own activism?
  - a. Confidence in media
  - b. Confidence in CSOs
  - c. Confidence in citizens own power
3. In what ways, if any, have ACFC/IJP improved the engagement of stakeholders, including CSOs, citizens, media, government, businesses, and academia, around anti-corruption efforts?
5. In what ways, if any, has ACFC contributed to improving BiH's anti-corruption policy framework? In what ways, if any, has the IJP contributed to these efforts? In what ways, if any, have ACFC/IJP supported increased reporting of cases of corruption to authorities?  
Probe: KLP: How has the ACFC/IJP improved the protection of citizens reporting corruption?
6. How would you describe the justice sector's response to reports of corruption, including their response to defamation lawsuits which are at times used as a strategy to deter media writing about corruption??

### *Lessons learned and recommendations*

7. Think about the expected results in terms of improving public awareness and confidence in anti-corruption activities, stakeholder engagement in such activities, anti-corruption policies, and justice response to corruption. Based on what you have learned through the implementation so far:
  - What activities and approaches have been most successful and least successful in achieving the results to date?
  - What factors have facilitated or hindered achievement of results to date?
  - How can the Activity adjust or improve its implementation strategy and approach to better achieve the goals and objectives? (PROBE: engage different stakeholders, change activity design, etc.)
  - Have you made any changes to your planning or implementation based on the lessons you learned along the way?

### *Collaboration*

8. Please describe if and how you have collaborated with ACFC/IJP in implementing the Activity?
9. Please describe if and how you have collaborated with any other USAID (e.g. JACA, E-Governance, IMEP, BMAP, SPPG) or other donor projects in implementing the ACFC/IJP?
10. How could the collaboration between these two Activities or with other projects be strengthened to help ACFC/IJP achieve its objectives?

### *Implementation*

11. What challenges, if any, have ACFC/IJP experienced during the first 2 years of implementation?  
PROBE: Issues in terms of ...
  - a. COVID-19 circumstance
  - b. Political backlash against activists and journalists
  - c. External threats, cyberattacks
  - d. Other

12. Are there any upcoming or recent changes within the Activity that could affect implementation that the ET should be aware of? PROBE:
- Staffing changes?
  - Financing?

## **DIRECT BENEFICIARIES**

### *Introduction and context*

1. What are the major obstacles facing CSOs and media in BiH as it relates to the fight against corruption? What windows of opportunities are there?
2. FMI: To what extent would you say CSOs and media in BiH are independent and working in citizens' interest, versus being subject to external influences? If you feel that CSOs and media are subject to external influence, how do you feel these influences have impacted BiH's EU integration efforts? What or who are the drivers of these external influences?
3. KLP: To what extent would you say BiH citizens trust the work of local CSOs and the information produced by local media outlets? If you think they do not trust them, why do you think it so?
4. FMI: To what extent would you say BiH citizens are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation in media? Please elaborate.
5. Please describe your Activity's theory of change and expected results.

### *Design and implementation*

6. Can you briefly describe the project for which you received ACFC/IJP financial support, specifically highlighting what were you trying to achieve, and how?

### *Results*

7. How did you promote your activities? Please state the examples (e.g., activities, approaches, platforms, formats)
8. In what way, if any, has your project improved citizens' awareness of CSO and/or media anti-corruption activities?
9. In what way, if any, has your project improved citizens' confidence in anti-corruption activism of supported CSOs, media, and their own activism? (1-not at all, 2-slightly, 3-moderately, 4-extremely)
  - Confidence in media
  - Confidence in CSOs
  - Confidence in citizens' power
10. In what way, if any, has your project improved engagement in the fight against corruption among CSOs, citizens, media and journalist, governments, businesses, academia, or any other stakeholders?
11. KLP: Has your project improved the protection of citizens reporting corruption? If yes, how?
12. Has your project contributed to improvements in the anti-corruption policy framework, and how?
13. If applicable, could you please provide examples of when your project reported cases of corruption to authorities? How would you describe the justice sector's response to these reports?
14. If you encountered any defamation lawsuits during your engagement with the Activity, can you please describe your experience, the support you receive from the ACFC/IJP, and the justice sector's response?

15. Have there been any issues in implementation in your project that you would like to highlight?

PROBE: Issues in terms of ...

- a. COVID-19 circumstance
- b. Political backlash against activists and journalists
- c. External threats, cyber attacks
- d. Other

16. Think about the expected results in terms of improving public awareness about and confidence in anti-corruption activities, various stakeholder engagement in such activities, anti-corruption policies, and justice response to corruption. Based on what you have learned through the implementation your project:

- What activities and approaches have been most successful and least successful in improving public perception and confidence in CSO and media efforts to fight corruption?
- What factors facilitate or hinder the success of anti-corruption efforts?

How can the stakeholders, including government, international donors, civil society organizations, and media, improve anti-corruption policies and justice sector response?

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, AUTHORITIES, NON-BENEFICIARIES

### *Introduction and context*

1. What are the major obstacles facing CSOs and media in BiH as it relates to the fight against corruption? What windows of opportunities are there?
2. FMI: To what extent would you say CSOs and media in BiH are independent and working in citizens' interest, versus being subject to external influences? If you feel that CSOs and media are subject to external influence, how do you feel these influences have impacted BiH's EU integration efforts? What or who are the drivers of these external influences?
3. KLP: To what extent would you say BiH citizens trust the work of local CSOs and the information produced by local media outlets? If you think they do not trust them, why do you think it so?
4. FMI: To what extent would you say BiH citizens are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation in media? Please elaborate.

### *Projects*

1. Please describe the work that your organization's does in the field of anti-corruption.
2. What changes, positive or negative, have you noticed in the last two years when it comes to:
  - public awareness about and confidence in anti-corruption activities
  - stakeholder engagement (CSO, media, citizens, other) in anti-corruption activities
  - anti-corruption policies
  - justice sector's response to corruption cases
3. Are you familiar with the work of the USAID funded ACFC/IJP Activities or ACFC/IJP grantees?
  - What about these web and online tools (Zurnal.info, Antikorupcija.info, Transparentno.ba, Pratimotendere.ba)? If yes, do you ever follow these websites or use these tools? If yes, do you find them useful?
  - Do you find these organizations/groups/grantees credible in their fight against corruption?
  - In what ways, if any, has your organization coordinated or cooperated with ACFC, IJP, or one of its grantees?
  - To what extent did you find this coordination or cooperation useful in contributing to your organization's efforts to fight corruption?

- How could this coordination or cooperation be improved to better promote anti-corruption efforts?
4. In what ways, if any, do you coordinate or cooperate with (other) stakeholders in the anti-corruption space including civil society organizations, donors, government institutions?
    - a. To what extent did you find this coordination or cooperation useful in contributing to your organization's efforts to fight corruption?
    - b. How could this coordination or cooperation be improved to better promote anti-corruption efforts?
  5. Based on your experience working in the anti-corruption field:
    - What activities and approaches have been most successful and least successful in improving public perception and confidence in CSO and media efforts to fight corruption?
    - What factors facilitate or hinder the success of anti-corruption efforts?
    - How can the stakeholders, including government, international donors, civil society organizations, and media, improve anti-corruption policies and justice sector response?
  6. Do you have any research or policy reports on this topic you would be comfortable sharing?

## EXPERTS

5. What are the major obstacles facing CSOs and media in BiH? What are the major windows of opportunity?
6. What are the major obstacles facing CSOs and media in BiH as it relates to the fight against corruption? What windows of opportunities are there?
7. FMI: To what extent would you say CSOs and media in BiH are independent and working in citizens' interest, versus being subject to external influences? If you feel that CSOs and media are subject to external influence, how do you feel these influences have impacted BiH's EU integration efforts? What or who are the drivers of these external influences?
8. KLP: To what extent would you say BiH citizens trust the work of local CSOs and the information produced by local media outlets? If you think they do not trust them, why do you think it so?
9. FMI: To what extent would you say BiH citizens are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation in media? Please elaborate.
10. What activities and approaches have been most successful and least successful in improving public perception and confidence in CSO and media efforts to fight corruption?
11. What factors facilitate or hinder the success of anti-corruption efforts?
12. How can the stakeholders, including government, international donors, civil society organizations, and media, improve anti-corruption policies and justice sector response?
13. Have you had experience as an activist or a researcher with CSOs building a wider movement against corruption in any of the countries of former Yugoslavia? What have you learned?
14. How do you explain that so many people detest corruption in BiH, yet so few are willing to engage in action against corruption, and even fewer are willing to report it?
15. What is important for civil society organizations and media trying to incite citizen engagement through protest, reporting as witnesses or whistleblowers, and other forms of engagement?
16. Do you have any research or policy reports on this topic you would be comfortable sharing?

## ANNEX 5: FOCUS GROUPS GUIDE

### DIRECT BENEFICIARIES (GRANTEES AND INFORMAL GROUPS)

#### *Introduction and context*

1. What are the major obstacles facing CSOs and media in BiH as it relates to the fight against corruption? What windows of opportunities are there?
2. FMI: To what extent would you say CSOs and media in BiH are independent and working in citizens' interest, versus being subject to external influences? If you feel that CSOs and media are subject to external influence, how do you feel these influences have impacted BiH's EU integration efforts? What or who are the drivers of these external influences?
3. KLP: To what extent would you say BiH citizens trust the work of local CSOs and the information produced by local media outlets? If you think they do not trust them, why do you think it so?
4. FMI: To what extent would you say BiH citizens are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation in media? Please elaborate.

#### *Design and implementation*

5. Could you briefly (in 3-5 sentences) describe the project for which you received the ACFC/IJP financial support? What were you trying to achieve, and how?

#### *Results*

6. How did you promote your project activities? Please state the examples (e.g., activities, approaches, platforms, formats)
7. In what ways, if any, has your project improved citizens' awareness of CSO and/or media anti-corruption activities?
8. In what ways, if any, has your project improved citizens' confidence in anti-corruption activism of CSOs, media, and their own activism?
  - a. Confidence in media
  - b. Confidence in CSOs
  - c. Confidence in citizens' power
9. In what ways, if any, has your project improved engagement in the fight against corruption among the following stakeholders?
  - a. CSOs
  - b. Citizens
  - c. Media and journalists
  - d. Other stakeholders (e.g., government, businesses, academia)
10. KLP: Has your project improved the protection of citizens reporting corruption? If yes, how?
11. Has your project contributed to improvements in the anti-corruption policy framework, and how?
12. If applicable, could you please provide examples of situations when your project reported the cases of corruption to authorities, if any? How would you describe the justice response to these reports?
13. Did you have any encounters with defamation lawsuits? Please describe your experience, support you received from the ACFC/IJP, and justice response?
14. How has your project adjusted in the past 2.5 years to the evolving operating environment?  
PROBE:

- a. COVID-19 circumstance
- b. Political backlash against activists and journalists
- c. External threats, cyber attacks
- d. Other

15. Think about the expected results in terms of improving public awareness about and confidence in anti-corruption activities, various stakeholder engagement in such activities, anti-corruption policies, and justice response to corruption. Based on what you have learned through the implementation your project thus far:

- What activities and approaches have been most successful and least successful in improving public perception and confidence in CSO and media efforts to fight corruption?
- What factors facilitate or hinder the success of anti-corruption efforts?
- How can the stakeholders, including government, international donors, civil society organizations, and media, improve anti-corruption policies and justice sector response?

## ANNEX 6: SURVEYS FOR DIRECT BENEFICIARIES

Legend:

- IGs = ACFC Informal groups
- CSOGs = ACFC CSO grantees
- MGs = IJP media grantees

This survey is collected for the USAID Monitoring and Evaluation Support Activity (MEASURE II).

[IGs & CSOGs] The survey is intended to gather additional information about the implementation of the Assistance to Citizens in Fight Against Corruption (ACFC) implemented by Centers for Civil Initiatives (CCI), Transparency International (TI), and Center for Media Development and Analyses (CRMA), with financial support from the USAID, the United States Agency for International Development.

[MGs] The survey is intended to gather additional information about the implementation of the Investigative Journalism Program (IJP) implemented by the Center for Media Development and Analyses (CRMA), with financial support from the USAID, the United States Agency for International Development.

It is important that this survey is completed by the leader of the initiative/project or the person that is the most familiar with its activities. Your participation is voluntary, confidential, and anonymous. Although some of your responses may disclose the identifiers about your group, such information will not be shared outside the MEASURE II evaluation team, neither with USAID nor with implementing partners. The survey includes questions with predefined response options or, in some cases, open-ended questions which you can respond to in your own words. We would be grateful for your candor.

In the first set of questions, we are exploring effects of this project on citizens' awareness about the anticorruption activities and their trust that media, civil society organizations, and citizen activists can curb corruption.

1. [IGs] Please briefly describe the problem your groups is fighting against. /[CSOs] What is the main area of work for your organization, or the theme your organization works on?

2. [CSOGs] How many persons are currently employed in your organization?

3. [CSOGs & MGs] How many grants has your organization received through the ACFC/IJP? Please enter the total number of grants.

## **SATISFACTION WITH ACTIVITIES**

4. [All] On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means “Completely dissatisfied” and 5 means “Completely satisfied”, how satisfied are you with the following aspects of the project? (1 = Completely dissatisfied; 2 = Dissatisfied; 3 = Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied; 4 = Satisfied; 5 = Completely satisfied; 99 = Not applicable)

- Financial support (including cost compensation)
- Technical support (for example trainings, advice, feedback)
- Media support and promotion
- Legal support
- Staff professionalism
- Coordination between initiatives and campaigns supported by the project
- Communication with the project team
- Administrative procedures and reporting requirements

## **EXPLORING THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION**

[All] For the purpose of this survey, we can define corruption as misuse of public authority for private gains or gains of a limited number of persons. Corruption can involve direct bribe, such as money and gifts to inspectors or public employees, as well as donations to political parties or individuals in return for favoritism towards a particular company in granting of concessions and tenders for public works.

5. [IGs] How is the problem you are fighting against connected to corruption? How has someone who is a public employee or an employee of a public company, or a member of a political party appropriated resources for their own benefit or the benefit of their own group by means of misusing their public post or function?

6. [IGs & CSOGs] Which areas of misuses of public authority and resources for private gains of individuals or groups of individuals the most common in your city/municipality? Mark up to two options.

- Corruption in employment
- Corruption in healthcare
- Corruption in education
- Corruption in public procurement
- Corruption in traffic/police
- Corruption in issuing of construction permits
- Corruption in issuing concessions (e.g. for exploitation of waters, forests, ores)
- Corruption in inspections
- Corruption in customs procedures
- Something else (please specify)

7. [All] Which area of corruption is your initiative supported through this project focused on? Multiple response possible.  
/Which area of corruption were you mostly investigating as a media outlet?

- Corruption in employment
- Corruption in healthcare
- Corruption in education
- Corruption in public procurement
- Corruption in traffick/police
- Corruption in issuing of construction permits
- Corruption in issuing concessions (e.g. for exploitation of waters, forests, ores)
- Corruption in inspections
- Corruption in customs procedures
- Something else (please specify)

## **COVID-19**

8. [All] How has the corona virus pandemic affected the implementation of your initiative?

## ACHIEVEMENTS

9. [IGs & CSOGs] What is the most significant change you have achieved through this project?

## FUTURE ENGAGEMENT

10. [IGs] How likely is it that you will engage in other similar initiatives once this problem is resolved? /[CSOGs] How likely is it that you will continue to engage on this problem which you addressed through this grant?

Not at all

x-----x-----x-----x-----x-----x

Very likely

## STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT & CONFIDENCE

11. [IGs & CSOGs] How would you rate the level of interest of the following groups in the territory which your initiative covers to engage directly in protests, street actions, or any other activities supported within this project? Mark your answer on a scale from 1 to 4. (1 = Not interested at all; 2 = Slightly interested; 3 = Moderately interested; 4 = Very interested; 88 = Not certain).

- Citizens in the territory directly affected by the problem
- Citizens outside the directly affected territory, but still in that city/municipality
- Owners of private companies and crafts
- Local public media and journalists
- Local private media and journalists
- Employees of public institutions
- Politicians and local councilors, members of local commissions
- Local academic community
- Police, investigators
- Prosecutors, judges
- Local non-governmental organizations and citizens' associations

12. [MGs] Who is the targeted audience for your articles on corruption? Multiple response possible.

- Citizens in the territory directly affected by the problem
- Citizens outside the directly affected territory, but still in that city/municipality
- Owners of private companies and crafts
- Local public media and journalists
- Local private media and journalists
- Employees of public institutions
- Politicians and local councilors, members of local commissions
- Local academic community
- Police, investigators
- Prosecutors, judges
- Local non-governmental organizations and citizens' associations

13. [All] How much influence does each of those groups have on resolving the specific problem of corruption which you are fighting against? (1 = No influence at all; 2 = Small influence; 3 = Moderate influence; 4 = Very large influence; 88 = Not certain; 99 = Not applicable)

- Citizens in the territory directly affected by the problem
- Citizens outside the directly affected territory, but still in that city/municipality
- Owners of private companies and crafts
- Local public media and journalists
- Local private media and journalists
- Employees of public institutions
- Politicians and local councilors, members of local commissions
- Local academic community
- Police, investigators
- Prosecutors, judges



- Local non-governmental organizations and citizens' associations

The following questions explore somewhat contradicting opinions, and you can mark your answer on a line depending on which opinion you are closer to.

14. [All] Which opinion are you closer to?

<p>(0) Citizens themselves cannot do to resolve a local corruption problem</p>	<p>(10) Citizens can contribute the most to resolving a local corruption problem</p>
<div style="border-top: 1px solid black; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-size: 0.9em;"> <span>0</span><span>1</span><span>2</span><span>3</span><span>4</span><span>5</span><span>6</span><span>7</span><span>8</span><span>9</span><span>10</span> </div>	

15. [All] Which opinion are you closer to?

<p>(0) Corruption would decrease if all associations were united and stood against corruption</p>	<p>(10) Even if all associations were united against corruption, that would not be enough to decrease corruption</p>
<div style="border-top: 1px solid black; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-size: 0.9em;"> <span>0</span><span>1</span><span>2</span><span>3</span><span>4</span><span>5</span><span>6</span><span>7</span><span>8</span><span>9</span><span>10</span> </div>	

16. [All] Which opinion are you closer to?

<p>(0) If all media reported truthfully about corruption, corrupt politicians would lose the election</p>	<p>(10) Even if many more media reported about corruption, corrupt politicians would still be in power</p>
<div style="border-top: 1px solid black; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-size: 0.9em;"> <span>0</span><span>1</span><span>2</span><span>3</span><span>4</span><span>5</span><span>6</span><span>7</span><span>8</span><span>9</span><span>10</span> </div>	

17. [IGs & CSOGs] Which stakeholders did you engage in planning your activities supported through this project? Multiple responses possible.

- Other non-governmental organizations and associations
- Local government institutions
- Government institutions at higher levels
- Local media
- Media covering a broader area
- Public companies
- Private companies
- Academic community
- Citizens
- Someone else (please specify)

18. [IGs & CSOGs] To what extent have the citizens, because of your initiative, started believing more that citizens themselves can contribute to fight against corruption if they take an active role?

Not at all

x-----x-----x-----x-----x-----x-----x

To a large extent

19. [IGs & CSOGs] How do you know that? Please state some examples.

20. [IGs] Can you generally estimate the maximum number of citizens who joint events organized within this initiative?

### REQUESTS FOR CHANGES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

21. [IGs & CSOGs] Have you, as part of this initiative, filed any requests for change of administrative decisions of any government institution? (1 = Yes; 0 = No)

22. [IGs & CSOGs] Please briefly describe what kind of request it was and who you sent it to?

23. [IGs & CSOGs] What happened to that request? [Accepted in full (3); Accepted partially (2); Rejected in full (1); Not certain, I have no feedback (88)]

### POLICY PROPOSALS

24. [IGs & CSOGs] Have you, as part of this initiative, filed any proposals for adoption or changes of a strategy, plan, law, bylaw (rulebook or a procedure) which relate to fight against corruption, or participated in creation of such policy solutions? [Yes (1); No (0)]

25. [IGs & CSOGs] Please list all proposals which you filed, or you participated in development of as part of this initiative

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.
- e.

26. [IGs & CSOGs] What happened to each of those proposals? [Accepted in full (4); Accepted partially (3); Mostly discarded (2); Discarded in full (1); Not certain, I have no feedback (88)]

- a. from your previous response \_\_\_\_\_
- b. from your previous response \_\_\_\_\_
- c. from your previous response \_\_\_\_\_
- d. from your previous response \_\_\_\_\_
- e. from your previous response \_\_\_\_\_

### FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUESTS

27. [MGs] Have you, as part of this project (IJP), filed any requests for access to information? [Yes (1); No (0)]

28. [MGs] Please specify who you filed those requests to.

29. [MGs] What happened with those requests? [No response (1); Discarded completely (2); Answered after legal deadline and incompletely (3); Answered within legal deadline but incompletely (4); Answered completely but after the legal deadline (6); Answered within legal deadline and completely (5); Not certain, no feedback yet (88); Other (please specify).

### REPORTING CORRUPTION

30. [All] Have you reported corruption to any of the following bodies as part of this initiative? [Yes (1); No (0)]

- Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of Fight Against Corruption
- Entity or cantonal teams against corruption
- Inspections
- [only IGs & MGs] Other administrative bodies
- Police
- Prosecutors
- Transparency International
- Web platform [www.prijavikorupciju.org](http://www.prijavikorupciju.org)
- Someone else (please specify)

31. [All] If you have reported corruption to any of those bodies, please mark the number of times you reported corruption to those bodies [Once (1); Twice (2); Three or more times (3)]

- Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of Fight Against Corruption
- Entity or cantonal teams against corruption
- Inspections
- [only IGs & MGs] Other administrative bodies
- Police
- Prosecutors
- Transparency International
- Web platform [www.prijavikorupciju.org](http://www.prijavikorupciju.org)
- Someone else (please specify)

32. [IGs & CSOGs] For each of those bodies you reported corruption to, please mark how satisfied you are with their response to your report? [Very satisfied (4); Somewhat satisfied (3); Somewhat dissatisfied (2); Very dissatisfied (1)]

- Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of Fight Against Corruption
- Entity or cantonal teams against corruption
- Inspections
- [only IGs & MGs] Other administrative bodies
- Police
- Prosecutors
- Transparency International
- Web platform [www.prijavikorupciju.org](http://www.prijavikorupciju.org)
- Someone else (please specify)

33. [All] Can you briefly describe the outcome of each of your reports for each of the bodies you reported corruption to?

## DEFAMATION

34. [MGs] Have you faced any defamation lawsuits during this project (IJP)? [Yes, for content produced within this project (3); Yes, but not for content produced within this project (2); No (1)]

35. [MGs] Have you faced any other types of lawsuits or legal proceedings because of your writing? [Yes, for content produced within this project (3); Yes, but not for content produced within this project (2); No (1)]

36. [MGs] Have you received legal aid from this project? [Yes (1); No (0)]

37. [MGs] How satisfied are you with legal aid which you received? [Completely dissatisfied (1); Dissatisfied (2); Neutral (3); Satisfied (4); Completely satisfied (5)]

38. [MGs] What was the outcome of that lawsuit? [Positive (2); Negative (1); Process is still ongoing (99); Something else (please specify)]

## **AWARENESS ABOUT ANTICORRUPTION ORGANIZATIONS**

39. [All] Below is a list of associations which are currently active in fight against corruption in BiH through different projects. Are you aware of their anticorruption activities? [Yes (1); No (0)]

- Restart Srpska, Banja Luka
- Union of Employers' Associations of Republika Srpska, Banja Luka
- Misli dobro/Mean Well, Banja Luka
- Put pravde/Road to Justice, Banja Luka
- Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Bijeljina
- Vermont, Brčko
- Demos, Brčko
- Center for Humane Politics, Dobo
- ToPeeR, Dobo
- Women's Interactive Rural Center (ŽIR), Istočno Sarajevo
- Center for Civic Cooperation (CGS), Livno
- Association of Professionals, Trainers, and Officers for Public Procurement in BiH (UPTIS), Mostar
- Ja BiH u EU, Sarajevo
- FBiH Employers' Association, Sarajevo
- BIRN BiH, Sarajevo
- Baby Steps, Sarajevo
- Union of Employees of the Fund for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities, Sarajevo
- Center for Development of Youth Activism (CROA), Sarajevo
- Forestry and Environmental Action, Sarajevo
- Aarhus centar, Sarajevo
- Consumer Protection Association DON, Prijedor
- Look of Nature /Cardboard Revolution, Tuzla
- Stop Mobbing, Trebinje
- Aktiv 33, Srebrenik
- Center for Advocacy of Citizens' Policy Interests (CPI), Sarajevo
- KAM, Zenica

## **COORDINATION WITH THE ACFC CSO GRANTEES**

40. [IGs & CSOGs] Have you coordinated your activities in the project with any of those associations? [Yes, with multiple associations (3); Yes, with one of those associations (2); No (1); Not certain (88)]

41. [MGs] Have you as part of the IJP written about any of the listed organizations? [No (1); Yes, one of those (2); Yes, multiple (please specify the number) (3); Not certain (88)]

42. [MGs] Have you communicated with any of those associations while preparing content related to corruption? [No (1); Yes, one of those (2); Yes, multiple (please specify the number) (3); Not certain (88)]

## **CONFIDENCE IN CSO GRANTEES**

43. [IGs & CSOGs] To what extent you agree with the following statement "These associations work in public interest primarily"? [Not at all (1); To small degree (2); Moderately (3); Completely (4)]

- Restart Srpska, Banja Luka
- Union of Employers' Associations of Republika Srpska, Banja Luka
- Misli dobro/Mean Well, Banja Luka
- Put pravde/Road to Justice, Banja Luka
- Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Bijeljina
- Vermont, Brčko
- Demos, Brčko
- Center for Humane Politics, Dobo
- ToPeeR, Dobo
- Women's Interactive Rural Center (ŽIR), Istočno Sarajevo
- Center for Civic Cooperation (CGS), Livno
- Association of Professionals, Trainers, and Officers for Public Procurement in BiH (UPTIS), Mostar
- Ja BiH u EU, Sarajevo
- FBiH Employers' Association, Sarajevo
- BIRN BiH, Sarajevo
- Baby Steps, Sarajevo

- Union of Employees of the Fund for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities, Sarajevo
- Center for Development of Youth Activism (CROA), Sarajevo
- Forestry and Environmental Action, Sarajevo
- Aarhus centar, Sarajevo
- Consumer Protection Association DON, Prijedor
- Look of Nature /Cardboard Revolution, Tuzla
- Stop Mobbing, Trebinje
- Aktiv 33, Srebrenik
- Center for Advocacy of Citizens' Policy Interests (CPI), Sarajevo
- KAM, Zenica

44. [IGs & CSOGs] How much do you believe that these associations can resolve the specific problems of misuse of public authority and resources? [Not at all (1); To small degree (2); Moderately (3); Completely (4)]

- Restart Srpska, Banja Luka
- Union of Employers' Associations of Republika Srpska, Banja Luka
- Misli dobro/Mean Well, Banja Luka
- Put pravde/Road to Justice, Banja Luka
- Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Bijeljina
- Vermont, Brčko
- Demos, Brčko
- Center for Humane Politics, Doboj
- ToPeeR, Doboj
- Women's Interactive Rural Center (ŽIR), Istočno Sarajevo
- Center for Civic Cooperation (CGS), Livno
- Association of Professionals, Trainers, and Officers for Public Procurement in BiH (UPTIS), Mostar
- Ja BiH u EU, Sarajevo
- FBiH Employers' Association, Sarajevo
- BIRN BiH, Sarajevo
- Baby Steps, Sarajevo
- Union of Employees of the Fund for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities, Sarajevo
- Center for Development of Youth Activism (CROA), Sarajevo
- Forestry and Environmental Action, Sarajevo
- Aarhus centar, Sarajevo
- Consumer Protection Association DON, Prijedor
- Look of Nature /Cardboard Revolution, Tuzla
- Stop Mobbing, Trebinje
- Aktiv 33, Srebrenik
- Center for Advocacy of Citizens' Policy Interests (CPI), Sarajevo
- KAM, Zenica

## AWARENESS ABOUT INFORMAL GROUPS

45. [All] Have you heard of the informal initiatives listed below? [Yes (1); No (0)]

- "Protiv kamenoloma Planina u naselju Karanovac", Banja Luka
- "Zaustavimo nelegalnu eksploataciju šljunka u Bijeljini", Bijeljina
- "Za transparentno finansiranje neprofitnih organizacija iz budžeta Brčko distrikta", Brčko
- "Za priznate diplome od akreditovanih visokoskolskih ustanova u Brčko distriktu BiH", Brčko
- "Za legalnu eksploataciju minerala iz korita rijeke Bosne", Doboj
- "Licencirane i akreditovane visokoškolske ustanove - validne i priznate diplome", Doboj
- "Uklonite Heksan iz Kotorskog", Doboj
- "Drvar bez nelegalnog otpada", Drvar
- "Sačuvajmo rijeke Foče", Foča
- "Spasimo Drinu", Goražde
- "Stop izgradnji mHE na Kasindolskoj rijeci", Istočno Sarajevo
- "Za Doljanku" Jablanica – Inicijativa protiv izgradnje MHE Zlate na rijeci Doljanki
- "Neretvica - Pusti me da tečem" Konjic – Inicijativa protiv izgradnje malih hidroelektrana u slivu rijeke Neretvice
- "Kreševski građanski pokret" Kreševo – Inicijativa za zaustavljanje nelegalnog rada kamenoloma i krečnjare u Kreševu
- "Za legalnu eksploataciju minerala u gornjem toku rijeke Bosne", Maglaj

- “Jer nas se tiče” Mostar - Inicijativa za zatvaranje ilegalne deponije Uborak
- “Stop izgradnji mHE Buna I i II”, Mostar
- “Stop nelegalnoj gradnji na Bijelom Brijegu”, Mostar
- “Ne na Buni i u mome Blagaju”, Mostar – Inicijativa protiv nelegalne gradnje na rijeci Buni
- “Građanska inicijativa Kutli”, Mostar – Inicijativa protiv rada kamenoloma u Mostaru
- “Hastahana park”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa protiv nelegalne gradnje objekata u Hastahana parku
- “Nelegalna gradnja u opštini Stari Grad”, Sarajevo
- “Inicijativa KCUS”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa za poboljšanje transfera pacijenata na liječenje u inostranstvu
- “Spas u zadnji čas – Spasimo Dobrinju”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa protiv izgradnje skladišta kerozina i benzinske pumpe u naselju Dobrinja
- “Farmeri” Šipovo – Inicijativa protiv korupcije u Agrocentru Šipovo
- “Stop nelegalnom odlaganju otpada na Krupačkim stijenama”, Trnovo
- “Inicijativa protiv odlagališta šljake i pepela iz Termoelektrane u MZ Šićki Brod”, Tuzla
- “Ođbranim rijeke Višegrada”, Višegrad
- “Hrabre žene Kruščice”, Vitez - Inicijativa protiv izgradnje mini hidroelektrana na rijeci Kruščici
- “Naše zgrade - naše pravo da znamo”, Vitez - Inicijativa protiv nezakonitog trošenja sredstava za održavanje zgrada u Vitezu
- “Čuvari zraka”, Zenica – Inicijativa protiv ilegalnog trošenja namjenskih sredstava zaštite okoliša FBiH u Zeničko-dobojskom kantonu
- “Pokret za preokret”, Zenica - Inicijativa protiv ilegalnih radnji u Gradskoj upravi grada Zenice
- “STOP nelegalnim šljunkarama na rijeci Drini”, Zvornik
- “Spriječimo nelegalnu eksploataciju šljunka na području Žepča I Zavidovića”, Žepče
- “Netransparentno trošenje sredstava iz budžeta za vodosnabdjevanje građana”, Tešanj

## COORDINATION WITH INFORMAL GROUPS

46. [IGs & CSOGs] Have you coordinated your activities in this project with any of those initiatives? [Yes, with multiple associations (3); Yes, with one of those associations (2); No (1); Not certain (88)]

47. [MGs] Have you as part of the IJP written about any of the listed informal groups? [No (1); Yes, one of those (2); Yes, multiple (please specify the number) (3); Not certain (88)]

48. [MGs] Have you communicated with any of those informal groups while preparing content related to corruption? [No (1); Yes, one of those (2); Yes, multiple (please specify the number) (3); Not certain (88)]

## CONFIDENCE IN THE INFORMAL GROUPS

49. [IGs & CSOGs] To what extent do you agree with the following statement “These groups work primarily in citizens, that is, in public interest”? [Not at all (1); To small degree (2); Moderately (3); Completely (4)]

- “Protiv kamenoloma Planina u naselju Karanovac”, Banja Luka
- “Zaustavimo nelegalnu eksploataciju šljunka u Bijeljini”, Bijeljina
- “Za transparentno finansiranje neprofitnih organizacija iz budžeta Brčko distrikta”, Brčko
- “Za priznate diplome od akreditovanih visokoskolskih ustanova u Brčko distriktu BiH”, Brčko
- “Za legalnu eksploataciju minerala iz korita rijeke Bosne”, Doboj
- “Licencirane I akreditovane visokoškolske ustanove - validne I priznate diplome”, Doboj
- “Uklonite Heksan iz Kotorskog”, Doboj
- “Drvar bez nelegalnog otpada”, Drvar
- “Sačuvajmo rijeke Foče”, Foča
- “Spasimo Drinu”, Goražde
- “Stop izgradnji mHE na Kasindolskoj rijeci”, Istočno Sarajevo
- “Za Doljanku” Jablanica – Inicijativa protiv izgradnje MHE Zlate na rijeci Doljanki
- “Neretvica - Pusti me da tečem” Konjic – Inicijativa protiv izgradnje malih hidroelektrana u slivu rijeke Neretvice
- “Kreševski građanski pokret” Kreševo – Inicijativa za zaustavljanje nelegalnog rada kamenoloma I krečnjare u Kreševu
- “Za legalnu eksploataciju minerala u gornjem toku rijeke Bosne”, Maglaj
- “Jer nas se tiče” Mostar - Inicijativa za zatvaranje ilegalne deponije Uborak
- “Stop izgradnji mHE Buna I i II”, Mostar
- “Stop nelegalnoj gradnji na Bijelom Brijegu”, Mostar
- “Ne na Buni i u mome Blagaju”, Mostar – Inicijativa protiv nelegalne gradnje na rijeci Buni
- “Građanska inicijativa Kutli”, Mostar – Inicijativa protiv rada kamenoloma u Mostaru
- “Hastahana park”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa protiv nelegalne gradnje objekata u Hastahana parku

- “Nelegalna gradnja u opštini Stari Grad”, Sarajevo
- “Inicijativa KCUS”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa za poboljšanje transfera pacijenata na liječenje u inostranstvu
- “Spas u zadnji čas – Spasimo Dobrinju”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa protiv izgradnje skladišta kerozina i benzinske pumpe u naselju Dobrinja
- “Farmeri” Šipovo – Inicijativa protiv korupcije u Agrocentru Šipovo
- “Stop nelegalnom odlaganju otpada na Krupačkim stijenama”, Trnovo
- “Inicijativa protiv odlagališta šljake i pepela iz Termoelektrane u MZ Šićki Brod”, Tuzla
- “Odbranim rijeke Višegrada”, Višegrad
- “Hrabre žene Kruščice”, Vitez - Inicijativa protiv izgradnje mini hidroelektrana na rijeci Kruščici
- “Naše zgrade - naše pravo da znamo”, Vitez - Inicijativa protiv nezakonitog trošenja sredstava za održavanje zgrada u Vitezu
- “Čuvari zraka”, Zenica – Inicijativa protiv ilegalnog trošenja namjenskih sredstava zaštite okoliša FBiH u Zeničko-dobojskom kantonu
- “Pokret za preokret”, Zenica - Inicijativa protiv ilegalnih radnji u Gradskoj upravi grada Zenice
- “STOP nelegalnim šljunkarama na rijeci Drini”, Zvornik
- “Spriječimo nelegalnu eksploataciju šljunka na području Žepča I Zavidovića”, Žepče
- “Netransparentno trošenje sredstava iz budžeta za vodosnabdjevanje građana”, Tešanj

50. [IGs & CSOGs] How likely is it that these informal initiatives can resolve the specific problems of misuse of public authority and resources? [Not at all (1); To small degree (2); Moderately (3); Completely (4)]

- “Protiv kamenoloma Planina u naselju Karanovac”, Banja Luka
- “Zaustavimo nelegalnu eksploataciju šljunka u Bijeljini”, Bijeljina
- “Za transparentno finansiranje neprofitnih organizacija iz budžeta Brčko distrikta”, Brčko
- “Za priznate diplome od akreditovanih visokoskolskih ustanova u Brčko distriktu BiH”, Brčko
- “Za legalnu eksploataciju minerala iz korita rijeke Bosne”, Dobo
- “Licencirane i akreditovane visokoškolske ustanove - validne i priznate diplome”, Dobo
- “Uklonite Heksan iz Kotorskog”, Dobo
- “Drvar bez nelegalnog otpada”, Drvar
- “Sačuvajmo rijeke Foče”, Foča
- “Spasimo Drinu”, Goražde
- “Stop izgradnji mHE na Kasindolskoj rijeci”, Istočno Sarajevo
- “Za Doljanku” Jablanica – Inicijativa protiv izgradnje MHE Zlate na rijeci Doljanki
- “Neretvica - Pusti me da tečem” Konjic – Inicijativa protiv izgradnje malih hidroelektrana u slivu rijeke Neretvice
- “Kreševski građanski pokret” Kreševo – Inicijativa za zaustavljanje nelegalnog rada kamenoloma i krečnjare u Kreševu
- “Za legalnu eksploataciju minerala u gornjem toku rijeke Bosne”, Maglaj
- “Jer nas se tiče” Mostar - Inicijativa za zatvaranje ilegalne deponije Uborak
- “Stop izgradnji mHE Buna I i II”, Mostar
- “Stop nelegalnoj gradnji na Bijelom Brijegu”, Mostar
- “Ne na Buni i u mome Blagaju”, Mostar – Inicijativa protiv nelegalne gradnje na rijeci Buni
- “Građanska inicijativa Kutli”, Mostar – Inicijativa protiv rada kamenoloma u Mostaru
- “Hastahana park”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa protiv nelegalne gradnje objekata u Hastahana parku
- “Nelegalna gradnja u opštini Stari Grad”, Sarajevo
- “Inicijativa KCUS”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa za poboljšanje transfera pacijenata na liječenje u inostranstvu
- “Spas u zadnji čas – Spasimo Dobrinju”, Sarajevo - Inicijativa protiv izgradnje skladišta kerozina i benzinske pumpe u naselju Dobrinja
- “Farmeri” Šipovo – Inicijativa protiv korupcije u Agrocentru Šipovo
- “Stop nelegalnom odlaganju otpada na Krupačkim stijenama”, Trnovo
- “Inicijativa protiv odlagališta šljake i pepela iz Termoelektrane u MZ Šićki Brod”, Tuzla
- “Odbranim rijeke Višegrada”, Višegrad
- “Hrabre žene Kruščice”, Vitez - Inicijativa protiv izgradnje mini hidroelektrana na rijeci Kruščici
- “Naše zgrade - naše pravo da znamo”, Vitez - Inicijativa protiv nezakonitog trošenja sredstava za održavanje zgrada u Vitezu
- “Čuvari zraka”, Zenica – Inicijativa protiv ilegalnog trošenja namjenskih sredstava zaštite okoliša FBiH u Zeničko-dobojskom kantonu
- “Pokret za preokret”, Zenica - Inicijativa protiv ilegalnih radnji u Gradskoj upravi grada Zenice
- “STOP nelegalnim šljunkarama na rijeci Drini”, Zvornik
- “Spriječimo nelegalnu eksploataciju šljunka na području Žepča I Zavidovića”, Žepče
- “Netransparentno trošenje sredstava iz budžeta za vodosnabdjevanje građana”, Tešanj



## CONFIDENCE IN AND TRANSPARENCY OF LEADING ORGANIZATIONS

51. [All] Thinking about non-governmental organizations operating across BiH, to what extent do you agree with the following statement, for each of the listed organizations? "This organization works primarily in citizens' interest", that is, in public interest"? [Not at all (1); Somewhat disagree (2); Somewhat agree (3); Agree completely (4); Not certain (88); Not applicable/I am not aware of that organization (99)]

- Centers of Civil Initiatives (CCI)
- Transparency International (TI)
- Center for Promotion of Civil Society (CPCD)
- Oštra nula
- Center for Development of Media and Analyses (CRMA)

52. [IGs & MGs] How would you rate the transparency of those organizations? [High (3); Moderate (2); Low (1); Not applicable/I am not aware of that organization (99)]

- Centers of Civil Initiatives (CCI)
- Transparency International (TI)
- Center for Promotion of Civil Society (CPCD)
- Oštra nula
- Center for Development of Media and Analyses (CRMA)

53. [IGs & CSOGs] What is the likelihood that this organization can resolve specific problems of misuse of public authority and resources which they are fighting against?

	0-10%	11-20%	21-30%	31-40%	41-50%	51-60%	61-70%	71-80%	81-90%	91-100%	Not certain	Not applicable, not aware of that organization
Centers of Civil Initiatives (CCI)												
Transparency International (TI)												
Center for Promotion of Civil Society (CPCD)												
Oštra nula												
Center for Development of Media and Analyses (CRMA)												

## CIVIL SOCIETY CONTEXT

54. [IGs & CSOGs] Do you consider the following statements about civil society organizations in BiH true or false? [False (1); Partially true (2); True (3); Not certain (88)]

- Non-governmental organizations in BiH work primarily in citizens' interest, or that is, in public interest
- A part of the non-governmental organizations in BiH serve foreign interests
- Political parties establish associations to pull money from public budgets
- Non-governmental organizations mostly serve the interest of those who finance them
- Through a part of non-governmental organizations in BiH, some foreign governments are trying to make the BiH's road to EU more difficult
- Non-governmental organizations can push governments to work more in citizens' interest
- The corona pandemic has made the work of most non-governmental organizations in BiH more difficult
- Cooperation and coordination between different stakeholders in the field of anticorruption is satisfactory
- Change of policies in the area of anticorruption is almost impossible because of the lack of political will

- Citizens are more likely to report corruption to non-governmental organizations than to prosecutors or other institutions
- Judicial institutions are effective in processing corruption cases

#### **COOPERATION BETWEEN MEDIA GRANTEEES**

55. [MGs] Which of the following media have you been cooperating with in corruption-related content creation of information exchange within the IJP?

- Capital.ba
- Direkt-portal.com
- Micromreza.com
- Etrafika.net
- MojaHercegovina.com
- Fokus.ba
- Skener.info
- Gerila.info
- Hercegovina.info
- Tacno.net
- Impulsportal.net
- Inforadar.ba
- Zurnal.info
- Infoveza.com
- Interview.ba
- Spin-portal.info
- None of the above

#### **AWARENESS ABOUT MEDIA GRANTEEES**

56. [All] Have you been reading any content related to corruption in any of the following web portals or platforms recently? [Yes (1); No (0)]

- Capital.ba
- Direkt-portal.com
- Micromreza.com
- Etrafika.net
- MojaHercegovina.com
- Fokus.ba
- Skener.info
- Gerila.info
- Hercegovina.info
- Tacno.net
- Impulsportal.net
- Inforadar.ba
- Zurnal.info
- Infoveza.com
- Interview.ba
- Spin-portal.info
- Antikorupcija.info
- Transparentno.ba
- Pratimotendere.ba
- (Only CSOs) Prijavikorupciju.org

#### **CONFIDENCE IN MEDIA GRANTEEES**

57. [All] Thinking about each of those web portals or platforms you have been reading something at, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "That web portal or platform contributes to fight against corruption"? [Do not agree at all (1); Somewhat disagree (2); Somewhat agree (3); Completely agree (4); Not certain (88)]

- Capital.ba
- Direkt-portal.com
- Micromreza.com
- Etrafika.net
- MojaHercegovina.com
- Fokus.ba
- Skener.info
- Gerila.info
- Hercegovina.info
- Tacno.net
- Impulsportal.net
- Inforadar.ba
- Zurnal.info
- Infoveza.com
- Interview.ba
- Spin-portal.info
- Antikorupcija.info
- Transparentno.ba
- Pratimotendere.ba
- (Only CSOs) Prijavikorupciju.org

58. [All] How much do you agree with the following statement: “I believe that the information which this web portal or platform publishes is trustworthy”? [Do not agree at all (1); Somewhat disagree (2); Somewhat agree (3); Completely agree (4); Not certain (88)]

- Capital.ba
- Direkt-portal.com
- Micromreza.com
- Etrafika.net
- MojaHercegovina.com
- Fokus.ba
- Skener.info
- Gerila.info
- Hercegovina.info
- Tacno.net
- Impulsportal.net
- Inforadar.ba
- Zurnal.info
- Infoveza.com
- Interview.ba
- Spin-portal.info
- Antikorupcija.info
- Transparentno.ba
- Pratimotendere.ba
- (Only CSOs) Prijavikorupciju.org

## MEDIA CONTEXT

59. [All] Do you believe that the following statements about investigative journalism and media in BiH are true or false? [False (1); Partially true (2); True (3); Not certain (88)]

- There are more investigative pieces about corruption now than two years ago
- Investigative media successfully counter disinformation spread by politically manipulated media
- Investigative media are trustworthy
- [MGs only] Investigative reporting about corruption can help citizens to understand that their own activism can change the situation
- [MGs only] Investigative reports can motivate citizens to engage in anticorruption activities such as protests, petitions, writing to authorities

- [MGs only] Investigative reports can motivate citizens to report corruption to non-governmental organizations
- [MGs only] Investigative reports can motivate citizens to report corruption to judicial institutions

## USEFULNESS OF NEW PLATFORMS

60. [CSOGs & MGs] Did you ever use data from the following web platforms? [Yes (1); No (0)]

- [CSOGs & MGs] Pratimotendere.ba
- [CSOGs only] Antikorupcija.info
- [CSOGs only] Transparentno.ba
- [CSOGs only] Prijavikorupciju.org

61. [CSOGs & MGs] How useful have those platforms been to you? [Not at all (1); Of little use (2); Moderately useful (3); Very useful (4); Not applicable (99)]

- [CSOGs & MGs] Pratimotendere.ba
- [CSOGs only] Antikorupcija.info
- [CSOGs only] Transparentno.ba
- [CSOGs only] Prijavikorupciju.org

62. [MGs] How would you improve Pratimotendere/ba?

## MEDIA FORMATS AND TOOLS

63. [MGs] Which media formats do you mostly use for investigative reports about corruption? Two responses at most.

- Text
- Video
- Audio
- Infographics
- Combined
- Something else (please specify)

64. [MGs] Which formats would you like to use more in the future for investigative content about corruption?

- Text
- Video
- Audio
- Infographics
- Combined
- Something else (please specify)

65. [MGs] Which social networks do you consider adequate for promoting investigative content about corruption?


- Facebook
- Instagram
- TikTok
- Snapchat
- LinkedIn
- Something else (please specify)

66. [MGs] Which social networks would you like to use more in the future for promotion of investigative content about corruption?


- Facebook
- Instagram
- TikTok
- Snapchat
- LinkedIn
- Something else (please specify)

## IJP SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT


67. [MGs] To what extent has the IJP helped you advance your investigative approach?



68. [MGs] To what extent has the IJP helped you advance formats of content presentation?



69. [MGs] To what extent has the IJP helped you advance content promotion?



## ABOUT THE LEADERS OF SUPPORTED INITIATIVES

[IGs & CSOGs] The following few questions pertain to your personal experiences fighting corruption in the public sector.

70. [IGs & CSOGs] Did you personally ever do any of the following, before this initiative? [Yes (1); No (2)]

- Report a corrupt public employee to a non-governmental organization fighting corruption
- Report a corrupt public employee to a relevant institution
- Petition against corruption
- Participate in an advocacy initiative against corruption
- Participate in a public discussion or hearing related to corruption
- Refuse to bribe a public employee or official



80. [IGs] The following several questions are about your status in employment and financial resources at your disposal. We kindly ask you to take into account also income which you are generating from employment and other income sources when responding to those questions. We guarantee you that the information you provide is strictly confidential and your name will not be used anywhere. We therefore kindly ask you for candor, because we are primarily interested to learn how people in BiH really live, and how they finance their needs.

81. [IGs] Which of the listed options best describes your employment status in the past month, taking into account the work that you generate income or profit from, regardless of whether it is formally registered or informal?

- Full time employed
- Part-time employed
- Intern
- Volunteer
- Unemployed with temporary jobs, actively looking for work
- Unemployed, actively looking for work
- Unemployed, not looking for work
- Unpaid everyday work in the house, at a farm, taking care of children or elderly, not looking for work
- Person with a disability whose disability is the main reason for unemployment
- Pupil, student, specialization
- A retired person
- Military employee

82. [IGs] What is the monthly income level available to your household?

- <400 BAM
- 401 – 550 BAM
- 551 – 1100 BAM
- 1100 – 2500 BAM
- >2500 BAM

83. [IGs] How many family members do currently live in your household?

84. [IGs] Talking about your personal income, would you say that they are above average, average, or below average compared to other persons your age? [Above average (3); Average (2); Below average (1)]

## **ABOUT ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS**

85. [IGs] Constitutional unit which your initiative mostly refers to? [RS (1); FBiH (2); BD BiH (3)]

86. [CSOGs and MGs] Constitutional unit which the organization/media outlet is in [RS (1); FBiH (2); BD BiH (3)]

87. [MGs] What year was your media outlet established?

88. [MGs] What percentage of your budget is spent for marketing activities?

89. [MGs] Were you, as a media organization, a member of the ACCOUNT network?

90. [MGs] What should be improved in the IJP?



## ANNEX 7: CATI SURVEY

This telephone survey is administered to 1,600 BiH citizens in order to learn what they think about corruption and anticorruption activities. Participant in the survey is voluntary and anonymous, there is no risk for you in participating. Responses will be analysed in aggregate manner and presented as statistics. I will be asking you questions and reading response options, while in some cases I will ask you to answer in your own words. It is important that you respond honestly. Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1. Yes – DEMO I
2. No – END OF SURVEY

DEMO I. Which municipality do you live in?

1. Sarajevo
2. Bijeljina
3. Kreševo
4. Brčko

## AWARENESS ABOUT ACFC INITIATIVES ACTIVE IN SPECIFIC TERRITORY

For this survey, we can define corruption as misuse of public authority for private gains or gains of a limited number of persons. Corruption can involve direct bribe, such as money and gifts to inspectors or public employees, as well as donations to political parties or individuals in return for favoritism towards a particular company in granting of concessions and tenders for public works.

1. Which nongovernmental organizations, associations, or citizens' groups fighting such misuses of public authority and resources have you heard about?
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  - e. \_\_\_\_\_
  - f. \_\_\_\_\_
  - g. \_\_\_\_\_
  - h. \_\_\_\_\_
  - i. \_\_\_\_\_
  - j. \_\_\_\_\_
2. I have here a list of associations and initiatives active in your municipality/city. I will read out loud the names of those associations and groups, and you please tell me if you know about this information or not.
  1. Yes
  2. No
  3. (Refuses to answer)

[FOR EACH MUNICIPALITY, READ ONLY THE LIST OF INITIATIVES ACTIVE IN THAT MUNICIPALITY. NOTED: NGO means nongovernmental organization. ROTATE INITIATIVES.]

SARAJEVO:

- a. Kampanja mladih usmjerena na borbu protiv korupcije u obrazovanju, zdravstvu, javnim uslugama i upravljanju javnim finansijama – sproveo Udruženje “Ja BiH u EU”, Sarajevo
- b. Kampanja za unapređenje regulativa sa ciljem smanjenja prostora za korupciju od strane vlasti i smanjenja izlaganja privatnih firmi korupciji – sproveo Udruženje poslodavaca u Federaciji BiH, Sarajevo
- c. Kampanja zagovaranja da sve tužbe za korupciju budu javno dostupne – sproveo BIRN BiH, Sarajevo
- d. Kampanja da se smanji korupcija u porodiljskim odjelima u BiH i ohrabrivanja građana da prijave korupciju - Udruženje “Baby Steps”, Sarajevo
- e. Kampanja smanjenja zloupotrebe sredstava Fonda za rehabilitaciju i zapošljavanje osoba sa invaliditetom u FBiH – sproveo Udruženje Sindikat uposlenika Fonda, Sarajevo
- f. Kampanja jačanja aktivizma među studentima Univerziteta u Sarajevu i Istočnom Sarajevu sa ciljem da se otkrije korupcija na univerzitetima i da počinioци odgovaraju za korupciju - sproveo Centar za razvoj omladinskog aktivizma CROA, Sarajevo
- g. Kampanja za smanjenje korupcije i ilegalnu sječu šuma – sproveda Inicijativa za šumarstvo i okoliš FEA, Sarajevo
- h. Kampanja za smanjenje korupcije vezano za izgradnju mini hidrocentrala – sproveo Aarhus centar, Sarajevo
- i. Kampanja za sprečavanje zloupotreba u postavljanju cijena osnovnih lijekova u Agenciji za lijekove i medicinska sredstva BiH – sproveo Udruženje Misli dobro, Banja Luka
- j. Inicijativa grupe građana koji se bore protiv pretvaranja parka Hastahana parka u poslovni kompleks i garažu

- k. Inicijativa grupe građana koji se bore protiv nelegalne gradnje u Opštini Stari grad
- l. Inicijativa grupe građana da se unaprijedi izmještanje pacijenata na liječenje u inostranstvo
- m. Inicijativa grupe građana protiv izgradnje HIFA pumpe i kompleksa na Dobrinji u Aerodromskom naselju

#### BIJELJINA:

- a. Inicijativa grupe građana da se zaustavi nelegalna eksploatacija šljunka u Bijeljini
- b. Kampanja zagovaranja da sve tužbe za korupciju budu javno dostupne – sproveo BIRN BiH, Sarajevo
- c. Smanjenje korupcionih rizika u radu inspeksijskih organa u Republici Srpskoj – sproveo Udruženje poslodavaca Republike Srpske
- d. Kampanja da se smanji korupcija u porodiljskim odjelima u BiH i ohrabrivanja građana da prijave korupciju - Udruženje "Baby Steps", Sarajevo
- e. Kampanja protiv zloupotreba kod imenovanja direktora javnih preduzeća i ustanova u Republici Srpskoj – provodi Udruženje Restart Srpska, Banja Luka
- f. Kampanja zagovaranja za usvajanje posebnog zakona protiv zapošljavanja bez javnih konkursa u institucijama u Republici Srpskoj – sproveo Udruženje ReStart Srpska.
- g. Kampanja za sprečavanje zloupotreba u postavljanju cijena osnovnih lijekova u Agenciji za lijekove i medicinska sredstva BiH – sproveo Udruženje Misli dobro, Banja Luka
- h. Kampanja za uspostavljanje sistema žalbi na rad inspeksijskih organa u Republici Srpskoj, te praćenje rada inspekcija – sprovodi Udruženje DON, Prijedor
- i. Kampanja podizanja svijesti javnosti i zagovaranja za transparentniji rad Tužilaštava u Republici Srpskoj – sproveo Udruženje Put pravde, Banja Luka

#### KREŠEVO:

- a. Kampanja za smanjenje korupcije u zapošljavanju u javnim institucijama i preduzećima - sproveo Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, Bijeljina
- b. Inicijativa grupe građana Kreševa protiv ilegalne eksploatacije kamena i vapnenca
- c. Kampanja da se smanji korupcija u porodiljskim odjelima u BiH i ohrabrivanja građana da prijave korupciju - Udruženje "Baby Steps", Sarajevo
- d. Kampanja zagovaranja da sve tužbe za korupciju budu javno dostupne – sproveo BIRN BiH, Sarajevo
- e. Inicijativa za sprečavanje zloupotreba u postavljanju cijena osnovnih lijekova u Agenciji za lijekove i medicinska sredstva BiH – sproveo Udruženje Misli dobro, Banja Luka
- f. Kampanja za smanjenje korupcije vezano za izgradnju mini hidrocentrala - Aarhus centar, Sarajevo
- g. Kampanja za unapređenje regulativa sa ciljem smanjenja prostora za korupciju od strane vlasti i smanjenja izlaganja privatnih firmi korupciji – sproveo Udruženje poslodavaca u Federaciji BiH, Sarajevo
- h. Kampanja smanjenja zloupotrebe sredstava Fonda za rehabilitaciju i zapošljavanje osoba sa invaliditetom u FBiH – sproveo Udruženje Sindikat uposlenika Fonda, Sarajevo

#### BRČKO:

- a. Kampanja vezano za zloupotrebe u dodjeli poljoprivrednih poticaja - sproveo Omladinski centar Vermont, Brčko
- b. Kampanja organizacije "Demos" vezano za smanjenje korupcije u zapošljavanju kroz ugovore o povremenom i privremenom zapošljavanju u javnim institucijama i kompanijama u Brčkom
- c. Inicijativa građana koji se bore protiv korupcije u finansiranju neprofitnih organizacija iz budžeta Brčko Distrikta
- d. Inicijativa studenata i građana za priznavanje diploma akreditovanih visokoškolskih ustanova u Brčko Distriktu od strane poslodavaca i drugih univerziteta
- e. Kampanja da se smanji korupcija u porodiljskim odjelima u BiH i ohrabrivanja građana da prijave korupciju - Udruženje "Baby Steps", Sarajevo
- f. Inicijativa za sprečavanje zloupotreba u postavljanju cijena osnovnih lijekova u Agenciji za lijekove i medicinska sredstva BiH – sproveo Udruženje Misli dobro, Banja Luka
- g. Kampanja zagovaranja da sve tužbe za korupciju budu javno dostupne – sproveo BIRN BiH, Sarajevo
- h. Kampanja za smanjenje korupcije vezano za izgradnju mini hidrocentrala - Aarhus centar, Sarajevo

3. Have you personally participated in any street actions, protests, petitions, or other activities some of these groups/organizations organised, or some other organizations organized? [SINGLE CHOICE].
  1. Yes, some of those campaigns/initiatives
  2. Yes, other initiatives
  3. No
  4. (Not certain)
  5. (Refused to answer)

## AWARENESS ABOUT MEDIA, THEIR CREDIBILITY AND CONFIDENCE

4. Do you use the Internet?

1. Yes
2. No

(SKIP THIS BLOC IF THE PERSON RESPONDED NO TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION. ASK THIS BLOC IN ALL OTHER CASES.)

5. I will not read out the names of some web portals and platforms. Have you read any content on those websites recently?

1. Yes
  2. No
  3. (Refuses to answer)
- 
- a. Capital - capital.ba
  - b. Direkt - direkt-portal.com
  - c. eTRAFIKA - etrafika.net
  - d. Fokus - fokus.ba
  - e. Gerila - gerila.info
  - f. Hercegovina.info
  - g. Impuls - impulsportal.net
  - h. Inforadar - inforadar.ba
  - i. Infoveza – infoveza.com
  - j. Interview – interview.ba
  - k. Micromreža – micromreza.com
  - l. Moja Hercegovina – mojahercegovina.com
  - m. Skener – skener.info
  - n. Tačno.net
  - o. Žurnal – zurnal.info
  - p. transparentno.ba
  - q. antikorupcija.info
  - r. pratimotendere.ba

6. Related to those web platforms and web portals you visited, how much do you believe that the information those web portals publish is verified? Respond on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means not at all, and 7 means a lot. (99- Does not know/Refuses to answer).

## CSO AND MEDIA CREDIBILITY AND FOREIGN MALICIOUS INFLUENCE

7. Please say whether you believe that the following statements about nongovernmental organizations and media is true or not. I will read out the statements, and you can respond on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “not true at all” and 7 means “very true”. [ONE RESPONSE, ROTATE, 88-Does not know, 99-Refuses to answer.

- a. Citizens groups gathering around a problem to fight against corruption are working in citizens interest primarily, not the interests of other stakeholders.
- b. Some nongovernmental organizations and associations are under influence of foreign governments which are trying to make the EU path towards the EU more difficult.
- c. Most nongovernmental organizations in BiH are pressuring the authorities and fighting corruption in citizens' interest, not for their personal gain or in the interest of other stakeholders.
- d. Some media in BiH are influenced by foreign governments which are trying to make the BiH road to EU more difficult.
- e. Most investigative media are contributing to fight against corruption.
- f. All political parties are corrupt and there is no one to vote for in election.

## CONFIDENCE IN CAPACITY TO EFFECT CHANGE

8. What is the likelihood that nongovernmental organization can resolve specific problems caused by corruption? Please respond on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “not likely at all” and 7 means “very likely”. [SINGLE CHOICE; 99- Does not know/Refuses to answer.

9. How likely is it that citizens, if they get organized, can resolve specific problems caused by corruption? Please respond on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “not likely at all” and 7 means “very likely”. [SINGLE CHOICE; 99- Does not know/Refuses to answer.]

10. How likely is it that the investigative media can contribute to resolving specific problems caused by corruption? Please respond on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "not likely at all" and 7 means "very likely". [SINGLE CHOICE; 99-Does not know/Refuses to answer.]
11. How much do you agree or disagree with the statement that the following organizations work primarily in citizens' interest while fighting corruption? Please respond on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "disagree completely" and 7 means "very much agree". [SINGLE CHOICE; 97-Have not heard of that organization; 99-Does not know/Refuses to answer.]
- a. Centri civilnih inicijativa (CCI)
  - b. Transparency International
  - c. Centar za razvoj medija i analize / Magazin Zurnal
12. How likely is it that these specific nongovernmental organization can resolve specific problems caused by corruption? Please respond on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "not likely at all" and 7 means "very likely". [SINGLE CHOICE; 97 – Have not heard about that organization; 99-Does not know/Refuses to answer.]
- a. Centri civilnih inicijativa (CCI)
  - b. Transparency International
  - c. Centar za razvoj medija i analize / Magazin Zurnal
13. How likely is it that you may do any of the following in the next 12 months if a situation arises? [1-Yes, 2-No, 9-Do not know]
- a. Report a corrupt public employee to a non-governmental organization fighting corruption
  - b. Report a corrupt public employee to a relevant institution
  - c. Petition against corruption
  - d. Participate in an advocacy initiative against corruption
  - e. Participate in a public discussion or hearing related to corruption
  - f. Refuse to bribe a public employee of official
  - g. Participate in protest or other public gathering against corruption
  - h. Share corruption-related content on your social media profile
  - i. Inform media or journalists about a specific corruption problem
  - j. Vote for political options which are less corrupt, even if they are not my usual choice

## SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

14. Sex [Male; Female; (Refuses to answer – 8)]
15. Age \_\_\_\_\_
16. What is the highest level of education you completed?
- a. No formal education
  - b. Unfinished primary school
  - c. Primary school
  - d. Secondary school
  - e. Higher education, college
  - f. First degree, three-year or four-year university degree
  - g. Masters, PhD, or post-doc
  - h. (Refuses to answer)

The following several questions are about your status in employment and financial resources at your disposal. We kindly ask you to take into account also income which you are generating from employment and other income sources when responding to those questions. We guarantee you that the information you provide is strictly confidential and your name will not be used anywhere. We therefore kindly ask you for candor, because we are primarily interested to learn how people in BiH really live, and how they finance their needs.

17. Što od navedenoga najbolje opisuje Vaš status u zaposlenosti u proteklih mjesec dana, uzimajući u obzir bilo koji rad kojim ostvarujete prihod ili profit, bez obzira na to da li je formalno registriran?
- 1. Full time employed
  - 2. Part-time employed
  - 3. Intern
  - 4. Volunteer
  - 5. Unemployed with temporary jobs, actively looking for work
  - 6. Unemployed, actively looking for work
  - 7. Unemployed, not looking for work
  - 8. Unpaid everyday work in the house, at a farm, taking care of children or elderly, not looking for work

9. Person with a disability whose disability is the main reason for unemployment
10. Pupil, student, specialization
11. A retired person
12. Military employee
13. Refuses to answer

18. How many members live in your household at the moment? \_\_\_\_\_

19. Talking about your personal income, would you say that they are above average, average, or below average compared to other persons your age? [Above average (3); Average (2); Below average (1); (Refuses to answer - 88)?

## ANNEX 8: EVALUATION TEAM

MEASURE II has assembled a team comprised of regional and local technical and subject-matter experts and MEASURE II staff members. The team composition, key qualifications, and level of effort (LoE) are shown in Exhibit 7.

EXHIBIT 7. KEY TEAM MEMBERS AND THEIR QUALIFICATIONS		
POSITION	LoE (DAYS)	KEY QUALIFICATIONS
Salminka Vizin, MEASURE II staff member: project manager and technical expert/evaluation co-lead	50	Project management skills; expertise in evaluation methodologies and USAID's evaluation requirements; familiarity with the ACFC and IJP Activities; report writing skills.
Maja Barisic, local consultant, technical expert/evaluation co-lead	50	Project management skills; expertise in evaluation methodologies and USAID's evaluation requirements; report writing skills.
Zoran Jachev, regional consultant, anti-corruption expert/evaluation team member	28	Expert in anti-corruption policies and work with anti-corruption bodies; strengthening the CSOs' role to fight corruption; and cooperation between anti-corruption institutions and civil society.
Davor Marko, regional consultant, media expert/evaluation team member	18	Subject-matter expert for media, awareness raising, and investigative journalism.
Edis Brkic, MEASURE II Chief of Party (CoP), judiciary expert, evaluation team member	10	Subject-matter expert for corruption and judiciary's role in fighting corruption.
Sandina Bosnjak, MEASURE II staff member, evaluation team member	30	Experience in working with CSOs on issues such as government transparency, accountability, and state capture; data collection and qualitative data analysis skills; report writing skills.
Mirza Kulenovic, MEASURE II staff member, evaluation team member	20	Data collection coordination experience; quantitative and qualitative data collection experience, including surveys and note taking; quantitative and qualitative data analysis skills.
Amer Cekic, MEASURE II staff member, evaluation team member	20	Data collection coordination experience; quantitative and qualitative data collection experience, including surveys and note taking; quantitative and qualitative data analysis skills.

**I. Salminka Vizin, MEASURE's MEL Manager and Technical Expert, Evaluation Team Co-Lead.** Ms. Vizin has eleven years of experience in the field of social research, including project management, creation of data collection instruments, conducting interviews and focus groups, carrying out qualitative and quantitative analyses, and reporting. She is an experienced researcher on many different topics, including governance and politics, human rights and discrimination, inter-ethnic

relationships, education, justice and rule of law, European integration, and corruption. As member of MEASURE/MEASURE II team, Ms. Vizin has been involved in MEL Plan designs and MEL reporting for USAID activities and conducting surveys, assessments, and evaluations. She was a lead researcher on 2017-2020 rounds of the National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions in BiH, National Youth Survey in BiH (2018), Brief Basic Education Assessment Follow-on (2018), and Political Economy Assessment (2020). In addition, she participated in the impact evaluation of the USAID/BiH's PRO-Future Activity (2017), performance evaluations of the USAID/BiH's Justice Activity (2018), Marginalized Populations Support Activity (2019), Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes (2021), OTI/BHRI's Cluster Evaluation (2020), and PRO-Future II performance evaluation. She holds a Master of Arts in Psychology from the University of Sarajevo.

**2. Maja Barisic, Local Consultant/Technical Expert, Evaluation Team Co-Lead.** Maja Barišić brings to the evaluation team over 13 years of work experience, including seven in supporting local institutions, local communities, and civil society organizations through project design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluating projects for various donors including the OSCE/BiH and MEASURE/BiH. Notably, Ms. Barisic led and/or contributed the following evaluations and assessments, among others: Evaluation of the EU Scheme for Young Professionals in BiH (2021); Evaluation of a UN Women project against Gender Based Violence (2018); Evaluation of the Resonant Voices Initiative (2017-2018); Evaluation of the USAID Strengthening Independent Media Activity (2016); Gender Assessment of the Tourism Sector for USAID Turizam (2021); Gender analysis of election results for the FBiH Gender Centre (2021); Construction of the Online Mobilisation Score for the Resonant Voices Initiative in the EU (2019); Gender Analysis of the Media Sector for the Council of Europe project JUFREX II (2019/20); Assessment of Extremist Radicalization and Violence in Montenegro for CIJAUS (2019); and, Gender Analysis for USAID MEASURE-BiH (2016 and 2019). She also published independent policy research on public participation in energy decision-making in SEE (2009) and on corruption risk assessments and integrity plans in public institutions in BiH (ACIPS, 2010). She holds a university degree in Economics (University of J.J. Strossmayer, Osijek), a European Regional Master's Degree in Democracy and Human Rights in Southeast Europe (University of Sarajevo/University of Bologna, 2007) and an MA in Social Research Methods for the field of Social Policy (Durham University, UK, 2017). She is currently a PhD candidate at the Centre for Southeast European Studies of the University of Graz, focusing on post-Yugoslav diasporas' political activism on migration/refugees.

**3. Zoran Jačev, Regional Anti-corruption Expert, Evaluation Team Member.** Mr. Jačev has more than 30 years of work experience serving in senior positions in ministries of Interior, Education, Foreign Affairs and Defense, two non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the Founder and President of TI Macedonia, and a freelance consultant in the scope of anticorruption with assignments in the Balkans including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo and Albania. He is experienced in drafting recommendations and guidelines related to anti-corruption policies, strategies, and legislation (i.e., anti-corruption laws and by-laws), including strategies for monitoring implementation of anti-corruption instruments, tools, and measures. Mr. Jačev has first-hand and in-depth knowledge of the work of non-governmental organizations and public opinion in the area of rule of law and has supported the implementation of 40 international donor funded projects. He has served as Team Leader of three EU IPA funded anti-corruption projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina include "Supporting NGOs in the fight against corruption" (2011 – 2013), "Strengthening anti-corruption capacities and CSO networks in the area" (2014 – 2016), and "Support to implementing anti-corruption strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (2019 – 2021). Mr. Jačev has supported the preparation of the last two anti-corruption strategies of BiH (2015 – 2019 and 2020 – 2024) as well as for supported the preparation of new anti-corruption strategies at the cantonal level. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in law on security studies and is a Master of Arts candidate in the scope of management of social changes.

**4. Davor Marko, Regional Media Expert, Evaluation Team Member.** Mr. Marko is a media development expert, communication visionary, and solution-oriented manager. He currently works as the Western Balkans program manager for the Thomson Foundation. He is an experienced communication and media development expert, with two decades of professional engagement in managing international projects aimed at supporting media outlets in their efforts to become more sustainable. He has expertise in public media, strategic communications, social media and audience trends, community building, online fundraising, and innovative business models. He has extensive experience in the region of Southeast Europe (SEE), specifically in the Western Balkans region. Prior to this post, he worked as Media System Lead for IREX in Serbia, as well as with other donors and development organizations including the United Nations Development Programme, Open Society Foundation, and OSCE, among others. He has a strong academic background and holds a Doctor of Philosophy in communication and culture from the University of Belgrade, Serbia, and has been profiled as one of the leading solution-oriented researchers in the SEE region. He received an award for extraordinary research and analytical potentials from Open Society Foundation, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organizations, OSCE, and ZEIT Foundation Hamburg. He is the author of many local and regional media landscape assessments, research papers and publications. In his book entitled “Zar na Zapadu postoji drugi Bog?” (Does another God exist in the West?), he analyzes dominant stereotypes and prejudices on the Islam in the media of the Western Balkans. He is also co-editor of “State or Nation? Challenges for Political Transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (2011). As one of the leading media development experts, Mr. Marko provides diverse consulting services to different clients in the forms of assessment and monitoring and evaluation, covering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Croatia, and Ukraine.

**5. Edis Brkic, MEASURE II CoP and Anti-Corruption Expert, Evaluation Team Member.** Mr. Brkic has over 25 years of work experience and more than ten years of project management experience on USAID and other donor projects in BiH and the region. In his capacity as MEASURE II CoP, he supervises all MEASURE II’s performance monitoring tasks, evaluations, assessments, studies, surveys, and collaborating, learning, and adapting (CLA) activities. Within the democracy and governance portfolio, Mr. Brkic was the team lead for five waves of the Judicial Effectiveness Index of BiH (JEI-BiH) and the lead subject-matter expert for the development of the Anti-corruption Index of BiH (ACI-BiH). He co-led the performance evaluation of the USAID/BiH’s Justice Activity and the Brief Assessment of the BiH Judicial Sector, and he was a team member of the Whole-of-Project Evaluation of USAID/BiH Project 2.2. Moreover, Mr. Brkic was the team lead for the Local Governance Assessment (LGA). He also conducted assessments in the judicial sectors in Montenegro and Kosovo. He holds a Graduate Law Degree from the University of Mostar, Bar Exam, and a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree from the University of Delaware.

**6. Sandina Bosnjak, MEASURE II Senior Research Analyst, Evaluation Team Member.** Prior to her employment at MEASURE II, Ms. Bosnjak worked as a program manager in the civil society sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing on enhancing government transparency and accountability. Apart from having worked with several NGOs, her work experience also includes working with the United Nations Office for Project Services Applied Research Unit as a researcher/M&E consultant as well as with an European Commission-funded agency that specialized in reforming tax and customs administration in BiH and aligning its legislation and procedures with the European Union acquis. Ms. Bosnjak holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Sarajevo as well as an Master of Arts in Human Rights and Democracy from the University of Bologna. She joined MEASURE II at the beginning of 2020 and has since contributed to a number of its deliverables including the Brief Media Assessment Update for BiH, Youth Focus Group Research, two rounds of National Survey of Citizens’ Perception, Evaluation of the USAID’s Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes Activity (SPPG Activity) and



Evaluation of the USAID's the Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future II (PRO-Future II) Activity.

**7. Mirza Kulenovic, MEASURE II Senior Research Analyst, Evaluation Team Member.** Mr. Kulenovic is experienced in social research, including conducting literature reviews, developing data collection instruments, analyzing data, and reporting. He is an expert in using various statistical tools such as SPSS, STATA, Amos, and Smart PLS. He has more than eight years of experience in the real sector and education and has authored or co-authored 12 research papers published in different scientific databases, including the Web of Science and Scopus. He was a guest lecturer for several European higher educational institutions in Croatia, Slovakia, and Czech Republic. He has worked on numerous international projects, mostly conducted through ERASMUS+, where he implemented more than 15 projects in the last four years. Mr. Kulenovic has been a part of the MEASURE BiH assessment team for the USAID/BiH Diaspora Assessment Activity and Local Governance Assessment. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy in Management/Business from the School of Economics and Business Sarajevo.

**8. Amer Cekic, MEASURE II Analyst, Evaluation Team Member.** Mr. Čekić has five years of experience in the NGO sector, as an NGO Representative to United Nations with the American-based NGO Project 1948, promoting and supporting human rights, and promoting greater local and international awareness about the democratic setbacks in BiH. He joined the MEASURE BiH team in February 2020. He was part of the evaluation team for three evaluations of USAID/BiH's activities including the Financial Reform Agenda Activity (FINRA), Supporting Political Pluralism and Good Governance Processes Activity (SPPG), and PRO Future (II) Trust, Understanding and Responsibility for the Future Activity. He also contributed to the 2019 and 2020 Judicial Effectiveness Index and the 2019 and 2020 National Survey of Citizens' Perceptions. He holds a Master of Arts in Integration and Governance from the University of Salzburg, specializing in Economics of Conflict at Sciences Po in Paris.

Additional support for the evaluation team will include:

- Home Office (HO) and Field Office (FO) support in reviewing the evaluation deliverables, conducting general oversight of the evaluation process, and providing assistance in defining the evaluation recommendations;
- HO CLA experts who will contribute to the application of CLA principles throughout the evaluation process;
- Transcribers experienced in transcribing audio recordings from KIIs and FGs; and
- Office Manager who will provide logistical support to contracting, payments, and field work.

## ANNEX 9. KEY RESULTS OF SURVEYS WITH DIRECT BENEFICIARIES

**Exhibit 4. The most and the least known and trustworthy direct beneficiaries**

CATEGORY	CSO SURVEY	INFORMAL GROUPS SURVEY	MEDIA POOL SURVEY
Top 5 CSO grantees most known for their AC activities	1. Baby Steps, Sarajevo 2. BIRN BiH, Sarajevo 3. Restart Srpska, Banja Luka 4. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (HCHR), Bijeljina 5. Stop mobbing, Trebinje	1. Aarhus Center, Sarajevo 2. HCHR, Bijeljina 3. DON Prijedor, Prijedor 4. Restart Srpska, Banja Luka 5. ToPeer, Doboj	1. Restart Srpska, Banja Luka 2. BIRN BiH, Sarajevo 3. HCHR, Bijeljina 4. "Ja BiH u EU", Sarajevo 5. FBiH Employers' Association (EA), Sarajevo
Bottom 5 CSOs	22. RS Union of Employers' Associations, Banja Luka 23. Put Pravde, Banja Luka 24. Center for Humane Politics, Doboj 25. Center for Civic Cooperation, Livno 26. Aktiv 33, Srebrenik	22. Baby Steps, Sarajevo 23. Izgled prirode, Tuzla 24. Aktiv 33, Srebrenik 25. CPI, Sarajevo 26. KAM, Zenica	22. KAM, Zenica 23. Demos, Brčko 24. Association of Public Procurement Professionals (UPTIS), Mostar 25. Forestry and Environmental Action (FEA), Sarajevo 26. Izgled prirode, Tuzla
Top 5 most known informal groups	1. Uborak Landfill, Mostar 2. Hastahana park, Sarajevo 3. Neretvica HPPs, Konjic 4. "Spasimo Drinu", Goražde 5. For Doljanka (HPPs) Jablanica	1. Kruščica women (HPPs), Vitez 2. Kreševo civic movement (quarry) 3. Gravel exploitation in Bijeljina 4. Neretvica HPP, Konjic 5. HPPs in Buna, Mostar	1. Kruščica women against HPPs, Vitez 2. For Doljanka (HPPs), Jablanica 3. Uborak Landfill, Mostar 4. HPPs in Buna, Mostar 5. Neretvica HPPs, Konjic
Bottom 5 informal groups	31. Building maintenance, Vitez 32. Water fee spending, Tešanj 33. Farming support abuse, Šipovo 34. Krupačke stijene - waste, Trnovo 35. Movement for change, Zenica	31. Building maintenance, Vitez 32. Movement for change, Zenica 33. KCUS – transfer of patients abroad, Sarajevo 34. Farming support abuse, Šipovo 35. Waste in Šićki Brod, Tuzla	28. CSO financing, Brčko 29. Degree recognition, Doboj 30. Hexane in Kotorsko, Doboj 31. Gravel exploitation, Maglaj 32. Waste in Šićki Brod, Tuzla 33. Building maintenance, Vitez 34. Movement for change, Zenica 35. Water fees spending, Tešanj
Top 3 most read media outlets	1. Zurnal.info 2. Fokus.ba 3. Capital.ba	1. Fokus.ba 2. Zurnal.info 3. Capital.ba	1. Capital.ba 2. Fokus.ba 3. Zurnal.info
Bottom 3 (least read) media outlets	13. Skener.info 14. Impulsportal.net 15. Spin-portal.info	13. Etrafika.net 14. Infoveza.com 15. Spin-portal.info	13. Interview.ba 14. Skener.info 15. Micromreza.com
Bottom 5 IJP media outlets by trustworthiness of information	11-13. E-trafika, Fokus.ba, Tacno.net 14-15. Mikromreza.com, Skener.info	11-12. Capital.ba, Tacno-net 13-14. Direkt-portal, Interview.ba 15. Inforadar.ba	12-13. MojaHercegovina.com, Inforadar.ba, 14. Spin-portal.info 15. Skener.info

**Exhibit 5. How likely to achieve their goals regarding specific problems (Somewhat + Mostly**

INDICATOR	CSO SURVEY	INFORMAL GROUPS SURVEY	MEDIA POOL SURVEY
For informal groups	90 %	70 %	
For CSO grantees	81 %	65 %	

### Exhibit 6. Self-assessed contribution to citizens' confidence in activism


INDICATOR	CSO SURVEY	INFORMAL GROUPS SURVEY	MEDIA POOL SURVEY
Citizens started believing more in anticorruption activism because of your initiative (values 5, 6, and 7 = To large degree)		8 out of 16 (50 %)	

### Exhibit 7. Beneficiaries' confidence in influence of activism of own group and other groups


#### Influence of citizens (perfect confidence at "10")



#### Influence of CSOs (perfect confidence at "0")



#### Influence of media (perfect confidence at "0")




### Exhibit 8. How interested the following groups were in participating in your initiative (Somewhat + Mostly)

CATEGORY	CSO SURVEY (N=16)	INFORMAL GROUPS SURVEY (N=16)
Citizens in the directly affected area	14	13
Citizens outside the directly affected area but within that city /municipality	9	8
Business owners, crafts	6	6
Local public media and their journalists	13	12
Local private media and their journalists	13	12
Local public employees	9	8
Politicians, councilors, committee members	5	5
Local academic community	6	5
Police, investigators	8	5
Prosecutors, judges	6	3
Local CSOs	13	11

### Exhibit 9. Coordination within and between groups of beneficiaries

INDICATOR	CSO SURVEY	INFORMAL GROUPS SURVEY	MEDIA POOL SURVEY
With informal groups	90 %	70 %	
With CSO grantees	81 %	65 %	

### Exhibit 10. The IJP's support to media grantees



### Exhibit 11. Beneficiaries' dissatisfaction with institutional and judicial response to filed reports

INDICATOR	CSO SURVEY	INFORMAL GROUPS SURVEY	MEDIA POOL SURVEY	ALL
Agency for Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of Fight Against Corruption	0 out of 1 who reported	0 out of 1	0 out of 1	0 out of 3 (0%)
Entity and/or cantonal anticorruption teams	1 out of 2 who reported	1 out of 3	0 out of 0	2 out of 5 (40%)
Inspections	2 out of 3 who reported	4 out of 7	1 out of 3	7 out of 13 (54%)
Other administrative body	N/a	2 out of 5	1 out of 1	3 out of 6 (50%)
Police	0 out of 1 who reported	2 out of 6	0 out of 1	2 out of 7 (29%)
Prosecutors	4 out of 5 who reported	6 out of 9	1 out of 2	11 out of 16 (69%)
Transparency International	0 out of 2 who reported	0 out of 0	0 out of 2	0 out of 4 (0%)
Web platform <a href="http://www.prijavikorupciju.org">www.prijavikorupciju.org</a>	0 out of 2 who reported	0 out of 1	0 out of 0	0 out of 3 (0%)

## ANNEX 10. KEY RESULTS OF CATI

**Exhibit 12. The most known initiatives in four CATI locations**

SARAJEVO	BIJELJINA	BD BiH	KREŠEVO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 72 %, initiative against construction in Hastahana Park</li> <li>- 50 %, the Dobrinja initiative against Hifa kerosine facility</li> <li>- 49 %, the Aarhus Center against small Hydropower Plants (HPPs)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 41 %, informal initiative against illegal extraction of gravel from the Drina River,</li> <li>- 29 %, Restart Srpska for transparency in public employments</li> <li>- 22 %, CSO Misli Dobro, Banja Luka, for real prices of medicines</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 63 %, CSO Vermont for more transparency in agricultural subsidies</li> <li>- 49 %, CSO Demos for transparency in public employment</li> <li>- 33 percent, informal initiative for transparency in CSO funding</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 64 %, Kreševo civic movement against quarries</li> <li>- 21 %, the Aarhus Center initiative against small HPPs</li> <li>- 16 %, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) initiative for transparency in corruption processing</li> </ul>

**Exhibit 13. Percentage agreeing that IPs work primarily in citizens' interest**

	COUNT	PERCENTAGE	SARAJEVO	BIJELJINA	KREŠEVO	BRČKO
CCI	425	26.6%	40%	14.3%	25.3%	26.8%
TI	415	25.9%	40.5%	14.8%	23.5%	25.0%
CRMA/Žurnal	117	21.9%	31%	13.3%	20.8	22.8%

**Exhibit 14. Percentage agreeing that IPs can resolve problems corruption caused**

	COUNT	PERCENTAGE	SARAJEVO	BIJELJINA	KREŠEVO	BRČKO
CCI	332	20.8%	29%	11.8%	18.5%	23.8%
TI	337	21.1%	31%	13.5%	16.5%	23.3%
CRMA/Žurnal	288	18%	24.3	11.3%	15.8%	20.8%

**Exhibit 15. Respondents who personally participated in activities the initiatives organized**

COUNT	PERCENTAGE	SARAJEVO	BIJELJINA	KREŠEVO	BRČKO
73	4.6%	9.3%	1.5%	3.8%	3.8%

**Exhibit 16. Read any content recently on any of the following websites? (ranked by percentage)**

NEWS OUTLET	NUMBER WHO READ	PERCENTAGE WHO READ (UNWEIGHTED)	PERCENTAGE WITHIN			
			SARAJEVO	BIJELJINA	KREŠEVO	BRČKO
Žurnal.info	488	41%	48%	34%	40%	41%
Fokus.ba	472	40%	40%	29%	46%	42%
Tačno.net	253	21%	20%	16%	26%	22%
Capital.ba	241	20%	21%	21%	19%	20%
Hercegovina.info	228	19%	15%	17%	28%	16%
Direkt-portal.com	217	18%	15%	18%	23%	17%

NEWS OUTLET	NUMBER WHO READ	PERCENTAGE WHO READ (UNWEIGHTED)	PERCENTAGE WITHIN			
Etrafika.net	209	18%	13%	17%	22%	18%
Transparentno.ba	208	18%	22%	19%	13%	16%
Gerila.info	179	15%	14%	15%	19%	12%
Inforadar.ba	179	15%	17%	16%	14%	12%
Skener.info	176	15%	13%	16%	17%	13%
Impulsportal.net	162	14%	14%	15%	15%	10%
Mojahercegovina.com	155	13%	11%	14%	18%	8%
Antikorupcija.info	143	12%	12%	13%	11%	12%
Infoveza.com	119	10%	8%	15%	10%	7%
Pratimotendere.ba	113	10%	11%	12%	8%	8%
Micromreza.com	105	9%	7%	12%	9%	8%
Interview.ba	102	9%	6%	12%	10%	7%

**Exhibit 17. Percentage of respondents likely to take anti-corruption action in the future**

	LIKELY TO TAKE THAT ACTION #	LIKELY TO TAKE THAT ACTION %	SARAJEVO %	BIJEJINA %	KREŠEVO %	BRČKO %
a. Report a public official for corruption to a CSO fighting corruption	758	47.4%	57.8%	39.0%	47.8%	45.0%
b. Report a public official for corruption to a competent institution	801	50.1%	63.8%	42.0%	49.0%	45.5%
c. Sign a petition against corruption	1195	<b>74.7%</b>	87.5%	69.5%	69.8%	72.0%
d. Participate in an advocacy initiative against corruption	829	51.8%	67.8%	38.5%	49.5%	51.5%
e. Participate in a public hearing, or a meeting related to corruption	796	49.8%	66.3%	37.0%	45.5%	50.3%
f. Refuse to give bribe to a civil servant or a public official	1244	<b>77.8%</b>	86.5%	74.8%	69.8%	80.0%
g. Participate in protests or other public gatherings related to corruption	926	57.9%	72.3%	46.0%	59.5%	53.8%
h. Share content related to corruption on my social media profile	603	37.7%	47.8%	28.3%	36.8%	38.0%
i. Inform the media or journalists about a problem of corruption	653	40.8%	55.5%	32.0%	36.8%	39.0%
j. Vote for a political party which is less corrupt, even if different from my usual voting preference	1036	<b>64.8%</b>	78.8%	57.3%	60.0%	63.0%

## ANNEX 11. CONTENT SAMPLED FOR MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS

1. ŽURNAL SA POVRATNICIMA U VLASENICU: Dok povratnici sanjaju o toploj sobi, odbornici SDA dobijaju donacije; FY 2020; 01.08.2020; [https://zurnal.info/novost/23286/dok-povratnici-sanjaju-o-toploj-sobi-odbornici-sda-dobijaju-donacije?fbclid=IwAR16GaJaDG3V6Ex3Fv5j2pvacXLrmznjC3ztgu-\\_M\\_6ElsXV7kz-EUhbFRQ](https://zurnal.info/novost/23286/dok-povratnici-sanjaju-o-toploj-sobi-odbornici-sda-dobijaju-donacije?fbclid=IwAR16GaJaDG3V6Ex3Fv5j2pvacXLrmznjC3ztgu-_M_6ElsXV7kz-EUhbFRQ)
2. ZBOG POSLA VRIJEDNOG 19 HILJADA: Julardžija u odbrani direktora Fonda za profesionalnu rehabilitaciju i zapošljavanje osoba sa invaliditetom; FY 2021; 20.07.2021; <https://zurnal.info/novost/24169/julardzija-u-odbrani-direktora-fonda-za-profesionalnu-rehabilitaciju-i-zaposljavanje-osoba-sa-invaliditetom?>
3. PROŠIRENJE PORODIČNE MANUFAKTURE: Ministrica Turković, nakon sina, angažovala i njegovog badžu!? FY 2020; 03.04.2020; <https://zurnal.info/novost/22920/ministrica-turkovic-nakon-sina-angazovala-i-njegovog-badzu?fbclid=IwAR1k-A0OGIGIPHN02ucsa5YRQ5Ald4ddBEO9LgwEpIcJlburygylupQPkIE>
4. HONORAR KAO JOŠ JEDNA PLAĆA: Savjetnica ministra za dvije godine u komisijama zaradila 43.000 KM; FY 2021; 09.08.2021; <https://zurnal.info/novost/24220/savjetnica-ministra-za-dvije-godine-u-komisijama-zaradila-43.000-km-?>
5. KO SU ČLANOVI NOVOG KRIZNOG ŠTABA: Kako su SDA i HDZ BiH formirali prvu liniju odbrane od virusa; FY 2020; 30.03.2020.; [https://zurnal.info/novost/22895/kako-su-sda-i-hdz-bih-formirali-prvu-liniju-odbrane-od-virusa?fbclid=IwAR3DpVnPZz2Cxf\\_ae8qlzSI50r-xbsk6QMO9\\_ap6GdFEMvLJ5q\\_CtZMZYoe](https://zurnal.info/novost/22895/kako-su-sda-i-hdz-bih-formirali-prvu-liniju-odbrane-od-virusa?fbclid=IwAR3DpVnPZz2Cxf_ae8qlzSI50r-xbsk6QMO9_ap6GdFEMvLJ5q_CtZMZYoe)
6. Vitinka do ekstra profita putem transfernih cijena; FY 2020; 12.05.2020. <http://www.gerila.info/istrazivanja/vitinka-do-ekstra-profita-putem-transfernih-cijena/>
7. Unosni poslovi za Dodikovog miljenika: Mladi odbornik iz Laktaša radi na izgradnji mosta na Savi; FY 2020; 25.03.2020; <https://mojahercegovina.com/unosni-poslovi-za-dodikovog-miljenika-mladi-odbornik-iz-laktasa-radi-na-izgradnji-mosta-na-savi/>
8. UDT OKONČAO ISTRAGU: Podignuta disciplinska tužba protiv Jadranka Grčevića, predsjednika Osnovnog suda Brčko distrikta; FY 2022; 31.12.2021; [https://zurnal.info/clanak/podignuta-disciplinska-tuzba-protiv-jadranka-grcevica-predsjednika-osnovnog-suda-brcko-distrikta/24605?fbclid=IwAR1ZmiIKcsDF7CNcvsASZZRjjMxvJEopvVrOLor7ti5RklAHVSEiyqy\\_lyY](https://zurnal.info/clanak/podignuta-disciplinska-tuzba-protiv-jadranka-grcevica-predsjednika-osnovnog-suda-brcko-distrikta/24605?fbclid=IwAR1ZmiIKcsDF7CNcvsASZZRjjMxvJEopvVrOLor7ti5RklAHVSEiyqy_lyY)
9. KANCELARIJA IRB RS: Porodični biznis Dražena Vrhovca na račun budžeta Republike Srpske; FY 2021; 14.05.2021; <https://zurnal.info/novost/23997/porodicni-biznis-drazena-vrhovca-na-racun-budzeta-republike-srpske?>
10. Ljudi za sve: Odbornik SNSD-a na dvije javne direktorske funkcije, porodično u unosnim poslovima; FY 2021; 24.02.2021; <https://www.direkt-portal.com/ljudi-za-sve-odbornik-snsd-a-na-dvije-javne-direktorske-funkcije-porodicno-u-unosnim-poslovima/>
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**MONITORING AND EVALUATION  
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